Political liberalism and political conservatism: Functionally independent?

Abstract

Political liberalism and conservatism are often conceptualized as opposite ends of the same continuum. Our question was whether these constructs might be better understood as “functionally independent” ideologies. We tested whether liberalism and conservatism, as separable constructs, could be differentially, rather than equally and oppositely, associated with core psychological components of political orientation. Participants (n = 245) completed measures of liberalism, conservatism, and psychological variables relating to preferences for equality versus inequality and social change versus tradition. A bi-dimensional model with separate and moderately correlated liberal and conservative factors best summarized political orientation. Liberalism was distinctly associated with universal orientation and creativity whereas conservatism was related to dogmatism.

Introduction

Is political liberalism the opposite of conservatism? Political orientation – the tendency to lean more liberal or conservative – is linked with many psychological variables (Carney et al., 2008, Haidt et al., 2009, Janoff-Bulman, 2009, Jost et al., 2003). Much of this work is based on a model of political orientation in which liberalism and conservatism are considered to be at opposite ends of a single continuum (Jost et al., 2009, Wilson, 1973). There is evidence that the structure of political ideology is more complex (see Duckitt, 2001, Duckitt and Sibley, 2009, Feldman, 2003). Consequently, liberalism and conservatism should relate differentially to psychological variables usually associated with them. Thus, we compare the conventional uni-dimensional/bipolar model to a bi-dimensional model in which liberalism and conservatism are treated as functionally independent factors, and explore whether the bi-dimensional model provides a better fit concerning relations between political ideologies and indices of core psychological components of political orientation.

The uni-dimensional conceptualization of political orientation has yielded the most widely-employed operationalization of political orientation and involves a single self-report item with response options ranging from extremely liberal to extremely conservative (Jost, 2006). Jost et al. propose that the bipolar structure, dating back to the French Revolution, is particularly useful and parsimonious as it is based upon two political perspectives (preference versus opposition to social change, acceptance versus rejection of inequality) that characterize those identifying as liberal or conservative in varying cultural and historical contexts (see Jost et al., 2009 for a full discussion). Despite the popularity of this approach, the extent to which a single bipolar liberalism versus conservatism dimension adequately captures peoples’ political ideology has been questioned. Conover and Feldman (1981) concluded that “liberals and conservatives view the political world not from different sides of the same coin, but … from the perspective of entirely different currencies” (p. 204). The structure of political orientation has often been described as bi-dimensional, the nature of which varies depending on item content and factor rotation (Ashton et al., 2005, Choma et al., 2010, Choma et al., 2009, Conover and Feldman, 1981, Stone and Schaffner, 1988; see Duckitt & Sibley, 2009).

One of the most comprehensive bi-dimensional models of political ideology was proposed by Kerlinger (1984), who argued that liberalism and conservatism were conceptually and empirically independent. However, in factor analytic studies across different countries he found moderate negative correlations between liberalism and conservatism. Although such findings do not support Kerlinger’s proposal of orthogonality, his data demonstrate that liberalism and conservatism are separable. Sidanius and Duffy (1988) tested Kerlinger’s model demonstrating that a uni-dimensional/bipolar model summarized political ideology better than a bi-dimensional orthogonal model with uncorrelated liberal and conservative factors. Yet, consistent with many of Kerlinger’s results, in an American sample, a bi-dimensional model with moderately negatively correlated liberal and conservative factors summarized political ideology better than either the uni-dimensional or bi-dimensional-orthogonal model. Thus, the structure of political orientation cannot always be adequately described on the basis of a single continuum. Indeed, there is evidence supporting a uni-dimensional/bipolar model and a bi-dimensional (two correlated factors) structure of political ideology.

There is a comparable debate concerning affect that could inform disagreements about the structure of political orientation. Researchers studying affect have debated whether positive and negative affect are opposite ends of a single continuum (Green, Goldman, & Salovey, 1993) or distinct dimensions (Tellegen, Watson, & Clark, 1999). To reconcile the competing models, Cacioppo, Berntson, and Gardner (1999) asserted that opposing effects of positive and negative affect does not signify that they are themselves reciprocally activated or mutually exclusive. They noted that separate positive and negative affect factors did not require a dismissal of the bipolar model, and proposed that exploring the circumstances under which a bipolar versus bi-dimensional model might best summarize affect was of greater value. According to Cacioppo et al., evidence that positive and negative affect uniquely predict responses suggests that they could be “functionally independent” (p. 844). Hence, even though a bipolar model might adequately summarize affect in certain circumstances, a greater understanding of affect might be gained by conceptualizing positive and negative affect as separable (even if correlated) dimensions.

Cacioppo et al. (1999) proposed that positive and negative affect were functionally independent on the basis of research indicating they had unique properties. A corresponding argument could be made regarding the relationship between liberalism and conservatism. Several theories have emphasized the distinct attributes of liberal-versus-conservative orientations (e.g., Higgins, 1998, Tomkins, 1963). More recently, Janoff-Bulman (2009) argued that political ideology originates in motivational orientations: Conservatism (versus liberalism) is associated with avoidance motivation; liberalism (versus conservatism) is associated with approach motivation. Based, in part, on these notions, Choma et al. (2009) demonstrated unique and shared relations between political orientation, considered as separate factors from low to high for each political orientation, and the components of subjective well-being: Liberalism uniquely predicted greater positive affect, conservatism uniquely predicted less negative affect, and both liberalism and conservatism predicted greater life satisfaction. These data demonstrate how examining political orientation from a bi-dimensional perspective provides important insights concerning the relation between political orientation and subjective well-being that are not apparent by examining this same issue using only a bipolar/uni-dimensional conceptualization of political orientation.

In the domain of moral psychology, Graham, Haidt, and Nosek (2009) showed that liberals rely on their moral intuitions relating to harm/care and fairness/reciprocity. Conservatives rely also on moral intuitions relating to authority/respect, ingroup loyalty, and purity/sanctity (Graham et al., 2009, McAdams et al., 2008). Lakoff (2002), a cognitive linguist, asserted that metaphors relating to family life influence individuals’ political ideology. He proposes that conservatives are more likely to endorse a ‘strict-father’ metaphor, whereas for liberals, the metaphor is more likely to involve a ‘nurturant-parent’ model.

Considering political orientation from a multi-dimensional perspective (Conover and Feldman, 1981, Duckitt and Sibley, 2009, Kerlinger, 1984) invites a renewed consideration of how these dimensions relate to other individual differences within the psychological domain. For example, preferences for equality/inequality and preferences for social change/tradition have been identified as the primary components that distinguish liberalism versus conservatism (Jost, 2006, Jost et al., 2003). Preferences for equality and social change characterize liberalism, whereas acceptance of inequality and preferences for tradition characterize conservatism (Thorisdottir, Jost, Liviatan, & Shrout, 2007). There is a growing literature supporting this claim, especially for social change/tradition (Jost et al., 2003, Jost et al., 2009).

Notwithstanding the robustness of this general pattern of differences between liberals and conservatives, there may be additional subtle distinctions. Hirsh, DeYoung, Xu, and Peterson (2010), for example, using a bipolar liberal-conservatism scale, found that the compassion facet of agreeableness correlated positively with liberalism, whereas the politeness facet correlated positively with conservatism. Their reasoning implies that important distinctions between liberals and conservatives can be uncovered by investigating which aspects of the two core components characterize each political orientation.