Review
Outbreaks of serious pneumococcal disease in closed settings in the post-antibiotic era: A systematic review

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Summary

Objectives

Since the introduction of antibiotics, pneumococcal disease is predominantly sporadic, with occasional outbreaks. Our objective was to review the epidemiology of reported outbreaks of serious pneumococcal disease in closed settings to inform the development of guidelines to manage such outbreaks.

Methods

We systematically reviewed the literature for reported outbreaks of serious pneumococcal disease in closed settings to inform the development of guidelines in managing such outbreaks.

Results

We identified 42 outbreaks reported in 39 papers – 14 in hospitals, 12 in long term care facilities, five outbreaks in households, four in military settings, three in child care settings and two each in homeless shelters and jails. The serotype/group most frequently associated with outbreaks was 14 (seven outbreaks) followed by 4 (five outbreaks) then serotypes/groups 1, 9 and 9 V each causing four outbreaks. The median outbreak size was four cases (2 - 46). The median duration was eight days, with 84% of cases occurring within 14 days of the first case.

Conclusion

Outbreaks of serious pneumococcal disease are likely to continue happening requiring early recognition and implementation of public health measures in order to interrupt transmission. This study facilitated the development of the first UK interim guidelines for managing such outbreaks.

Introduction

In 1903, Sinigar described one of the first documented outbreaks of pneumococcal disease in a closed setting among patients and staff of an asylum.1 In 1918, a one-month epidemic of S. pneumoniae in a military camp in the USA resulted in 2349 hospital admissions and a 50% death rate.2 Several other large outbreaks of pneumococcal pneumonia have been reported in the pre-antibiotic era occurring in families,3 mental institutions,4 hospitals,5 barracks 6 and schools.7 Although pneumococcal outbreaks are rarely reported now, when they occur, they still can cause significant morbidity and mortality, depending upon the population affected. Since the introduction of antibiotics, pneumococcal disease has occurred predominantly sporadically, with occasional outbreaks reported in various settings. The epidemiology of these outbreaks has varied widely in terms of size, duration, serotype, and setting. No systematic review of these outbreaks has been undertaken.

Our objective was to review the epidemiology of reported outbreaks of serious pneumococcal disease including in various closed settings such as residential and nursing homes, nurseries/day care, schools, prisons and hospitals to inform the development of evidence-based guidelines for their public health management. This review informed the “Interim UK Guidelines for the public health management of outbreaks of serious pneumococcal disease in closed settings” published in 2008.58

Section snippets

Methods

A search of electronic databases was undertaken in May 2006 using Medline (1966 onwards), with subsequent reviews until February 2009. Serious pneumococcal disease was defined as pneumococcal pneumonia, meningitis or bacteraemia. We excluded from this study outbreaks of all non-invasive presentations other than pneumonia such as conjunctivitis and acute otitis media. Our search strategy included three primary MeSH terms; “Streptococcus pneumoniae”, “Pneumonia, Pneumococcal”, and “Meningitis,

Results

We found a total of 42 outbreaks in 39 papers reported from 1980 to 2006.8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45 In the post-antibiotic era, a median of one outbreak was reported per year in the literature. Between 1991 and 2000 the frequency of reported outbreaks was three times more than in the proceeding 10 years, with six outbreaks reported in 1999 alone. This trend appears to have

Discussion

We identified 42 outbreaks of serious pneumococcal disease in closed settings occurring most frequently in LTCF and hospitals and households. Given the frequency of pneumococcal pneumonia, particularly in the elderly, it was surprising how few outbreaks were reported. There are several possible explanations for the low reporting of outbreaks. Outbreaks may not be identified, may not be recorded or reported or reported outbreaks not published. Another reason might be that S. pneumoniae is a

Acknowledgements

We will like to acknowledge the contributions of the HPA group set up to develope guidelines for the management of serious pneumococcal disease in the United Kingdom. These include Dr Richard Pebody, Dr Deborah Wilson, Dr Isabel Oliver, Marion Bond, Dr Chikwe Ihekweazu, Dr Robert George, Dr Mary Slack, Dr Martin Donaghy, Dr David Dance, Dr Bharet Patel, Dr Alex Doroshenko, Dr Marina Basarab and Sarah Brill.

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