Skip to main content
Log in

Robust voting

  • Published:
Public Choice Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

The formal equivalence between social choice and statistical estimation means that criteria used to evaluate estimators can be interpreted as features of voting rules. The robustness of an estimator means, in the context of social choice, insensitivity to departures from majority opinion. In this paper we consider the implications of substituting the median, a robust, high breakdown estimator, for Borda's mean. The robustness of the median makes the ranking method insensitive to outliers and reflect majority opinion. Among all methods that satisfy a majority condition, median ranks is the unique one that is monotonic. It is an attractive voting method when the goal is the collective assessment of the merits of alternatives.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Similar content being viewed by others

References

  • Bassett, G.W. (1991). Equivariant, Monotone, 50% Breakdown Estimators. The American Statistician: 135–137.

  • Bassett, G.W. and Persky, J. (1994). Rating skating. Journal of the American Statistical Association 89(427): 1075–1079.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hampel, F.R., Ronchetti, E., Rousseeuw, P.J. and Stahel, W.A. (1986). Robust statistics: The approach based on influence functions. New York: John Wiley & Sons.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hettmansperger, T.P. and Sheather, S.J. (1992). A cautionary note on the method of least median squares. The American Statistician 46: 79–83.

    Google Scholar 

  • Koenker, R. (1982). Robust methods in econometrics. Econometric Reviews 1: 213–225.

    Google Scholar 

  • Levin, J. and Nalebuff, B. (1995). An introduction to votecounting schemes. Journal of Economic Perspectives 9(1): 3–26.

    Google Scholar 

  • Levy, D. (1989). The statistical basis of AthenianAmerican constitutional theory. Journal of Legal Studies 18: 79–103.

    Google Scholar 

  • McLean I. (1995). Independence of irrelevant alternatives before Arrow. Mathematical Social Sciences 30: 107–126.

    Google Scholar 

  • McLean, I. and Urken, A.B. (1995). Classics of social choice theory. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Mosteller, F. and Tukey, J.W. (1977). Data analysis and regression. AddisonWesley.

  • Nanson, E.J. ([1882], 1907). Methods of election, paper read to the Royal Society of Victoria on 12 October 1882, printed in Reports::: respecting the application of the principle of proportional representation to public elections, Cd. 3501. London: HMSO 1907. 123–141. In McLean and Urken (1995)

  • Rousseeuw, P.J. (1984). Leastmedian of squares regression. Journal of the American Statistical Association 79(388), December.

  • Rousseeuw, P.J. (1994). Unconventional features of positivebreakdown estimators. Statistics and Probability Letters 19(5): 417–431.

    Google Scholar 

  • Sen, A. (1995a). Rationality and social choice. American Economic Review 85(1): 1–24.

    Google Scholar 

  • Sen, A. (1995b). How to judge voting schemes. Journal of Economic Perspectives: 91–98.

  • Small, C.G. (1990). A survey of multidimensional medians. International Statistical Review 58: 263–277.

    Google Scholar 

  • Young, H.P. (1988). Condorcet's theory of voting. American Political Science Review 82(4): 1231–1244.

    Google Scholar 

  • Young, H.P. (1995). Optimal voting rules. Journal of Economic Perspectives 9(1): 51–56.

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Cite this article

Bassett, G.W., Persky, J. Robust voting. Public Choice 99, 299–310 (1999). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1018324807861

Download citation

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1018324807861

Keywords

Navigation