Elsevier

Games and Economic Behavior

Volume 67, Issue 1, September 2009, Pages 245-252
Games and Economic Behavior

Competitive environments and protective behavior

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2008.10.011Get rights and content

Abstract

The class of two-person competition games is introduced and analyzed. For any game in this class the set of Nash equilibria is convex and all Nash equilibria lead to the same payoff vector. Competition games are compared to other competitive environments such as unilaterally competitive games and rivalry games. Moreover, protective behavior within competitive environments is analyzed. For matrix games it is known that protective strategies profiles exactly correspond to proper equilibria. It is shown that this result can be extended to the class of unilaterally competitive games.

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