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The Origins of the German-Austrian Customs Union Affair of 1931

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  16 December 2008

Extract

On March 21, 1931, the German and Austrian governments informed interested foreign governments that they had agreed on a plan to form a customs union. They presented the scheme, not as a step towards the fulfillment of a revisionist aim long held in the two countries, but as a purely economic contribution to European recovery from the depression. However, opinion at home and abroad greeted the project as the prelude to a political union; and the alarm was raised in those countries, notably France and Czechoslovakia, to whom the idea of such a union was inadmissible. Financial and political pressures were brought to bear, the more easily because, as a result of the collapse in May of the great Credit–Anstalt Bank, Austria desperately needed new international support; and the scheme was effectively quashed even before the Permanent Court of International Justice, in September, by a narrow majority pronounced it incompatible with Austria's international obligations.

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Copyright © Conference Group for Central European History of the American Historical Association 1980

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References

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11. Marek (Prague) to Vienna, May 19, 1927, NPA, 63; Marek to Vienna, Oct. 6, NPA, 64; Franckenstein (London) to Vienna, Nov. 28, NPA, 42. The French, fearing Italian hostility to a general scheme, thought preferences should be bilateral and between Austria and her neighbors alone, in Order to prevent an Anschluss: correspondence in France, Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, series Europe 1919–1929, Autriche, vols. 79–80 (documents from this series of the French Foreign Ministry archives are henceforth cited as MAE, with country and volume number).

12. Memorandum by Peter, May 30, 1927, NPA, 108; ADAP, vol. 5, no. 194.Google Scholar

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14. Record of conversations, Nov. 14, 1927, ADAP, vol. 7, no. 106Google Scholar; 3086/D614241–60. For differing views on Stresemann's attitude to Anschluss see Suval, Anschluss Question in the Weimar Era, pp. xv, 55–56; Campbell, F. Gregory, Confrontation in Central Europe: Weimar Germany and Czechoslovakia (Chicago and London, 1975), p. 19Google Scholar. For Seipel's views see Klemperer, Ignaz Seipel, pp. 301–6.

15. Aschmann (Geneva) to Ritter, Dec. 22, 1927, ADAP, vol. 7, no. 228Google Scholar; Koch (Prague) to Berlin, Dec. 29, K367/K119146–49. Czechoslovakia and Austria were each other's second most important trading partners.

16. Despatch to German missions, Dec. 12, 1927, 3154/D665948–56; ADAP, vol. 7, no. 246; vol. 8, nos. 15, 45, 56, 76.Google Scholar

17. Record of conversations, Feb. 13–14, 1928, NPA, Fasz. 479; French correspondence ni MAE, Autriche, vols. 67, 80; ADAP, vol. 8, nos. 90, 156, 174;Google Scholar Koch to Berlin, Feb. 15 and 18, K60/K006888–90;K006903–6; Lerchenfeld to Berlin, Feb. 21, K1099/K282543–45; memorandum by Schubert, Mar. 8, 3086/D617972; Koch to Berlin, Mar. 29, 4577/E174202–5. Model treaties were commended by the 1928 Assembly, but the idea was superseded by the Kellogg Pact: see Royal Institute of International Affairs, Survey of International Affairs. 1928 (London, 1929), pp. 8193.Google Scholar

18. ADAP, vol. 8, no. 188; vol. 9, nos. 27, 30;Google Scholar Marek to Vienna, May 31, NPA, 64; de Margerie (Berlin) to Paris, May 23 and 24, MAE, Autriche, vol. 80; see Campbell, Confrontation in Central Europe, pp. 191–95. In Vienna in Nov. 1927 (see above, n. 14) Stresemann had answered in the affirmative Seipel's question whether Germany would be interested in economic union with both Austria and Czechoslovakia.

19. ADAP, vol. 9, no. 95Google Scholar; memorandum by Ritter, June 28, 1928, 4576/E173512–14. Although in 1931 Ritter worked hard for the customs union, at this stage he may, according to Freymond, Le IIIe Reich et la réorganisation économique de l'Europe, p. 19 and n., be regarded as a “European.”

