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Correction, uncertainty, and anchoring effects
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 18 July 2023
Abstract
We compare the predictions of two important proposals made by De Neys to findings in the anchoring effect literature. Evidence for an anchoring-and-adjustment heuristic supports his proposal that system 1 and system 2 are non-exclusive. The relationship between psychophysical noise and anchoring effects, however, challenges his proposal that epistemic uncertainty determines the involvement of system 2 corrective processes in judgment.
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- Open Peer Commentary
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- Copyright © The Author(s), 2023. Published by Cambridge University Press
References
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Advancing theorizing about fast-and-slow thinking
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Author response
Further advancing fast-and-slow theorizing