Skip to main content
Log in

The impact of cross-listing in the United States on the precision of public and private information

  • Article
  • Published:
Journal of International Business Studies Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

Our study explores the source of improvement in the information environment from cross-listing shares on US stock exchanges. Are the improvements from cross-listing in the United States achieved more through public or private information channels? While we find evidence that US cross-listing is significantly associated with improvements in both public and private information precision, the association is stronger between cross-listing and improvements in private information precision. This suggests that the improvement in the information environment for cross-listed firms is largely due to analysts expending more effort on firm-specific information discovery as opposed to broader improvements in overall public disclosure. This research should influence international business scholars that improvements in the information environment do not occur solely through public information channels. They also occur through investors’ private information search activities.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Similar content being viewed by others

Notes

  1. Beginning in 2007, the SEC makes an exception to the requirement to reconcile financial information with US GAAP under form 20-F for firms already reporting under International Financial Reporting Standards.

  2. Bailey et al. (2006) and Fernandes and Ferreira (2008) are two exceptions.

  3. However, we point out that the number of US listings, which increased gradually until the late 1990s, have experienced a notable decline after the turn of the century. For instance, as of the end of 2002, the number of internationally cross-listed stocks had retreated to 2300 from its 1997 high of 4700 (Karolyi, 2006).

  4. Raising capital by way of a public issue (i.e., Level III ADRs) requires additional disclosure of an SEC F-1 filing (prospectus) for a public offering and an F-2 or F-3 filing for subsequent offerings (Bailey et al., 2006). In contrast, firms that do not list on an organized stock exchange (i.e., Level I ADRs and Rule 144a) are subject to less stringent supervision by the SEC.

  5. We include Rule 144a sample firms with Level I ADRs as cross-listed non-exchange firms as both types of firms are not subject to US GAAP reporting requirements.

  6. For instance, theory suggests that firms can demonstrate over time, that through good internal behavior, they deserve a reputational discount in the market for external capital (Diamond, 1991).

  7. In fact, as of 2007, the SEC no longer requires exchange-listing foreign registrants that use International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) to file US GAAP reconciliations. Given that IFRS are used in over 110 countries around the world, the new requirement eliminates the reconciliation requirement for the majority of foreign registrants.

  8. Prior literature suggests the external audit adds credibility to firm-provided financial information by providing a third-party assessment on the quality of information (Palmrose, 1988; Simunic, 1980).

  9. Alternatively, we measure the level of private information search activity by the precision of private information relative to the precision of public information incorporated into analysts’ earnings forecasts. Based on BKLS (1998), this variable is defined as D/[SE−D/N]. Our main results are not sensitive to this alternative measurement of the private information search level.

  10. Most previous studies on cross-listing have also used the WORLDSCOPE database including Lang et al. (2003), Doidge et al. (2004), and Fernandes and Ferreira (2008).

  11. The mean precision of public information for exchange-listed firms (rh=5.951) exceeds the combined precision of public information for non-cross-listed firms and non-exchange-listed-cross-listed firms (rh=5.455 and 5.773) with a t-statistic of 6.57 (p<0.001).

  12. To test for the exogeneity of our instruments, we regress the residuals from the second stage overall uncertainty model on the exclusionary variables, that is, instruments. Untabulated results show that with the exception of OWNCONC, the other three instruments, namely GROWTH, ACCTSTD, and LEGORG, are insignificant, suggesting they are reasonable instruments.

  13. A possible explanation for this discrepancy is the difference in sample composition, which is due to different sample restrictions. For example, Fernandes and Ferreira (2008) drop firms with total assets under $100 million from the sample while we do not. Since these two variables are country-level variables, the results can be sensitive to the countries represented in the sample.

  14. We use this propensity matching criterion, rather than for example caliper distance matching, in order to maximize the sample size. Using the latter approach, a caliper distance of 0.03 results in a smaller sample size (6340 firm-year observations as opposed to 6456), but yields similar results.

  15. Our study compares foreign firms cross-listing in the United States with foreign firms not cross-listed in the United States. An interesting avenue for future research would be to compare the improvements in the analysts’ information environment between firms cross-listing in the United States and domestic US firms.