20. ADAP, vol. 8, no. 227Google Scholar; memorandum by Wirth, May 23, 1928, 4577/E174318–30.

21. Charles-Roux (Prague) to Paris, June 28, 1928, MAE, Autriche, vol. 67; Puaux (Bucharest) to Paris, June 30, Tchécoslovaquie, vol. 70; Séguin (Prague) to Paris, Aug. 3, Autriche, vol. 81; ADAP, vol. 9, no. 164.Google Scholar

22. Memorandum by Köpke, July 30, 1928, 4576/E173578–79; ADAP, vol. 9, nos. 213, 237Google Scholar; memorandum by Stresemann, Dec. 10, 3086/D614406–16; French correspondence in MAE, Autriche, vols. 81, 82, 86. See also Campbell, Confrontation in Central Europe, pp. 206–7.

23. Reports from Berlin, Rome, Bucharest, Prague, Belgrade, and Budapest, Nov. 7, 1928 – May 14, 1929, in MAE, Autriche, vol. 82, and Tchécoslovaquie, vol. 71; Mutius (Bucharest) to Berlin, Feb. 9, 1929, K367/K119342–44.

24. Marek to Vienna, Feb. 28, Aug. 7, 1929, NPA, 64; ADAP, vol. 12, no. 209Google Scholar; Paris to Clauzel (Vienna), Charles-Roux, and Laroche (Warsaw), Nov. 30, MAE, Autriche, vol. 83.

25. Berlin to Lerchenfeld, Sept. 21, 1929; Lerchenfeld to Berlin, Sept. 24; memorandum by Schubert, Nov. 1; memoranda by Ow-Wachendorf, Nov. 2 and 4; Berlin to Hœsch (Paris), Neurath (Rome), Koch, and Schœn (Budapest), Nov. 5,4576/E173673–74, E173675–77, E173693, E173698–99, E173700–701, E173709–10.

26. Memoranda by Schubert, Dec. 28, 1929; memoranda by Curtius, Jan. 4 and 14, 1930; memorandum by Schubert, Jan. 25, 4576/E173892–96, E173901–5, E173906–7, E173930–34. On Schober see Hannak, J., Johannes Schober: Mittelweg in die Katastrophe (Vienna, 1966).Google Scholar

27. Neurath to Berlin, Feb. 1, 5, and 8,1930, 3086/D614642–43, D614647–48, D614660–61.

28. Schubert to Lerchenfeld, Feb. 4, 1930, 3086/D614644–46. Bülow, who as state secretary in 1931 was one of the prime movers of the customs union, thought in the summer of 1929 that after the Rhineland was evacuated the Anschluss problem in some economic form might receive higher priority than revision of the Polish frontier: Bülow to Smend (Rome), June 5, 1929, 4607/E193757–59.

29. Memorandum on Austro-German relations, Feb. 12, 1930, 4576/E174015–26.

30. Memorandum by Curtius, Jan. 14, 1930, 4576/E173906–7, and commentary, n.d., K49/K004861 (one of a series of notes by Curtius, written after the failure of the plan, to provide for the file Information not otherwise recorded, and in so doing to justify his policy); Frank to Vienna, Feb. 3, NPA, 108; Akten der Reichskanzlei, Weimarer Republik: Das Kabinett Müller II, 28 Juni 1928 bis 27 März 1930, ed. Vogt, Martin (Boppard am Rhein, 1970), no. 451Google Scholar. Frank had been instructed to tell the Germans that another failure on the trade agreement would be intolerable from the “national” point of view: Austria, Staatsarchiv, Allgemeine Verwaltungsarchiv (henceforth cited as AVA), Ministerratsprotokoll, Dec. 13, 1929.

31. There are two Austrian records of the conversations in NPA, Fasz. 464, one by Peter, secretary-general of the Bundeskanzleramt, and a longer one by Frank. The latter was accepted as a record by the Germans, but the version in 4576/E174067–107 is very slightly fuller. Part of this Version is printed in Akten der Reichskanzlei: Das Kabinett Müller II, no. 453.

32. A customs union agreement between the German and Austro-Hungarian empires was concluded on Oct. 11, 1918: Schüller, the Austrian foreign trade expert, was concerned both in those negotiations and in 1931. See Gratz, Gustav and Schüller, Richard, Die äussere Wirtschaftspolitik Österreich-Ungarns, Mitteleuropäische Pläne (Vienna, 1925), pp. 85106Google Scholar, and English version, The Economic Policy of Austria-Hungary during the War in Its External Relations (New Haven, Conn., 1928), pp. 5969.Google Scholar

33. AVA, Ministerratsprotokoll, Feb. 28, 1930. Bülow, who was not present at the talks, noted in a minute of April 30 (K59/K006729) that the impression given by the record, that it was the Germans who demanded preparations for a customs Union and the Austrians agreed only reluctantly, was not what participants had conveyed to him.

