Methodological and Ideological Options
Rhetoric, epistemology and climate change economics

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Highlights

  • Clarifies the role of rhetoric in climate change mitigation proposals.

  • Provides background on the historical development of rhetoric that is absent for available literature in ecological economics.

  • Critiques prognostications of economic models for climate change mitigation proposals.

  • Explores the connection between rhetoric, epistemology and language in the context of climate change activism.

Abstract

This paper explores the epistemological basis for economic prognostications of climate change activists arising from, arguably, the most important scientific problem confronting modern society: the facts, beliefs and theories associated with the measurement, causes, impact and mitigation of climate change. This facilitates identification of the role that rhetoric plays in activist claims associated with the economics of global warming and climate change. Following a rudimentary discussion of ancient views on rhetoric, the connection of rhetoric with anti-foundational epistemology and language is identified. Criteria for determining when language is rhetorical are specified. Exploiting this philosophical background, mitigation proposals of climate change activists derived from models of climate change economics are critiqued.

Introduction

Almost a century ago, the eminent Chicago economist Frank Knight (1925, p.373-4) observed:

Human beings act, not on the basis of fact and reality as such, but on the basis of opinions and beliefs about facts, and what is called knowledge, but which at best falls notoriously short of the implications of that term. From a logical point of view therefore, one who aspires to explain or understand human behavior must be, not finally but first of all, an epistemologist.

Though Knight was concerned with economic ‘knowledge’, a few decades later the influential experimental psychologist Edwin Boring (1954, p.639) observed such a claim applies, more generally, to scientific ‘knowledge’ because: “science is a human activity and that you have, therefore, to take into account the properties of human beings when you are assessing facts and theories.” Though such epistemic observations have ancient roots, in recognizing the impact of the “personal equation” on scientific ‘facts’ and theories, Knight and Boring provide insight into the influence that language has on the production and interpretation of ‘scientific’ knowledge about climate change and global warming. More precisely, the ability to influence human behavior using ‘the art of persuasion’ --- rhetoric – raises essential questions concerning the validity of economic knowledge claims made by climate change activists. Though modern references to rhetoric are typically pejorative, such references usually fail to recognize the epistemic foundations required to distinguish what is ‘rhetorical language’ from legitimate scientific knowledge claims.

This paper explores the epistemological basis for economic prognostications arising from, arguably, the most important scientific problem confronting modern society: the facts, beliefs and theories associated with the measurement, causes, impact and mitigation of climate change. This involves identifying the role that rhetoric plays in activist claims associated with the economics of global warming and climate change. In deference to the ancient origins, the following narrative commences with a rudimentary discussion of ancient views on rhetoric. The connection of rhetoric with epistemology and language is identified and subsequent evolution up to the influential contribution of McCloskey, 1983, McCloskey, 1985 is summarized and epistemic criteria specified for determining when language is rhetorical. In contrast to McCloskey and others where all economic discourse is perceived as rhetorical, this paper distinguishes rhetorical from legitimate non-rhetorical language forms employed in the economic discourse that climate change activists use to exert significant influence over mitigation initiatives. Building on an observation by Fish (1998) that “another word for anti-foundationalism is rhetoric”, criteria for distinguishing anti-foundational rhetoric from non-rhetorical scientific language are informed by the naturalized epistemology proposed by Quine and others asserting that ‘propositions that are not confirmable by experiment or by direct empirical observation are not scientific’.