References

  • Agarwal, P., & O’Hara, M. 2007. Information risk and capital structure. Working Paper, Cornell University, Ithaca, NY.

  • Amir, E., Harris, T. S., & Venuti, E. K. 1993. A comparison of the value-relevance of US versus non-US GAAP accounting measures using Form 20-F reconciliations. Journal of Accounting Research, 31 (Supplement): 230–264.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Bailey, W., Karolyi, G. A., & Salva, C. 2006. The economic consequences of increased disclosure: Evidence from international cross-listings. Journal of Financial Economics, 81 (1): 175–213.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Ball, R. 2001. Infrastructure requirements for an economically efficient system of public financial reporting and disclosure. Brookings-Wharton Papers on Financial Services, 2001: 127–169.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Barron, O. E., Kim, O., Lim, S. C., & Stevens, D. E. 1998. Using analysts’ forecasts to measure properties of analysts’ information environment. The Accounting Review, 73 (4): 421–433.

    Google Scholar 

  • Bhushan, R. 1989. Firm characteristics and analyst following. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 11 (2–3): 255–274.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Botosan, C., Plumlee, M. A., & Xie, Y. 2004. The role of information precision in determining the cost of equity capital. Review of Accounting Studies, 9 (2–3): 223–259.

    Google Scholar 

  • Byard, D., Li, Y., & Yu, Y. 2011. The effect of mandatory IFRS adoption on financial analysts’ information environment. Journal of Accounting Research, 49 (1): 69–96.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Byard, D., & Shaw, K. 2003. Corporate disclosure quality and properties of analysts’ information environment. Journal of Accounting, Auditing, and Finance, 18 (3): 355–378.

    Google Scholar 

  • Cantale, S. 1996. The choice of a foreign market as a signal. Working Paper, INSEAD, Fontainebleau, France.

  • Center for International Financial Analysis & Reporting (CIFAR). 1995. International accounting and auditing trends. Princeton, NJ: CIFAR.

  • Chan, K. C., & Seow, G. S. 1996. The association between stock returns and foreign GAAP earnings versus earnings adjusted to US GAAP. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 21 (1): 139–158.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Coffee, J. 2002. Racing towards the top? The impact of cross-listings and stock market competition on international corporate governance. Columbia Law Review, 102 (7): 1757–1831.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Diamond, D. 1991. Monitoring and reputation: The choice between bank loans and directly placed debt. Journal of Political Economy, 99 (4): 689–721.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Doidge, C., Karolyi, G. A., Lins, K., Miller, D., & Stulz, R. M. 2009. Private benefits of control, ownership and the cross-listing decision. Journal of Finance, 64 (1): 425–466.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Doidge, C., Karolyi, G. A., & Stulz, R. M. 2004. Why are foreign firms listed in the US worth more? Journal of Financial Economics, 71 (2): 205–238.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Errunza, V., & Miller, D. 2000. Market segmentation and the cost of capital in international equity markets. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 35 (4): 577–600.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Fernandes, N., & Ferreira, M. A. 2008. Does international cross-listing improve the information environment? Journal of Financial Economics, 88 (2): 216–244.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Forester, S. R., & Karolyi, G. A. 1999. The effects of market segmentation and investor recognition on asset prices: Evidence from foreign stocks listing in the United States. Journal of Finance, 54 (3): 981–1013.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Fuerst, O. 1998. A theoretical analysis of the investor protection regulations argument for global listing of stocks. Working Paper, Yale University, New Haven, CT.

  • Hail, L., & Leuz, C. 2009. Cost of capital effects and changes in growth expectations around US cross-listings. Journal of Financial Economics, 93 (3): 428–454.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Hope, O.-K., Kang, T., & Kim, J. 2013. Voluntary disclosure by foreign firms cross-listed in the United States. Working Paper, University of Toronto.

