Collateral and its substitutes in emerging markets’ lending
Highlights
► We examine the role of collateral in emerging markets’ lending. ► Micro data include loan terms, household characteristics and relationship characteristics. ► Most loans are provided without any tangible assets as collateral. ► Guarantees are the relatively most important substitute. ► Other substitutes are relationship lending and modified loan terms.
Introduction
Collateral is a regular ingredient of risky lending. It serves to limit potential losses for lenders and serves as an incentive mechanism and commitment signal for borrowers. Because of these functions it plays an important role in loan markets. Accordingly collateral is part of many if not most (business) loan contracts in mature markets (Steijvers and Voordeckers, 2009). Due to opaque information and weak enforcement, theory suggests that the request for collateral is even higher in less developed markets (Bae and Goyal, 2009, Behr et al., 2011, Hainz, 2003, Menkhoff et al., 2006). This high importance of collateral results into a problem for relatively poor borrowers in emerging markets: collateral requirements are expected to be particularly high but their ability to provide collateral is comparatively low. How do borrowers and lenders get along with this problem?
In principle, there may be two possibilities: first, collateral requirements are similar to requirements in mature markets so that poor households or entrepreneurs who lack adequate assets to pledge as collateral will be credit-rationed; second, conventional collateral is not necessary and lenders can issue some credit without collateral. In the latter case, the follow-up question is then how can a lender enforce a collateral-free loan, are there substitutes to collateral? Is it third party guarantees, pledged savings, other contractual features, close relationships or interpersonal trust that serve as collateral substitutes? As limited access to finance is constraining growth and welfare (Beck and Demirgüç-Kunt, 2008, Beck and Demirgüç-Kunt, 2008a) it seems important to learn about possible credit rationing induced by missing collateral and ways to overcome the threatening lack of collateral.
Despite the obvious relevance of lacking collateral for a very large share of the population in emerging countries, there is not much evidence available. Earlier studies documenting the use of collateral concentrate on mature markets. Studies on developing countries, however, are often narrow in their coverage, either with respect to target group, financial institutions or their information about borrowers and lending terms. In order to provide comprehensive evidence we have conducted a household survey in Northeastern Thailand in 2007. This survey covers 2186 rural households from which we receive information about household, demographic and in particular financial details; one should note that these households also operate as small entrepreneurs and that loans are accordingly used for production and consumption purposes, respectively. The three provinces of our sample are selected in order to differ in economic conditions. Moreover, Thailand’s rural areas are served by a variety of financial institutions (see Kaboski and Townsend, 2005, Siamwalla et al., 1990). All this provides welcome depth and diversity to our data set.
These data allow to empirically analyzing the above introduced “collateral puzzle” in emerging markets: first, we lay foundations by documenting the importance of collateral, second, we analyze the determinants of collateral including considering substitutes to collateral, and, third, we examine the use of the most important collateral substitutes. Regarding the importance of collateral we find that only about 15% of the 1671 loans in our sample are secured by various forms of collateral. Although there is some variation in cross-sections, such as household groups or borrowing purposes, the share of collateralized loans is consistently small throughout and does not exceed 25%. Moreover, the share of credit-constrained households is low at 11%, strongly indicating that lenders rely on substitutes to collateral in enforcing their interests.
This empirical research is the first, according to best of our knowledge, to systematically consider several substitutes to collateral in order to fully understand the role of collateral in lending to poor borrowers in emerging markets. We do indeed find that collateral is significantly less often required if there is either a third party guarantee or a case of relationship lending. The use of collateral is also related to other loan terms where collateral obviously serves to reduce the lender’s risk: more collateral is required for larger loans, for longer loan duration and for lower interest rates. As a third group of determinants we investigate household characteristics and possible default risk with little success. It is only better education that is related to less collateral requirements.
As the data set unusually covers two important collateral substitutes, i.e. guarantees and relationship lending, we are able to examine their use in the same market. We find that guarantees are relatively more important, that both substitutes work independently of each other and tend to substitute each other, that guarantees are relatively more important at formal financial institutions and that the marginal effect of these substitutes is independent of loan size. These findings extend recent literature emphasizing the importance of either guarantees or relationship lending in less developed markets as means to overcome information and incentive problems.
We are not aware that there is an earlier study on emerging markets where all these determinants of the use of collateral – including substitutes to the use of collateral – were considered within a unified approach. Closest in coverage is Ono and Uesugi (2009) for small firms in Japan where, however, collateral is very widely used and thus plays another role than in our case. Usually, studies rely on a subset of the following determinants: guarantees, relationship, loan term and borrower characteristics. Our study shows, however, that all of these groups of determinants are important in analyzing the use of collateral and thus should not be missed in empirical work.
The paper is organized in four more sections. Section 2 provides an overview of the theoretical and empirical literature which shapes expectations to be examined. Section 3 informs about the data used in this study and the characteristics of borrowers and lenders in the rural areas. In Section 4 we examine the use of collateral by descriptive statistics. The hypotheses on the determinants of collateral are tested by multivariate analyses in Section 5. Section 6 concludes.
Section snippets
Literature review
Our literature review aims for preparing expectations on the use of collateral in lending in emerging markets. We are thus selective in coverage. Section 2.1 addresses theoretical literature in order to derive hypotheses of interest, whereas Section 2.2 deals with respective empirical work in order to identify gaps in research.
Data compilation
The data used in this analysis are based on a household survey conducted in 2007 in three provinces in the Northeast region of Thailand. The survey is part of the project “Impact of shocks on the vulnerability to poverty: consequences for development of emerging Southeast Asian economies” (FOR 756), funded by the German Research Foundation (DFG). The Northeast region is particularly interesting for our study because it is often considered the poorest region with limited access to formal
The incidence and degree of collateral: aggregated view
In our sample, the incidence of collateral is surprisingly low, while the degree of collateral is high. Only 15% of loans are secured by collateral, but the mean collateral value is clearly above 100% of the loan volume. The degree of collateralization is much higher than that observed for business loans in previous studies (for an overview see Menkhoff et al., 2006). In a sample of loans to small, medium and large firms in Thailand the mean collateral value as percentage of loan volume was
Baseline results
In this section, we analyze which factors affect lenders’ decisions to give loans without any tangible collateral. We use the probit model to explain the incidence of collateral.
In our baseline regressions, we exclude loans from the lending institutions VF and POLICY from our analysis because the collateral policies of these institutions are institutionally fixed, i.e. loans are secured by third party guarantees. Alternatively we also exclude loans from two more lending institutions: CB, since
Conclusions
This paper examines the use of collateral in lending to relatively poor households in emerging countries, i.e. this research targets at a large fraction of world-wide population. Collateral is an important instrument for lending institutions. In general, collateral limits potential losses to the lenders in case of loan defaults and reduces borrowers’ incentives to default. Due to opaque information and weak enforcement, theory suggests that the incidence of collateral is even higher in
Acknowledgements
We thank participants at the Annual Conference of the German Economic Association 2010, at the International Workshop on “The Pro-Development Role of Banking and Finance in the Economic Periphery“, Bellagio, 2010, at the II. Workshop “Banking and Financial Intermediation: SMEs, Growth and Banking”, Rimini, 2010, Michael Funke, Oliver Gloede, Paola Rossi, Simona Zambelli and in particular an anonymous referee for very helpful comments. Financial support by the German Research Foundation (DFG) is
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