National identity in a divided nation: South Koreans’ attitudes toward North Korean defectors and the reunification of two Koreas

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijintrel.2016.10.003Get rights and content

Abstract

This paper examines how national identity is associated with South Koreans’ attitudes toward North Korean defectors and their opinions on the relationship between two Koreas. Using a nationally representative survey, we find that individuals high on ethnic identity are more likely to harbor negative attitudes toward migrants from North Korea and less likely to believe that the reunification between two Koreas is necessary. The findings suggest that alleged common belief in “one nation, two countries” notwithstanding, political division has led South Koreans to regard North Korean citizens as an out-group, who are not clearly distinguishable from non-coethnic immigrants.

Introduction

In recent years, scholars have paid greater attention to the causes and consequences of national identity.1 Academic interest in national identity is based on a long tradition of exploring identity formation and group relations in the field of social psychology (e.g., Brown, 1995). Recent scholarly attention reflects the reality that the massive flow of immigrants has blurred national boundaries of many advanced industrial democracies. A growing number of studies now report a significant association between national identity and public attitudes toward immigration, and its magnitude is known to be comparable to that of some key predictors of opinions on immigration issues such as retrospective evaluations of economic conditions, assessment of individuals’ personal finances, and the levels of educational attainment (e.g., Wright, 2011a).

In line with this research tradition, the present study examines the relationship between national identity and South Koreans’ attitudes towards North Korean defectors and their opinions on the relationship between the two Koreas. Our paper contributes to the literature on national identity and immigration by offering evidence from a country with a unique context. Koreans have traditionally considered themselves as “one single nation” that shares a common bloodline and culture (Shin, 2006). Such an alleged ethnic and cultural homogeneity has often entailed xenophobic reactions to the influx of immigrant workers from China and South Asian countries (e.g., Kim, 2011). In this regard, it is interesting to examine how South Korean national identity manifests itself with respect to North Korea. Two Koreas had shared a history as a single political community for more than a thousand years until they were forced to be divided into two countries in 1948.2 Even after the division, South Koreans continue to—or have been educated to—believe in an ethnic and cultural commonality with fellow members in North Korea, who have now lived in a very different political and economic system. That being said, the noticeably increasing number of North Korean defectors in South Korea in the past decade leads us to pose intriguing puzzles. Does an emphasis on a shared ethnicity and culture still direct South Koreans to view North Korean defectors differently (i.e., as co-ethnic individuals) from immigrant workers from other countries? Also, how would South Koreans’ understanding of national identity be linked to their opinions on the issue of the reunification between two Koreas, i.e., the restoration of a single nation-state? In a nutshell, these questions ask us to examine how national identity works when the nation itself is politically divided.

Relying on the dichotomous conceptualization of national identity—civic and ethnic—that demarcates normative boundaries of a nation (Brubaker, 1992, Smith, 1991), we test two mutually competing hypotheses by analyzing a nationally representative survey dataset. On one hand, assuming that Korean nationalism (“one nation, two countries”) rooted in the ethnic and cultural unity between South and North Koreans still persists, we may expect that a greater sense of ethnic identity should be more likely to be associated with positive attitudes toward migrants from North Korea and strong support for the reunification. On the other hand, taking into consideration the fact that two Koreas have already been governed under very different political and economic systems for more than six decades, we cannot rule out the possibility that South Koreans’ views on North Koreans may not be framed by Korean nationalism anymore. If the latter is the case, we may expect that a greater sense of ethnic identity—which is presumably limited to South Koreans—relates to negative attitudes toward North Korean defectors just like in the case of other immigrants from foreign countries and relatively lower levels of support for the reunification. By testing these hypotheses, the dynamics of national identity in South Korea will be able to be understood in a more nuanced way.

Section snippets

National identity and public attitudes toward immigrants

In a vast amount of literature on nationalism, nations are commonly referred to as “imagined communities” (Anderson, 1983), i.e., groups of people with a common “we-feeling” or a sense of mutual belonging and obligation. Such an understanding suggests that we are able to empirically measure a sense of belonging to the nation (i.e., national identity) by observing the criteria that individuals use to distinguish “us” from “them”. In this respect, the distinction between “ethnic” and “civic”

The Korean case

Until being occupied and declared as Imperial Japanese protectorate in 1905, Koreans had shared a history as a single political community with a common ancestry and homogeneous culture for more than a thousand years. The Japanese occupation and colonial administration ended in 1945, but the Korean peninsula was soon divided into two occupation zones at the 38th parallel—the northern zone governed by the Soviet Union and the southern zone administrated by the United States. Though not originally

Hypotheses

As mentioned above, the literature on public attitudes toward immigrants has shown that individuals with a strong sense of ethnic identity tend to have negative attitudes toward immigrants, whereas civic identity does not necessarily facilitate antagonism against immigrants. Considering that Korean nationalism has primarily been defined in ethnic and cultural terms (Shin, 2006), it is safe to assume that South Koreans’ attitudes toward immigrants as an out-group would not be an exception.