Exploiting this philosophical background, mitigation proposals derived from models of climate change economics are critiqued. Such strategies fall into two general groups: GHG emissions reduction; and, atmospheric GHG removal. Support for specific mitigation strategies reveals a central feature of climate change activism: the belief that Science can save the world from environmental catastrophe. This leads to emphasis on ‘soft strategies’: switching from fossil fuel to green(er) energy sources, especially in electricity generation and transportation; expanded use of nationally-based carbon pricing and cap-and-trade schemes; and, development and introduction of carbon capture and removal technologies. Clarification of the role that rhetoric plays in support of such strategies reveals systemic epistemic difficulties in key mitigation proposals. In the context of climate change, there is a complex layering of beliefs associated with: ex post scientific knowledge of climate change; ex ante theories about causes and effects of such change; and, rhetorical claims about the effectiveness of mitigation proposals. While evidence from scientific measurements of climate change justifies knowledge claims that such change is happening, other layers of belief concerned with the feasibility of ‘soft’ policies to combat climate change raise legitimate questions about the possibility of belief outstripping the evidence that such policies will be effective.2

Section snippets

Classical rhetoric

Despite attempts by Shi (2004), Shaw and Nerlich (2015) and Goul (2020) to keep the flame alive by continuing a critique of mainstream methodology employed in economic ecology, the ‘rhetorical turn’ promised by McCloskey (1983, 1985) and explored in ecological economics by Luks (1998) has seemingly faded into relative obscurity.3 This failure of the

Epistemology and language

Despite being from an era that is centuries in the past, the perceived a priori truths of medieval Christian faith provide helpful insight into the interpretation and identification of rhetoric in modern academic discourse. Medieval scholasticism represents an extreme historical instance of foundational epistemology. Since being advocated by Aristotle, foundationalism has evolved different variants involving demarcation between basic belief and non-basic belief. Basic beliefs are ‘characterized

Evidence, knowledge and belief

Concepts of evidence, knowledge and belief are central to traditional epistemology. At least since William James and Durant Drake, philosophers have debated whether and under what conditions ‘belief can outstrip evidence’ (Sharadin, 2015; Talbot, 2014). In contrast to the anti-foundational relativist approach to rhetoric advanced by McCloskey and Luks where “what really counts in scientific discourse is good argument: rhetoric” (Luks, 1998, p.141), a belief statement in naturalized epistemology

Ecological economics and climate change activism

What are the social and institutional conditions that sustain rational belief in mitigation strategies derived from climate change economics? When targeted to climate change there is a vast ‘scientific’ literature replete with ‘scientific evidence’ that provides an evidentiary foundation for climate change activism.8

Climate change: evidence, causes, effects and mitigation

For all but a chosen few with the resources to engage in climate science, evidence about climate change originates from the testimony of external sources. Sources of basic belief available to the individual alone – perception, memory, consciousness and reason – are incapable of generating much knowledge of climate change. As with the sources of basic belief available to an individual, external sources of evidence can be subject to error. However, in the realm of climate change, the ethos of

Mitigation, adaption and IPCC AR59

The recent Fifth Assessment Report (AR5) (IPCC, 2013; IPCC, 2014) prepared by the United Nations body responsible for assessing the science related to climate change provides a complicated deductive chain starting from ex post scientific knowledge about temperature change, to theories about causes, to ex ante estimates of climate change effects nested with proposals for mitigating and adapting to such effects. At what point in this chain, if any, does scientific knowledge transition to

Economics of climate change mitigation

Knowledge about climate change due to global temperature warming, caused by increased levels of anthropogenic GHG emissions in the atmosphere, originates from the collective of climate scientists. This scientific knowledge is a powerful motivator for climate change activism. In contrast, the economics associated with ex ante estimates of effects and mitigation of climate change lacks the scientific foundation necessary to rise above the status of rhetoric. The epistemological transition from

Conclusion

What can epistemology contribute to understanding human behavior toward climate change? Where does rational belief of individuals based on ‘science’ end and the “folk psychology” of social group activism take hold? Knowledge about climate change based on ex post scientific measurements and observations is deeply disturbing. Such knowledge can lead to dark and depressing ‘nihilism, despair, and disenchantment’. Being beyond the capacity of the individual to provide a solution, the frightening

Declaration of Competing Interest

The authors declare that they have no known competing financial interests or personal relationships that could have appeared to influence the work reported in this paper.

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    The author is Professor of Finance at Simon Fraser University in the Beedie School of Business and member of the Graduate Liberal Studies Program at Simon Fraser University, Vancouver, Canada.

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