Chapter 4 - Early Objectification of the Self

Infants’ social bids in the still face phase of the Still Face Task demonstrate their emerging sense of self agency as these behaviors happen in the absence of the partner’s social overtures. The study examined the role of infants’ contingent responsiveness to their mothers in social interactions on their social bidding to the mother when she becomes unresponsive. Social bids are non-distress vocalizations or smiles while looking at the unresponsive partner. Infants and their mothers longitudinally engaged in the Still Face Task when infants were one, two, and three months. At two months, infant non-distress vocalizations and smiles and contingent vocal and smiling responsiveness increased in the initial interactive phase and vocal and smile social bids increased in the still face phase. Infant contingent vocal responsiveness predicted infant vocal social bids but infant contingent smiling responsiveness did not predict infant smile social bids. Infant contingent vocal responsiveness was a stronger predictor than infant non-distress vocalizations per se of infant vocal social bids at two and three months. However, maternal contingent vocal responsiveness was the primary predictor of infant vocal social bids at these ages. Maternal contingent responsiveness to infant behavior allows infants to sense their agency in affecting their mothers’ behavior. Yet infants are active participants, becoming contingently responsive to their mothers, which facilitates their awareness that they are effective agents in instigating social interaction, as demonstrated by social bids.

This paper focuses on the development of explicit self-awareness in children. Mirror self-recognition has been the most popular paradigm used to assess this ability in children. Nevertheless, according to Rochat (2003), there are, at least, three different levels of explicit self-awareness. We therefore designed three different self-recognition tasks, each corresponding to one of these levels (a mirror self-recognition task, a picture self-recognition task and a masked self-recognition task). We observed a decrease in performance across the three tasks. This supports a developmental scale in self-awareness. Besides, the masked self-recognition performance makes it possible to assess the final and the most sophisticated level of self-awareness, i.e. the external self. To our best knowledge, this task is the first attempt to evaluate the external self in preverbal children. Our results indicate that 22-month old children show awareness of their external self or, at least, that this ability is in the process of being acquired.

Mirror self-experience is re-casted away from the cognitivist interpretation that has dominated discussions on the issue since the establishment of the mirror mark test. Ideas formulated by Merleau-Ponty on mirror self-experience point to the profoundly unsettling encounter with one’s specular double. These ideas, together with developmental evidence are re-visited to provide a new, psychologically and phenomenologically more valid account of mirror self-experience: an experience associated with deep wariness.

The present study investigated the touching behaviors of 4-month-old infants of depressed and non-depressed mothers during the still-face (SF; maternal emotional unavailability) and separation (SP; maternal physical unavailability) procedures. Forty-one dyads participated in the present study; dyads were from low SES backgrounds and they exhibited poor relationship qualities (e.g. poor maternal sensitivity, low infant responsiveness); thus, they were considered at-risk. Results indicated that infants exhibited more patting and pulling when mothers were unavailable during the SF and SP procedures. Moreover, depression affected infants’ tactile behaviors: infants of depressed mothers used more reactive types of touch (i.e. active touching behaviors, such as grab, pat, pull) than infants of non-depressed mothers during emotional and physical unavailability, suggesting greater activity levels in infants of depressed mothers. Negative relationship indicators, such as maternal intrusiveness and hostility, predicted soothing/regulatory (i.e. nurturing) and reactive/regulatory types of touch, even after controlling for maternal depression. Taken together, these results underscore the importance of touch for infant communication and regulation during early social interactions.

The “body image” is a putative mental representation of one’s own body, including structural and geometric details, as well as the more familiar visual and affective aspects. Very little research has investigated how we learn the structure of our own body, with most researchers emphasising the canonical visual representation of the body when we look at ourselves in a mirror. Here, we used non-visual self-touch in healthy participants to investigate the possibility that primary sensorimotor experience may influence cognitive representations of one’s own body structure. Participants used the fingers of one hand (the ‘active’ hand), to touch the fingers of the other (the ‘passive’ hand). A conflict between the experience of the active and passive hand was introduced by experimenter interleaving their fingers with the fingers of the participant’s passive hand. This led to the active hand experiencing that it touched more fingers than the passive hand felt it was being touched by. The effects on representation of body structure were assessed using an implicit measure based on Kinsbourne and Warrington’s ‘in-between task’. We found an underestimation of the number of fingers in the central part of the hand specifically linked to the experience of self-touch. This pattern of results corresponds to the experience of the passive hand, but not the active hand. Nevertheless, comparable reorganisation of fingers within the hand representation was found for both active and passive hands. We show that primary sensorimotor experience can modify the representation of body structure. This modification is driven by the passive experience of being touched, rather than by the active experience of touching. We believe this is the first experimental study of effects of self-touch on the mental representation of the body.

Intentionality is defined as the cognitive ability to represent goals beyond the here and now of perception. First signs of intentionality appear by the second month after birth. A major mechanism responsible for such development might be the unique reciprocal and intentional ways humans communicate with each other, particularly their young progenies. I argue that starting in the second month, reciprocal exchanges, affective mirroring, and mutual imitations with others provide infants with the unique opportunity to differentiate as well as to compare and conjugate first (self) and third (others’) person perspectives. This ability is a prerequisite not only for referential communication but also of intentionality. It corresponds to the emergence of a new contemplative and “meta” stance toward the world. An argument is made that the developmental origins of this stance are primarily social, not to be found in the individual infant interacting solely with physical objects.