Precursors of morality in the use of the symbols “good” and “bad” in two bonobos (Pan paniscus) and a chimpanzee (Pan troglodytes)
Introduction
Morality is a concept that is most frequently left to philosophers, as there are few direct behavioral measurements that can be made. In nonhumans, the study of morality has generally focused on behavioral precursors, such as altruism, cooperation, and fairness (Bekoff, 2004, Katz, 2000), as these allow for direct behavioral evaluation. For example, Brosnan and de Waal (2003) found that brown capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella) will reject rewards that they consider “unfair”. Indeed, previous research has delineated a suite of moral precursors that are present in nonhuman primates, including empathy, sympathy, and a concept of reciprocity (Flack and de Waal, 2000), but has yet to fully explore the concepts of perception of intention or using/perceiving social norms (Call, 2000), and has not yet touched other concepts that are more linguistically based, such as value judgments.
At its very essence, morality must rely on value judgments. For, if there is no “right” or “wrong”, no “good” or “bad”, then there is nothing on which to base a morality. There is some discussion by philosophers and scientists about whether humans have an innate concept of morality, and therefore of value judgments, and when said concept would have evolved (e.g., Hauser, 2006, Wilson, 1993). However, specific views and expressions of value judgments vary from culture to culture and are therefore seen to be (at least partially) culturally acquired (also e.g., Wilson, 1993). Certainly, the expression of value judgments as a specific linguistic behavior is measurable and therefore may allow for a more direct glimpse into the development of morality.
Supporting this argument, Lamb (1991) states that “the acquisition of morally relevant words such as good, bad, naughty and nice may reflect” the beginnings of morality. Interestingly, Snow (1987) found that at least one child began by using the term “bad” more frequently in moral utterances than the term “good”, but then switched their preference, using “good” more frequently than “bad”. Snow (1987) does not discuss this switch in her chapter, but we suggest that children first begin to label inappropriate actions (which are likely more frequently pointed out to them by their caregivers and may therefore be easier to understand) and only after, label themselves or their actions as appropriate (“good”) to distinguish them. This interpretation is supported by work in older children in which children initially describe “good” acts as acts absent of “bad” behavior (e.g., “Being good is not breaking windows”), and only later describe both “good” acts in terms of prosocial behavior (Hill and Hill, 1977).
This late development of moral understanding may therefore be driven, not just by cultural acquisition, but by other factors such as the simplicity of the concepts themselves, or more direct internal development. Supporting this possibility, Lamb (1991) found that in children, the use of internal state words, or words that represent internal psychological states, such as happy, tired, and hungry, preceded the first stages of moral development, while following the development of “awareness of standards”. Contrary to the cultural acquisition theory, however, Lamb found that the caregivers’ use of internal state words was rare and did not seem to drive the children’s use of these words. However, internal state words did appear at the same time that empathy appeared, and so may be related to the development of empathy, an internally driven developmental path.
Complex symbolic abilities in two bonobos and a chimpanzee allow for a similar linguistic exploration of value judgments in nonhuman apes. Savage-Rumbaugh et al., 1986, Savage-Rumbaugh et al., 1993 have explored symbolic capacities in bonobos (Pan paniscus) and chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) in studies that have indicated that, when reared in an environment with English, a keyboard of visual symbols (lexigrams), and cultural emersion, apes can acquire symbolic capacities without explicit training (Brakke and Savage-Rumbaugh, 1995, Brakke and Savage-Rumbaugh, 1996, Greenfield and Savage-Rumbaugh, 1991, Lyn et al., submitted for publication, Lyn and Savage-Rumbaugh, 2000, Savage-Rumbaugh et al., 1986, Savage-Rumbaugh et al., 1993, Savage-Rumbaugh et al., 1980).
