NoteA difficulty in implementing correlated equilibrium distributions☆
References (23)
Subjectivity and correlation in randomized strategies
J. Math. Econ.
(1974)Correlation without mediation: Expanding the set of equilibrium outcomes by cheap pre-play procedures
J. Econ. Theory
(1998)Cheap talk in games with incomplete information
J. Econ. Theory
(2003)Unmediated communication in games with complete and incomplete information
J. Econ. Theory
(2004)Secure protocols or how communication generates correlation
J. Econ. Theory
(1998)- et al.
One-shot public mediated talk
Games Econ. Behav.
(1997) - et al.
Virtual implementation in iteratively undominated strategies: Complete information
Econometrica
(1992) - et al.
Virtual implementation in Nash equilibrium
Econometrica
(1991) Correlated equilibrium as an expression of Bayesian rationality
Econometrica
(1987)- et al.
Long cheap talk
Econometrica
(2003)
Fair distribution protocols or how players replace fortune
Math. Operations Res.
(1992)
Cited by (6)
Implementation in adaptive better-response dynamics: Towards a general theory of bounded rationality in mechanisms
2011, Games and Economic BehaviorNash versus coarse correlation
2020, Experimental EconomicsCommunity-level natural resource management institutions: A noncooperative equilibrium example
2018, International Journal of the CommonsImplementability of correlated and communication equilibrium outcomes in incomplete information games
2014, International Journal of Game TheoryBut who will monitor the monitor
2012, American Economic ReviewMarkov games of incomplete information for multi-agent reinforcement learning
2011, AAAI Workshop - Technical Report
- ☆
We are indebted to Francoise Forges, Chirantan Ganguly, Dino Gerardi, and especially Rajiv Vohra for their helpful comments. We also thank two anonymous referees and the editor-in-charge for their constructive criticisms. Work on this paper began while Ray was visiting Brown University. Serrano gratefully acknowledges Universidad Carlos III and CEMFI in Madrid for their hospitality, and Fundacion Banco Herrero and Universidad Carlos III for research support.
Copyright © 2008 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.