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The Choice of Electoral Systems in Electoral Autocracies

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  24 June 2021

Eric C.C. Chang  and
Masaaki Higashijima Open the ORCID record for Masaaki Higashijima [Opens in a new window]
Eric C.C. Chang
Affiliation:
Department of Political Science, Michigan State University, East Lansing, Michigan, US
Masaaki Higashijima*
Affiliation:
Graduate School of Information Sciences, Tohoku University, Sendai, Japan
*
*Corresponding author. Email: masaaki.higashijima.d8@tohoku.ac.jp
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Abstract

This article develops a theory to account for the variation in electoral systems in electoral authoritarian regimes. We argue that resource-rich dictators are incentivized to employ proportional representation systems to alleviate the threat from the masses and pre-empt the emergence of new opposition, while resource-poor dictators tend to choose majoritarian systems to co-opt ruling elites in the legislature. Using cross-national data on electoral authoritarian regimes, we find strong empirical evidence supporting our theory. We also explicitly illustrate the causal links between natural resources and electoral systems with additional statistical analyses and comparative case studies on Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan.

Keywords

autocratic politicselectionselectoral system choicenatural resourceselectoral manipulation
Type
Article
Information
Government and Opposition , Volume 58 , Issue 1 , January 2023 , pp. 106 - 128
Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2021. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of Government and Opposition Limited

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