Preschoolers’ encoding of rational actions: The role of task features and verbal information

Abstract

In the current study, we first investigated whether preschoolers imitate selectively across three imitation tasks. Second, we examined whether preschoolers’ selective imitation is influenced by differences in the modeled actions and/or by the situational context. Finally, we investigated how verbal cues given by the model affect preschoolers’ imitation. Participants (3- to 5-year-olds) watched an adult performing an unusual action in three imitation tasks (touch light, house, and obstacle). In two conditions, the model either was or was not restricted by situational constraints. In addition, the model verbalized either the goal that was to be achieved, the movement, or none of the action components. Preschoolers always acted on the objects without constraints. Results revealed differences in preschoolers’ selective imitation across the tasks. In the house task, they showed the selective imitation pattern that has been interpreted as rational, imitating the unusual action more often in the no-constraint condition than in the constraint condition. In contrast, in the touch light task, preschoolers imitated the unusual head touch irrespective of the model’s constraints or of the verbal cues that had been presented. Finally, in the obstacle task, children mostly emulated the observed goal irrespective of the presence of the constraint, but they increased their imitation of the unusual action when the movement had been emphasized. Overall, our data suggest that preschoolers adjust their imitative behavior to context-specific information about objects, actions, and their interpretations of the model’s intention to teach something.

Introduction

By observing other children or adults, children can learn much about goal-directed actions and how these actions have an impact on their physical and social environment. Imitative learning, therefore, serves an important function in human development, offering the acquisition of many skills without the time-consuming process of learning through trial and error (Bekkering, Wohlschläger, & Gattis, 2000). Actions are defined as goal-directed behavior and mainly involve two observable components: a movement or means and an obtained action effect or end state (Elsner, 2007). These action components can be copied in different ways. Thus, children may emulate an environmental result produced by another person without attending to the exact movement used, or they may imitate both means and result in an attempt to reproduce another person’s goal-directed actions (Carpenter, Call, & Tomasello, 2002).

But which context-specific information do children and infants use during an action observation in order to imitate action components selectively? And does the encoding of context-specific information change with advancing age? Here, we assume that preschoolers combine different sources of information, for example, object-related and situation-related aspects of an action executed by another person serving as a model. In other words, imitation is seen as a function of children’s understanding of mystifying observations and interpersonal factors (Uzgiris, 1981).

For example, Nielsen (2006) investigated the development of selective imitation while varying the reason for a model’s demonstration and the communicative cues given by the model. More specifically, 12-, 18-, and 24-month-olds watched a model open a series of boxes. Results indicated that younger children did not imitate the modeled actions; instead, they used alternative means to emulate opening the boxes. In contrast, when given a logical reason for the action demonstration, they imitated the modeled action. The older children imitated the modeled object use irrespective of the reason for the demonstration or the social disposition. In other words, the reason for a modeled action demonstration and the communicative cues that were given during demonstration relate with age to affect how young children engage in social learning.

Imitation research indicates that infants’ and young children’s interpretation of a model’s action is affected by different context conditions as well as by children’s interpretation of the model’s intention (Call et al., 2005, Carpenter et al., 2002, Gergely et al., 2002, Schwier et al., 2006). Thus, children’s interpretation of object-related and situation-related aspects in a social learning context is influenced by the interplay of cognitive and social factors (Meltzoff and Williamson, 2010, Nielsen, 2006, Uzgiris, 1981).

Along this line, selective imitation in infants was documented by Gergely and colleagues (2002), in whose study infants watched an adult turning on a lamp with her forehead. The 14-month-olds imitated this unusual action more often when, during demonstration, the model’s hands lay idly beside the lamp (hands-free condition) as compared with when the model’s hands were constrained by holding a blanket around her shoulders (hands-occupied condition). Yet, in both conditions, all infants used their hand to switch on the light; thus, they chose a familiar movement from their repertoire to emulate the observed action effect. Gergely and colleagues interpreted the selective imitation of the unusual head action as evidence that infants’ processing of others’ actions bears on the so-called principle of rational action, which involves an evaluation of the rationality of the means in relation to the goal and the constraints of the situation (see Gergely & Csibra, 2003, for a review). In summary, when the situational context factors changed, 14-month-olds were able to decide on the most effective action that should be used to reach the goal (see also Gergely, Nádasdy, Csibra, & Bíró, 1995).

Moreover, to demonstrate that rational imitation in infants is flexible, Schwier and colleagues (2006) presented 12-month-olds with an adult who showed an unusual action by making a toy animal enter a toy house through the chimney instead of the door. As expected, the infants imitated the unusual action more often when, during demonstration, the door of the house was open as compared with when it was locked. Here again, infants took context-specific information into account and reproduced the model’s behavior in relation to the situational constraints and the observed goal. Schwier and colleagues argued that rational action understanding is important in cultural learning processes in situations where it is essential to do things the way others do (e.g., when learning the conventional use of artifacts or communicative symbols).