  • Hosmer, D. W., & Lemeshow, S. 2000. Applied logistic regression. New York: Wiley.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Karolyi, G. A. 2006. The world of cross-listings and cross-listings of the world: Challenging conventional wisdom. Review of Finance, 10 (1): 73–115.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Kim, O., & Verrecchia, R. 1991. Trading volume and price reactions to public announcements. Journal of Accounting Research, 29 (2): 302–321.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Kim, O., & Verrecchia, R. 1994. Market liquidity and volume around earnings announcements. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 17 (1–2): 41–67.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Kim, Y., Li, H., & Li, S. 2011. Does eliminating the Form 20-F reconciliation from IFRS to US GAAP have capital market consequences? Journal of Accounting and Economics, 53 (1): 249–270.

    Google Scholar 

  • La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. 1998. Law and finance. Journal of Political Economy, 106 (6): 1113–1155.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Lang, M. H., Lins, K. V., & Miller, D. P. 2003. ADRs, analysts, and accuracy: Does cross listing in the United States improve a firm’s information environment and increase market value? Journal of Accounting Research, 41 (2): 317–345.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Lang, M. H., & Lundholm, R. J. 1996. Corporate disclosure policy and analysts behavior. The Accounting Review, 71 (4): 467–492.

    Google Scholar 

  • Leuz, C., Nanda, D., & Wysocki, P. 2003. Earnings management and investor protection: An international comparison. Journal of Financial Economics, 69 (3): 505–527.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Merton, R. C. 1987. A simple model of capital market equilibrium with incomplete information. Journal of Finance, 42 (3): 483–510.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Miller, D. 1999. The market reaction to international cross-listings: Evidence from depositary receipts. Journal of Financial Economics, 51 (1): 103–123.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Mohanram, P. S., & Sunder, S. V. 2006. How has regulation FD affected the operations of financial analysts? Contemporary Accounting Research, 23 (2): 491–525.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Palmrose, Z.-V. 1988. An analysis of auditor litigation and audit service quality. The Accounting Review, 63 (1): 55–73.

    Google Scholar 

  • Petersen, M. 2009. Estimating standard errors in finance panel data sets: Comparing approaches. Review of Financial Studies, 22 (1): 435–480.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Piotroski, J. D., & Srinivasan, S. 2008. Regulation and bonding: The Sarbanes–Oxley Act and the flow of international listings. Journal of Accounting Research, 46 (2): 383–426.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Reese, Jr., W. A., & Weisbach, M. S. 2002. Protection of minority shareholder interests, cross-listings in the United States, and subsequent equity offerings. Journal of Financial Economics, 66 (1): 65–104.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Siconolfi, M, & Salwen, K. G. 1992. Big board, SEC fight over foreign stocks. Wall Street Journal, 13 May.

  • Siegel, J. 2005. Can foreign firms bond themselves effectively by renting US security laws? Journal of Financial Economics, 75 (2): 319–359.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Simunic, D. A. 1980. The pricing of audit services: Theory and evidence. Journal of Accounting Research, 18 (1): 161–190.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Stultz, R. M. 1981. A model of international asset pricing. Journal of Financial Economics, 9 (4): 384–406.

    Google Scholar 

  • Stulz, R. M. 1999. Globalization, corporate finance, and the cost of capital. Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, 12 (3): 8–25.

    Article  Google Scholar 

Download references

Acknowledgements

We are thankful for helpful suggestions from Charlene Henderson, Ole-Kristian Hope, Bob Lipe, Gary Meek, Wayne Thomas, and seminar participants at Chulalongkorn University, Korea University, and the 2010 Oklahoma State University Accounting Research Conference.

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Tony Kang.

Additional information

Received by David Reeb, Area Editor, 11 June 2014. This article has been with the authors for three revisions.

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Check for updates. Verify currency and authenticity via CrossMark

Cite this article

Herrmann, D., Kang, T. & Yoo, Y. The impact of cross-listing in the United States on the precision of public and private information. J Int Bus Stud 46, 87–103 (2015). https://doi.org/10.1057/jibs.2014.51

Download citation

  • Received:

  • Revised:

  • Accepted:

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/jibs.2014.51

Keywords

Navigation