Among others, two bonobos (P. paniscus), Kanzi – a male born in 1980, and Panbanisha – a female born in 1985, and a chimpanzee (P. troglodytes), Panpanzee (or Panzee) – a female born in 1986, have demonstrated the abilities to use lexigrams to name objects in double blind studies (Brakke and Savage-Rumbaugh, 1995, Brakke and Savage-Rumbaugh, 1996, Savage-Rumbaugh et al., 1986), to associate novel English names with novel objects with very few exposures to both object and word (Lyn and Savage-Rumbaugh, 2000), to hierarchically categorize these referents (Lyn, 2007), to utilize imitation in an intentionally communicative context (Greenfield, 1980), to make semantically-based combinations across both lexigram and gestural combinations (Greenfield and Lyn, 2007, Greenfield and Savage-Rumbaugh, 1990, Greenfield and Savage-Rumbaugh, 1991, Lyn et al., submitted for publication), and to comprehend English sentences at least at a similar level to a two-and-a-half year old child tested in the same manner as the ape (Savage-Rumbaugh et al., 1993). Additionally, recent publications have explored the development of a unique ape/human culture at the Language Research Center and now the Great Ape Trust of Iowa (Savage-Rumbaugh et al., 2004). The intensive 24-hour interaction among the apes and humans, sharing daily activities and communicative modes have produced extended spontaneous cognitive and social abilities not otherwise documented in these species, for example, pretend play (Lyn et al., 2006) and joint attention and imitation (Savage-Rumbaugh et al., 2004).
During interactions with the apes at the Language Research Center, and now at the Great Ape Trust of Iowa, human caregivers utilized the terms “good” and “bad” (in English and/or lexigram form) as value judgments as they would in ordinary interactions. For example, “Panzee’s being bad” or, “This is a good apple”. They would also produce interrogatives that requested value judgments from the apes. For example, “Do you think that’s a good idea?” or “Do you know how you’ve been acting?” Accordingly, within the human and ape culture, the apes have learned to use the “bad” and “good” lexigrams in many diverse contexts.
We propose an exploration into the apes’ use of “good” and “bad” lexigrams and the co-construction of these value judgments within a Pan/Homo culture.
Section snippets
Subjects
Two bonobos (P. paniscus) – Kanzi, born April 1980, and his half-sister Panbanisha, born December 1985, and one chimpanzee (P. troglodytes) – Panpanzee, born January 1986, served as subjects. All three were reared at the Language Research Center in Atlanta, Georgia in a within- and cross-species communicative environment that included the use of English by human caretakers and a keyboard printed with visuo-graphic symbols (lexigrams) used by several of the apes (including all three subjects) as
Use of “good” and “bad”
Kanzi, Panbanisha, and Panpanzee all use the terms “good” and “bad” in appropriate contexts and showed comprehension. The database contained 119 utterances of good and bad by Kanzi, including 100 utterances containing a “good” lexigram and 24 a “bad” lexigram (5 utterances were combinations that included both “good” and “bad”), 860 utterances by Panbanisha, 697 “good” and 174 “bad” (11 with both), and 115 by Panpanzee, 33 good and 83 bad (1 with both). Panpanzee’s preference for the “bad”
Discussion
Here we present evidence that three language-competent apes use the symbols “good” and “bad” in appropriate contexts, suggesting that the capacity for making value judgments evolved before the human line split from our common ancestor 5–7 million years ago (Byrne, 1995). However, the contexts in which the apes use “good” and “bad” are heavily influenced by the value judgments of their human caregivers, strongly suggesting that the specific expression of value judgments is mainly cultural. For
Acknowledgements
The authors wish to acknowledge the contributions of the staff of the Language Research Center, Atlanta, GA in collecting these data. This research was supported by a grant from the Campaign for Forgiveness Research to E. Sue Savage-Rumbaugh and the Great Ape Trust of Iowa, Des Moines, IA. All applicable guidelines for animal care and use were followed throughout this study. The authors declare that they have no professional or financial affiliations that may be perceived to have biased this
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