Studying scientific thought experiments in their context: Albert Einstein and electromagnetic induction

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Highlights

  • Thought experiments are often assumed to concern factual knowledge.

  • Einstein׳s magnet-conductor thought experiment does not fit this philosophical frame.

  • It rather contributed to a shift in the epistemological standards of physics.

  • An alternative more encompassing frame is proposed to study their epistemology.

Abstract

This article concerns the way in which philosophers study the epistemology of scientific thought experiments. Starting with a general overview of the main contemporary philosophical accounts, we will first argue that two implicit assumptions are present therein: first, that the epistemology of scientific thought experiments is solely concerned with factual knowledge of the world; and second, that philosophers should account for this in terms of the way in which individuals in general contemplate these thought experiments in thought. Our goal is to evaluate these assumptions and their implications using a particular case study: Albert Einstein׳s magnet-conductor thought experiment. We will argue that an analysis of this thought experiment based on these assumptions – as John Norton (1991) provides – is, in a sense, both misguided (the thought experiment by itself did not lead Einstein to factual knowledge of the world) and too narrow (to understand the thought experiment׳s epistemology, its historical context should also be taken into account explicitly). Based on this evaluation we propose an alternative philosophical approach to the epistemology of scientific thought experiments which is more encompassing while preserving what is of value in the dominant view.

Introduction

Since the publication of Mach׳s (1897) Über Gedankenexperimente, many eminent philosophers of science such as Alexandre Koyré, Karl Popper and Thomas Kuhn have shown interest in scientific thought experiments (scientific TEs, or STEs, for short). In the contemporary philosophy of science the focus is mainly on their role in the epistemology of science. Our focus on these epistemological issues is of a more indirect nature. We are concerned primarily with the way in which contemporary philosophers of science conceptualize and study the epistemology of STEs: How do they try to answer such epistemological questions?2

We will proceed as follows. After a short sketch of the contemporary philosophical debate in Section 2, we will argue in Section 3 that there are two implicit assumptions about the epistemology of STEs underlying it. The case study in Section 4 will then show how these assumptions can be problematic. Norton (1991)׳s analysis of Einstein׳s magnet-conductor STE, which functions as an example of these two assumptions is, in a sense, both misguided (the thought experiment by itself did not lead Einstein to factual knowledge of the world) and too narrow (to understand the thought experiment׳s epistemology, its historical context should also be taken into account explicitly). Based on this evaluation we propose an alternative philosophical approach to the epistemology of scientific thought experiments in Section 5. This approach is more encompassing while preserving what is of value in the dominant view.

Section snippets

James Robert Brown׳s platonic thought experiments

For Brown, 1986, Brown, 1991a, Brown, 1991b, Brown, 2004, Brown, 2010, Brown, 2013, STEs are philosophically interesting because they deviate from the epistemological norm in science: while “the great bulk of our knowledge must be accounted for along empiricist lines, […] there is […] the odd bit that is a priori and it comes from thought experiments” (1991a, ix). What is epistemologically peculiar about them is the way in which they lead us to a new and better understanding of reality: we make

The epistemology of scientific thought experiments: facts for generic individuals

The overview in the previous section shows that the accounts discussed all differ with respect to particular aspects of the epistemology of scientific TEs: Brown is concerned with how they bring about new a priori knowledge of reality; Norton, on the other hand, is interested in how they generalize and reorganize our knowledge of the natural world; Gendler, finally, focuses on their evidential significance in settling scientific disputes. At the same time, however, the overview also shows that

Einstein׳s magnet-conductor thought experiment

In the opening paragraphs of his special relativity article (1905), Albert Einstein presented what has become known in the philosophical literature as his magnet-conductor thought experiment. He presented it in the following words:

It is well known that Maxwell׳s electrodynamics – as usually understood at present – when applied to moving bodies, leads to asymmetries that do not seem to attach to the phenomena. Let us recall, for example, the electrodynamic interaction between a magnet and a

An alternative proposal: thought experiments transforming context

In 2 The philosophical debate, 3 The epistemology of scientific thought experiments: facts for generic individuals we pointed out that the contemporary philosophical debate on the epistemological role of STEs studied them in terms of a particular conceptualization, which we characterized as (Fac)-(Ind). In Section 4, we discussed John Norton׳s analysis of Einstein׳s magnet-conductor STE as an example of a philosophical analysis based on this conceptualization. We pointed out that there were

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  • The authors would like to thank Peter Verdée, John Norton, Tim de Mey, the audiences of the VAF (Rotterdam 2015) and CLMPS (Helsinki 2015) conferences, and a number of anonymous reviewers for their valuable and insightful questions, comments, and remarks.

    1

    Aspirant (Grant Number 1138716N) van het Fonds Wetenschappelijk Onderzoek - Vlaanderen (FWO - Research Foundation Flanders).

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