Seven Steps Toward Freedom and Two Ways to Lose It
Overcoming Limitations of Intentionality Through Self-Confrontational Coping with Stress
Abstract
Psychological approaches often conceptualize “free will” as self-determined decision-making. However, the functional mechanisms potentially underlying volitional freedom or its limitations have barely been elaborated. Starting from a functional definition of volition, we illustrate how personality systems interactions (PSI) theory may contribute to explaining underlying mechanisms of volitional freedom. Specifically, based on neurobiological evidence, this theory postulates that degrees of volitional freedom increase with an increasing involvement of more complex levels of psychological functioning (e.g., from habits and affective impulses toward motives, specific goals, intentions, and more global, personal goals). We will demonstrate how, at a psychological level, demand-related stress limits the pursuit of specific goals, whereas threat-related stress limits self-congruent choice of specific goals. Empirical evidence will be reported that relate to these two possible ways of losing volitional (“top-down”) control. In addition, we report on neurobiological findings supporting the present view of volitional freedom and its limitations.
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