Data and measure

For empirical analysis, we use the 2010 Korean General Social Survey (KGSS). The KGSS is a nationally representative, face-to-face survey with the sampling procedure and interviewing methods being virtually identical to those of the General Social Survey (GSS) in the United States. It contains the topical modules (in addition to core questions), which are mostly shared with the International Social Survey Program (ISSP) and the East Asian Social Survey (EASS). This particular survey took place

Results

The main findings are reported in Table 1. The results from all three models confirm that the idea of “one nation, two countries” does not exist anymore. Higher levels of ethnic identity among South Koreans yield negative attitudes toward North Korean defectors and the reunification of two Koreas. Model 1 shows that a relatively stronger sense of ethnic identity (indicated by prioritization) leads South Koreans to believe that the government should not increase the number of North Korean

Discussion

This paper demonstrates that there are statistically significant relationships between national identity and South Koreans’ attitudes toward North Korean defectors and their opinions on the reunification of two Koreas. The analyses reveal that individuals high on ethnic—exclusive—identity relative to more inclusive civic identity are more likely to harbor negative attitudes toward North Korean defectors and less likely to believe that the reunification is necessary. That said, despite alleged

Acknowledgement

This work was supported by the National Research Foundation of Korea Grant funded by the Korean Government (NRF-2015-S1A5A2A03049595).

References (35)

  • A. Alesina et al.

    Fractionalization

    Journal of Economic Growth

    (2003)
  • B. Anderson

    Imagined communities: Reflection on the origin and spread of nationalism

    (1983)
  • E. Bidet

    Social capital and work integration of migrants: the case of North Korean defectors in South Korea

    Asian Perspective

    (2009)
  • E.S. Borgadus

    Measurement of personal-group relations

    Sociometry

    (1947)
  • R. Brown

    Prejudice: Its social psychology

    (1995)
  • R. Brubaker

    Citizenship and nationhood in France and Germany

    (1992)
  • N. Choi

    The North Koran refugee policy of the Lee Myung-bak government: Nationalism and multiculturalism

    SAIS US-Korea yearbook

    (2010)
  • E.A. Chung

    Immigration and citizenship in Japan

    (2010)
  • B. Cumings

    Korea’s place in the sun: A modern history

    (1997)
  • R.J.P. De Figueiredo et al.

    Are patriots bigots? An inquiry into the vices of in-group pride

    American Journal of Political Science

    (2003)
  • H. Em

    Minjok as a modern and democratic construct: Shin Ch’aeho’s historiography of Korea

  • J. Fitzgerald

    Social engagement and immigration attitudes: Panel survey evidence from Germany

    International Migration Review

    (2012)
  • S. Haggard et al.

    Witness to transformation: Refugee insights into North Korea

    (2011)
  • M. Helbling

    Why Swiss-German dislike German: Opposition to culturally similar and highly skilled immigrants

    European Societies

    (2011)
  • L. Huddy et al.

    American patriotism, national identity: And political involvement

    American Journal of Political Science

    (2007)
  • F.L. Jones et al.

    Individual and societal bases of national identity: A comparative multi-level analysis

    European Sociological Review

    (2001)
  • N. Karakayali

    Social distance and affective orientations

    Sociological Forum

    (2009)
  • Cited by (25)

    • Methodological framework for analyzing peace engineering: Focusing on Kaesong Industrial Complex and North Korean innovators in South Korea

      2021, Technological Forecasting and Social Change
      Citation Excerpt :

      Table 16). Our survey results are consistent with recent survey results on South Koreans' attitudes toward North Korean defectors (Ha and Jang, 2016). A survey on the relationship between utilizing their expertise and satisfaction with settlement was carried out on the same group of NKIs to search for clues regarding the level of SK's readiness for a unified Korea.

    • Applying target congruence theory to victimization risk of students from multicultural backgrounds: A comparison of South Korean, North Korean, and other multicultural family adolescents

      2020, Children and Youth Services Review
      Citation Excerpt :

      For instance, multiculturalism can be seen as a form of target antagonism (Kahle & Peguero, 2017; Zavala & Whitney, 2019). This is because South Korean culture pressures members to hold high levels of disdain for multicultural persons, especially those of North Korean descent (Ha & Jang, 2016). In support of this position, Yu et al. (2012) found that many North Korean defectors who escaped North Korea and lived in South Korea reported experiencing discrimination and feelings of isolation.

    • We or they? A summit, accents and South Korean stereotypes toward North Koreans

      2020, International Journal of Intercultural Relations
      Citation Excerpt :

      Those who are more receptive to multiculturalism hold more positive attitudes toward North Korean defectors (Son & Lee, 2012). However, those with a strong sense of national identity are less likely to feel close to North Korean defectors or to support reunification (Ha & Jang, 2016). Having a North Korean accent is one of the principal obstacles to North Korean defectors’ adaptation to South Korean society (Chung, 2008).

    View all citing articles on Scopus
    View full text