Recently, some authors proposed alternative accounts for infants’ selective imitation. First, the motor resonance account (Paulus et al., 2011a, Paulus et al., 2011b) relies on the basic assumption that the observation of others’ actions fosters the performance of the same motor act (see Brass, Bekkering, Wohlschläger, & Prinz, 2000). Transferred to the touch light task, it is assumed that infants can perform the head movement only with their hands resting on the table. Therefore, motor resonance is supposed to be higher in the hands-free condition than in the hands-occupied condition, resulting in an enhanced imitation of the unusual head movement in the former rather than in the latter. Second, the perceptual distraction account (Beisert, Zmyj, Liepelt, Jung, Prinz, & Daum, 2012) explains infants’ context-specific imitation in the touch light task by attentional processes. In detail, the blanket that entirely covered the model’s upper body may have been very salient and, therefore, distracted infants’ attention from the head action in the hands-occupied condition, leading to a reduced imitation of the unusual action.

It is important to note that all three accounts consider selective imitation as an indicator of how infants have processed the demonstrated action within the given situational context. However, the accounts differ with respect to the type of information they render as relevant for infants’ action processing; the rationality account (Gergely, Bekkering, & Király, 2002) highlights constraints that hinder the model from performing the most effective means to the goal, the motor simulation account (Paulus et al., 2011a, Paulus et al., 2011b) focuses on specific features of the motor act, and the perceptual distraction account (Beisert et al., 2012) emphasizes the perceptual salience of the surrounding objects.

Although these accounts provide different explanations for infants’ encoding of action events in imitation tasks, little is still known about the development pattern of selective imitation. Thus, with regard to older children’s advanced cognitive capabilities and their ability to recognize the performance or accuracy of observed actions (Simpson & Riggs, 2011a) it would be interesting to elucidate whether 3- to 5-year-olds would show context-specific selective imitation like infants do or if they would show different imitation patterns. We assume that preschoolers’ changes in cognitive abilities would influence their interpretation of the context-specific information of observed actions and the interpersonal situation within an imitation task. The occurrence of imitation or emulation could inform us about how preschoolers, compared with infants, form a cognitive representation of an observed action within a specific situational context (Elsner, 2007).

To compare selective imitation, we presented 3- to 5-year-old preschoolers with identical tasks used in infant studies. We used the touch light task by Gergely and colleagues (2002) and the house task by Schwier and colleagues (2006), as described above. In addition, we designed a novel imitation task inspired by the looking time study of Gergely and colleagues (1995). In that study, 12-month-olds were habituated to a movie in which a circle jumped over an obstacle to reach another circle. During the test phase the obstacle was removed, and here the infants looked longer when the circle still performed a leap as compared with when the circle performed a straight movement. This has been taken as another instance of the rationality principle, in which infants expect the circle to perform the most effective means to the goal in the given situation (Gergely & Csibra, 2003). In our obstacle task, the model moved a toy teddy bear with an unusually big leap from a starting point to a cup, in which the bear was placed. The teddy bear’s path from the starting point to the cup was either free (no-constraint condition) or blocked by an obstacle (constraint condition). During the test phases of all tasks (touch light, house, and obstacle), preschoolers acted without constraints and we measured whether children would imitate the observed unusual action (i.e., head touch, going through the chimney, or making the leap) or whether they would emulate the goal by choosing a familiar action from their motor repertoire (e.g., using the hand, going through the door, or using a straight motion omitting the leap).

Our main question was whether preschoolers’ encoding or interpretation of object- and context-specific information in the modeled actions would differ in relation to findings in infant studies. For instance, the action demonstrated with the touch light differed from the other two tasks in that it comprised an unusual body movement from a model, it was an instrumental action in which a salient action effect was produced by switching on the light, and there was a situational constraint that could be interpreted as non-explicit due to the fact that the model deliberately decided to occupy her hands by holding the blanket (Zmyj, Daum, & Aschersleben, 2009). We were also interested in whether preschoolers’ selective imitation relies on verbal cues given by the model (highlighting either the unusual movement or the attained goal) as a social aspect of imitation (Uzgiris, 1981). It may be speculated that verbal cues are especially relevant in the no-constraint condition, when the model’s unusual movement is not justified by the situational context (Elsner & Pfeifer, 2012).

From the theoretical accounts outlined above, different predictions regarding preschoolers’ imitation in the three tasks can be deduced. If preschoolers behaved according to the rationality principle (Gergely et al., 2002), they should perform the demonstrated unusual action more often in the no-constraint condition than in the constraint condition in all three tasks. The same prediction can be derived from the perceptual distraction account (Beisert et al., 2012), but for different reasons. Here, it would be supposed that salience of the objects surrounding the demonstrated action is most important, so preschoolers should perform the demonstrated unusual action less often when a constraint is present. However, if motor resonance was most important (Paulus et al., 2011b), preschoolers should imitate the unusual movement in both conditions of the touch light task. Because of their advanced motor capabilities, preschoolers can perform the head movement without the support of their hands, so motor resonance should be equally strong in the hands-free and hands-occupied conditions. In the house task and the obstacle task, the action was acted out with a teddy bear, so it is difficult to draw predictions from the motor resonance account for these tasks.