Abstract
In this paper I wish to show that we can give a statement of a restricted form of Gleason's Theorem that is classically equivalent to the standard formulation, but that avoids the counterexample that Hellman gives in “Gleason's Theorem is not Constructively Provable”.
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Billinge, H. A Constructive Formulation of Gleason's Theorem. Journal of Philosophical Logic 26, 661–670 (1997). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1004275113665
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1004275113665