Elsevier

Cognition

Volume 146, January 2016, Pages 16-21
Cognition

Identical but not interchangeable: Preschoolers view owned objects as non-fungible

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2015.09.011Get rights and content

Abstract

Owned objects are typically viewed as non-fungible—they cannot be freely interchanged. We report three experiments (total N = 312) demonstrating this intuition in preschool-aged children. In Experiment 1, children considered an agent who takes one of two identical objects and leaves the other for a peer. Children viewed this as acceptable when the agent took his own item, but not when he took his peer’s item. In Experiment 2, children considered scenarios where one agent took property from another. Children said the victim could take back her own property from the perpetrator, but that she could not take an identical object belonging to the perpetrator. Finally, in Experiment 3A and 3B, children considered scenarios where a teacher could give a child either of two objects to play with—an object that the child had recently played with, or another object that looked the same. Children were more likely to say that the teacher should give the object recently played with when it belonged to the child, compared with when it belonged to the teacher. These findings are informative about the basis of judgments that property is non-fungible, and about young children’s representation of ownership rights. They show that children’s representation of ownership rights is not limited to principles protecting owners from being deprived. Our findings instead suggest that ownership rights are viewed as pertaining to individual objects.

Introduction

It is impermissible to replace a moonrock in a museum with a rock from your backyard, even if the rocks are physically indistinguishable. One reason this might be unacceptable is that the rocks differ in history and value. The moonrock has remarkable origins and is valuable; the rock from your backyard has mundane origins and is worthless. However, many objects cannot be freely interchanged even when they hold similar interest and value. For instance, if you borrow a shovel from your neighbor, you are typically expected to return it, rather than giving your neighbor a different but indistinguishable shovel; likewise, if you can restore a lost scarf to its owner, you are expected to give that scarf to the owner, and not a duplicate.

This non-fungibility of objects has been explicit in law from Ancient times and is still raised in legal discussions today (e.g., Mousourakis, 2012, Radin, 1982). It is a striking hallmark of people’s reasoning about most owned things, and has, as the examples of borrowing and restoring lost property show, widespread implications for people’s behavior in relation to owned objects. A world in which people viewed owned objects as non-fungible would operate very differently—people would not care if others took or kept their property, so long as they received comparable replacement objects. There are some exceptional things, like money, which people do largely treat as fungible (i.e., when you lend $20, you do not expect to receive the same $20 bill in return). However, adults sometimes even treat fungibles, like money, as non-interchangeable (Di Muro and Noseworthy, 2013, Uhlmann and Zhu, 2013; also see R v Velumyl, 1989).

The intuition that objects are not freely interchangeable is informative about people’s representations of ownership rights (see Radin, 1982). Switching an owned object with a duplicate typically produces no negative consequences for the owner (assuming the object does not hold sentimental value). For instance, if you take a friend’s umbrella, and replace it with a different but indistinguishable umbrella, she is no worse off. Hence, judgments that objects are not freely interchangeable suggest that people do not only view ownership rights as functioning to defend owners from negative consequences. Instead these judgments suggest that people may view ownership rights as giving people rights over particular objects.

Although the notion that most individual objects cannot be freely interchanged has long been part of law, little is known about its emergence in the lifespan. Discovering whether young children view objects as non-fungible might be informative about the nature and origins of these intuitions, and about the early representation of ownership rights. Young children might show this hallmark of reasoning about objects because they show an appreciation of ownership rights (e.g., Blake and Harris, 2009, Kanngiesser and Hood, 2014, Kim and Kalish, 2009, Neary and Friedman, 2014, Rossano et al., 2011). For instance, 3-year-olds spontaneously protest when someone violates their ownership rights or those of a third party (Rossano et al., 2011) and they typically side with owners over non-owners in disputes about the use of property (Neary & Friedman, 2014; also see Kim & Kalish, 2009). However, such findings do not show whether children view owned objects as non-interchangeable. Although children might normally show concern for an owner’s rights to an object, they might not show similar concern if a physically identical replacement was available to the owner.

