Notes, Comments, and Letters to the EditorAuctions with uncertain numbers of bidders☆
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Cited by (69)
Risk aversion and auction design: Theoretical and empirical evidence
2021, International Journal of Industrial OrganizationCitation Excerpt :Bose et al. (2006) show that a full insurance auction is also the optimal standard auction when bidders are averse to ambiguity, in the form of maxmin expected utility preferences. Ambiguity-averse bidders also prefer the SPA to the FPA (Levin and Ozdenoren, 2004) but di Tillio et al. (2016) show that an ambiguous mechanism, in which certain rules may be hidden from bidders, may have higher revenue than any standard auction in such a setting. Lange and Ratan (2010) study behavior in auctions with loss-averse bidders, using the reference-dependent utility model of Kőszegi and Rabin (2007).
Sequential auctions with ambiguity
2021, Journal of Economic TheoryCitation Excerpt :A natural benchmark of our analysis is the growing literature on auctions with ambiguity averse agents, which mostly focuses on static settings. For instance, in single-unit sealed-bid auctions, Salo and Weber (1995) show that over-bidding in experiments may be a consequence of ambiguity aversion, Lo (1998) examines maxmin bidders and uncertain distribution of values, Levin and Ozdenoren (2004) study the case with ambiguity about the number of bidders and Chen et al. (2007) experimentally study more general ambiguity preferences. A common insight of these papers and ours is that ambiguity aversion leads to pessimism and aggressive bidding.
Does highway project bundling policy affect bidding competition? Insights from a mixed ordinal logistic model
2021, Transportation Research Part A: Policy and PracticePopulation uncertainty and revealing contestants
2021, Economics LettersDisclosure policies in research contests with stochastic entry
2020, Economics LettersDisclosure policies in all-pay auctions with bid caps and stochastic entry
2020, Economics Letters
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Levin's work was supported by NSF Grant # 0136928. Much of the work was done while Dan Levin was visiting Harvard Business School whose hospitality is gratefully acknowledged.