34. At the meeting of Feb. 24 Curtius said that if ever there were an attempt at a European customs union the first step would have to be agreements between individual countries. Outside the meetings Schubert mentioned extending a customs Union to other countries: memoranda by Schubert, Feb. 23 and 24, 1930, 4576/E174062–66, E174110–15, E174116–22.

35. Schober to Curtius, May 14, 1930, 3086/D614834–37; record of conversations, NPA, Fasz. 474.

36. Memorandum by Köpke, May 8, 1930, 4576/E174151–55; Foreign Ministry memorandum, May, K49/K115123–24. The Austrians complained that concessions made in the new trade agreement were nullified by tariff increases made at the instance of the German agrarian lobby. For the latter's position see Akten der Reichskanzlei: Das Kabinett Müller II, passim; Gessner, Dieter, Agrardepression und Präsidialregierungen in Deutschland 1930 bis 1933 (Düsseldorf, 1977), ch. 1Google Scholar; Freymond, Le IIIe Reich et la réorganisation économique de l'Europe, pp. 41, 46.

37. Eyck, History of the Weimar Republic, 2: 226–50; Bracher, Die Auflösung der Weimarer Republik, pp. 287–330; Aldcroft, Derek H., From Versailles to Wall Street 1919–1929 (London, 1977), pp. 261–67Google Scholar; Kindleberger, Charles P., The World in Depression 1929–1939 (London, 1973), pp. 138–42, 148–51.Google Scholar

38. Memoranda by Köpke, June 3 and 6, 1930, 4576/E171478–80, E171497–98, K49/K005127; memorandum by Curtius, June 14, memorandum by Bülow, June 28, memorandum by Köpke, June 30, Lerchenfeld to Bülow, Aug. 8 and 20, memorandum by Curtius, Sept. 7, Curtius to Berlin, Sept. 11 and 29, 3086/D614853–55, D614864–65, D614866–68, D614894–97, K49/K005138–42, 4620/E198649–55, 2980/D580193, L417/L121496–99; Frank to Peter, June 16, Schober to Frank, June 21, NPA, Fasz. 464.

39. Memorandum by Curtius, Sept. 7, 1930, K49/K005138–42; Curtius to Berlin, Sept. 11, 2980/D580193; Curtius to Berlin, Sept. 29, L417/L121496–99.

40. Lerchenfeld to Berlin, Oct. 6, 1930, K1101/K212841; Lerchenfeld to Curtius, Nov. 15, 3086/D614908–13; memoranda by Köpke, Sept. 25, 1931, K49/K115187–91.

41. In quotes in the original.

42. Memorandum by Ritter, Jan. 1931, K49/K115109–15.

43. Memoranda by Schober, Jan. 16 and 17, 1931, NPA, Fasz. 471.

44. Memorandum by Schober, Jan. 16, 1931, NPA, Fasz. 471; Curtius to Bülow, Jan. 16, 3086/D614923–27. A resolution calling for negotiations on a customs union was also tabled in the Austrian Nationalrat in February.

45. Marek to Vienna, Jan. 26, Feb. 18, 1931, NPA, 66; memoranda by Köpke, Feb. 3, 2980/D580334–37.

46. Minute by Bülow, Feb. 17, 1931, 3086/D614941–42; note by Curtius, n.d., K49/K110243; cabinet protocol, Feb. 28, 3575/D786070–80.

47. Memorandum by Köpke, Feb. 21, 1931, K49/K005116–21. Gaus, the foreign ministry legal adviser, submitted on Feb. 23 a memorandum (K1168/K299826–39) arguing that a customs union was compatible with the peace treaties and the 1922 protocol.

48. Note by Curtius, n.d., K49/K005243; minute by Ritter, Feb. 17, 1932, minute by Köpke, Feb. 24, 1932, K1148/294596–98, K294599–603.

49. Hoesch to Berlin, Mar. 6, 1931, K936/K240609–26; see also Geigenmüller, Ernst, “Botschafter von Hoesch und der deutsch-österreichischen Zollunionsplan von 1931,” Historische Zeitschrift 195 (1962): 581–95.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

50. Record of conversations, Mar. 3 and 5, 1931, NPA, Fasz. 461.

51. A few years earlier Gratz and Schüller had written (Die äussere Wirschaftspolitik Österreich-Ungarns, p. 106; English Version, p. 69) that the kind of customs union concluded in 1918, without common institutions, could not be extended to more than two countries because the machinery for ensuring cooperation would be too complicated. The 1931 scheme differed from that of 1918 in providing for a common external tariff, but also lacked common institutions.

