Abstract
Humans strive after fame, especially in politics. We construct a model in which the executive is motivated by fame as well as the desire to hold office. The fame of an executive is based on his or her achievements relative to all prior executives. Periods of great uncertainty for a nation make politicians more likely to pursue fame rather than reelection. We show that fame incentives weaken as a country ages. If politicians are wiser than the median voter, then the pursuit of fame by politicians improves welfare, and the diminution of fame incentives over time causes national decline.
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Cowen, T., Sutter, D. Politics and the pursuit of fame. Public Choice 93, 19–35 (1997). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1017939531594
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1017939531594