Abstract
This paper evaluates the role that partisan politics plays in altering public spending levels. The analysis covers over three decades of data on the developments of the public sectors in 16 OECD countries. The results of the analysis lend firm support to the partisan politics model. Of special note is the distinction between the electorate' and the government' ideological preferences and the dominant role that the former plays. The results also suggest, contrary to conventional wisdom, that partisan political influences have not been eliminated with the tightening of linkages to the international economy.
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Cusack, T.R. Partisan politics and public finance: Changes in public spending in the industrialized democracies, 1955–1989. Public Choice 91, 375–395 (1997). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1004995814758
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1004995814758