52. Text printed in DBFP, ser. 2, vol. 2, no. 3.Google Scholar

53. Berlin to Hoesch, Schubert, Neurath, Koch, and Schoen, Mar. 9, 1931, 3086/D614971.

54. Note by Curtius, n.d., K49/K005276; AVA, Ministerratsprotokoll, Mar. 13, 1931.

55. Note by Curtius, n.d., K49/K115276; memorandum by Schober, Sept. 8, 1931, NPA, Fasz. 461.

56. Foreign Ministry memorandum, Feb. 24, 1931, K59/K116864–79. Ritter was at least partly responsible for sowing this confusion as early as April: see DBFP, ser. 2, vol. 2, no. 28.Google Scholar

57. Memorandum by Schober, Sept. 8, 1931, NPA, Fasz. 461.

58. Curtius, Sechs Jahre Minister der deutschen Republik, pp. 193–94.

59. DBFP, ser. 2, vol. 2, no. 1.Google Scholar

60. See Bennett, Germany and the Diplomacy of the Financial Crisis, pp. 56–57; Goldinger in Österreich und Europa, pp. 534–35.

61. Curtius, Sechs Jahre Minister der deutschen Republik, p. 193; Bennett, Germany and the Diplomacy of the Financial Crisis, p. 58.

62. Wilhelm Regendanz (a Prokurist in M. W. Warburg and Co.) to Bülow, Apr. 4, 1931, K50/K115749–61.

63. Marek to Vienna, Mar. 10, 1931, NPA, 66.

64. Marek to Vienna, Mar. 18, 1931, NPA, 66.

65. Minute by Köpke, Mar. 19, 1931, 3086/D614976.

66. Marek to Vienna, Mar. 19, 1931, NPA, 66.

67. Marek to Vienna, Mar. 26, 1931, NPA, 66. Bülow effectively began the action on March 13, but the British ambassador does not seem to have taken much notice and his report, when received in London on March 18, attracted little attention: memorandum by Bülow, Mar. 13, 3086/D614972–73; DBFP, ser. 2, vol. 1, no. 358.Google Scholar

68. DBFP, ser. 2, vol. 2, nos. 8, 28Google Scholar; cabinet protocol, Oct. 3, 1931, 3575/D788405.

69. AVA, Ministerratsprotokoll, Mar. 13, 1931.

70. Eyck, History of the Weimar Republic, 2: 297–98; Bracher, Die Auflösung der Weimarer Republik, pp. 377–88.

71. DBFP, ser. 2, vol. 1, no. 353.Google Scholar

72. Bennett, Germany and the Diplomacy of the Financial Crisis, pp. 50–51.

73. In his memorandum of Sept. 8, 1931 (NPA, Fasz. 461) Schober recorded fruitless efforts to get the Germans to change their minds.

74. DBFP, ser. 2, vol. 2, no. 2Google Scholar; Schober to Franckenstein, Grünberger (Paris), Egger (Rome), and Marek, Mar. 17, 1931, NPA, Fasz. 461; Foreign Ministry to Hoesch, Neurath, and Schubert, Mar. 18, K49/K005283–305.

75. Bülow to Koch, Apr. 19, 1931, 4620/E199512–15, translation printed by Stambrook in Journal of Central European Affairs 21 (1961): 1544Google Scholar; Kalkreuth (Reichslandbund) to Pünder, Mar. 23 and Apr. 8, K1063/K272059–61, K272089–90, cited by Bennett, Germany and the Diplomacy of the Financial Crisis, pp. 79–80. Cf. also Freymond, Le IIIe Reich et la réorganisation économique de l'Europe, pp. 33–37. Doering, in Industrielles System und politische Entwicklung in der Weimarer Republik, pp. 529–30, and Frommelt, in Paneuropa oder Mitteleuropa, pp. 81–84, 88, emphasize that the plan was part of an economic policy tending towards a German-led central and southeast European bloc, as opposed to a European union.

76. Krulis-Randa, Jan, Das deutsch-österreichische Zollunionsprojekt von 1931 (Zurich, 1955), pp. 135–51Google Scholar. Cf. also Doering, in Industrielles System und politische Entwicklung in der Weimarer Republik, pp. 525–26.