I disagree with parts of Bhaven Sampat's assessment of the US Bayh–Dole Act on ownership of federally funded research (Nature 468, 755–756; 2010).

The act was passed as an agent of economic policy, not of social policy. It aimed to reconnect academic research to the national economic infrastructure by allowing universities to obtain patents on their research and then commercialize it. It bypassed 'top-down' rules established by the government.

Sampat implies that universities grant only exclusive licences. The Bayh–Dole Act aimed to liberate universities from the rigid government prescription that permitted only non-exclusive licensing of federally funded inventions (most start-up companies require an exclusive licence, for example). In practice, the licensing mix of academic institutions is much more nuanced — 61% of US licences in fiscal year 2009 were non-exclusive (Association of University Technology Managers survey).

The United Kingdom had its 'Bayh–Dole moment' in 1988, when Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher abolished the monopoly on British academic inventions held by the National Research and Development Corporation. But outside the largest UK universities, there was very little technology-licensing activity until 1999. Then the government introduced 'third-stream' funding for knowledge transfer by universities. This essentially gave universities an economic development mandate and paid them to fulfil it.

Third-stream and university research funding were maintained in the UK government's budget in June 2010, despite most areas of government funding receiving 10–20% cuts. A £200-million (US$312-million) programme was also established to create a network of proof-of-concept centres, based on the German Fraunhofer Center model (http://www.fraunhofer.de/en).

Lessons can be learned from the UK government's acknowledgement that academic research is the long-term driver of economic growth and that sufficient support and funding is necessary to deliver on its potential.