Some studies show that preschoolers do distinguish between physically indistinguishable objects when judging who owns them (Gelman et al., 2012, Gelman et al., 2014). In these studies, children were told that one of three identical objects is theirs and that another belongs to the experimenter. Later, after the objects were moved, 3-year-olds correctly identified whose was whose. These findings show that preschoolers treat ownership as pertaining to individual things (e.g., I own this particular object), rather than applying more generally to objects of a certain type. But the findings do not address whether children view owned objects as non-interchangeable. For instance, after correctly identifying whose was whose, children could have judged it acceptable to substitute their object with the experimenter’s without first asking. Moreover, some findings from these studies suggest that children could view objects as freely interchangeable. When children were asked which object the experimenter liked best, they did not selectively choose the experimenter’s object (Gelman et al., 2012). Nor did they consistently claim preference of their own objects: Children said that they liked their property best in one study (Gelman et al., 2012), but not in the other (Gelman et al., 2014).

Other studies have also found that mere ownership may not affect young children’s judgments about indistinguishable objects (Frazier and Gelman, 2009, Gelman et al., 2015, Hood and Bloom, 2008). For instance, Hood and Bloom (2008) found that many 3- to 6-year-olds are willing to give up a toy for a perfect duplicate; strong resistance only occurred if the original had special value, and was an attachment object.1 If children are insensitive to differences in ownership for these judgments, they might also show this insensitivity when judging whether owned objects can be freely interchanged (e.g., children might judge this is acceptable if they think people are indifferent about whether they receive their property or a duplicate). Regardless, discovering whether children view owned objects as freely interchangeable will be informative about the extent to which they reason about particular things as individuals (e.g., this shovel) or as members of categories (i.e., shovels with particular features).

We investigated whether children view objects as non-fungible in three experiments. Across the three experiments, our participants included children aged three to five. We investigated these ages as they are the youngest ages at which there is compelling evidence of awareness of other people’s ownership rights (e.g., Neary and Friedman, 2014, Rossano et al., 2011).

Section snippets

Participants

We tested 36 4-year-olds (M age = 4;7, range = 4;0–4;11, 15 girls) and 36 5-year-olds (M age = 5;6, range = 5;0–5;11, 21 girls). In both experiments, children were recruited from and tested at child-care centers and schools.

Materials and procedure

Participants listened to two stories narrated by the experimenter, with accompanying pictures shown on a laptop. In the first story, a boy and girl each owned a rubber duck. The girl went to her house to have a snack, leaving her duck behind. The boy then took one rubber duck into

Participants

We tested 34 3-year-olds (M age = 3;6, range = 3;1–3;11, 14 girls) and 36 4-year-olds (M age = 4;6, range = 4;0–4;11, 21 girls). We excluded an additional four 3-year-olds because they failed comprehension questions twice (i.e., when first asked, and then again after being retold the relevant information).

Materials and procedure

Participants listened to two stories narrated by the experimenter, with accompanying pictures shown on a laptop. In the first story, a boy and girl each owned a yellow balloon. The boy took the girl’s

Participants

In Experiment 3A, we tested 31 3-year-olds (M age = 3;6, range = 3;1–3;11, 15 girls) and 35 4-year-olds (M age = 4;6, range = 4;0–4;11, 12 girls); a further 6 children were excluded from analysis because they failed comprehension questions twice (i.e., when first asked, and then again after being retold the relevant information). In Experiment 3B, we tested 32 3-year-olds (M age = 4;6, range = 3;0–3;11, 16 girls) and 34 4-year-olds (M age = 4;7, range = 4;1–4;11, 23 girls); again, a further 6 children were

General discussion

Our findings show that preschool-age children view everyday objects as non-fungible. When considering a scenario where a boy took one of two identical objects home, and left the other for a girl, preschoolers viewed his behavior as more acceptable when he took his own item, rather than the girl’s (Experiment 1). When considering a scenario where a boy deprived a girl of her balloon, preschoolers judged it acceptable for the girl to take back her own balloon; but they judged it unacceptable for

Author note

Research was supported by a grant from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada awarded to OF.

References (18)

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