Children's use of counterfactual thinking in causal reasoning

doi:10.1016/S0010-0277(96)00715-9

Cognition

Volume 61, Issue 3, December 1996, Pages 233-259

https://doi.org/10.1016/S0010-0277(96)00715-9 Get rights and content

Abstract

Research on children's causal thinking has emphasized the perception of temporal and spatial contiguity between cause and effect. However, our causal judgements often involve a contrast between a perceived sequence (A, then B) and a counterfactual case (in the absence of A, then not B). In three experiments, children's capacity for such counterfactual thinking was assessed. In Experiment 1, children aged 3–5 years observed a sequence such as A causing B. Subsequently, they replied quite accurately to a question about a counterfactual sequence, for example: “What if A had not occurred, then B or not B?”. In Experiment 2, children were asked about two counterfactual antecedents, one that would not have caused B, and one that (like the actual antecedent) would also have caused B. Children differentiated between the two types of antecedent. Finally, in Experiment 3, children heard stories in which the protagonist chose a course of action that led to a minor mishap (e.g., drawing with a black pen and getting inky fingers), having rejected an option that would have prevented it in experimental stories (e.g., using a pencil) or an option that would have led to an equivalent outcome in control stories (e.g., using a blue pen). Children aged 3 and 4 years often cited the failure to adopt another course of action as the cause of the mishap and, particularly in experimental stories, they focused on the rejection of the alternative option. Children's use of counterfactual thinking is discussed in relation to contemporary accounts of causal reasoning.

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Citation Excerpt :
Specifically, when reasoning about how events would have unfolded if things had happened differently in the past (i.e., counterfactual reasoning), children must draw on their knowledge of how those events are causally dependent (Gopnik & Schulz, 2007; Harris, German, & Mills, 1996; Lewis, 1973; Mackie, 1974; Pearl, 2000). In their foundational study of children’s counterfactual reasoning capabilities, Harris et al. (1996) told 3- to 5-year-olds a story about a character who left her muddy shoes on when entering the kitchen. Even some of the youngest children tested were able to specify that the floor would not have been dirty if the character had taken off her muddy shoes.
Although early causal reasoning has been studied extensively, inconsistency in the tasks used to assess it has clouded our understanding of its structure, development, and relevance to broader developmental outcomes. The current research attempted to bring clarity to these questions by exploring patterns of performance across several commonly used measures of causal reasoning, and their relation to scientific literacy, in a sample of 3- to 5-year-old children from diverse backgrounds (N = 153). A longitudinal confirmatory factor analysis revealed that some measures of causal reasoning (counterfactual reasoning, causal learning, and causal inference), but not all of them (tracking cause–effect associations and resolving confounded evidence), assess a unidimensional factor and that this resulting factor was relatively stable across time. A cross-lagged panel model analysis revealed associations between causal reasoning and scientific literacy across each age tested. Causal reasoning and scientific literacy related to each other concurrently, and each predicted the other in subsequent years. These relations could not be accounted for by children’s broader cognitive skills. Implications for early STEM (science, technology, engineering, and math) engagement and success are discussed.

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¹: Present address: Department of Psychology, University of Essex, Wivenhoe Park, Colchester, Essex CO4 3SQ, UK.

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Children's use of counterfactual thinking in causal reasoning

Abstract

Cognition

Cognition

Cognitive Development

Cognitive Psychology

Cognitive Psychology

Counterfactual reasoning

Are preschoolers truly indifferent to causal mechanisms?

Children talk about the mind

The linguistic shaping of thought: A study in the impact of language on thinking in China and the West

First steps in acquiring conditionals

The development of causal reasoning

Covariation in natural causal induction

Psychological Review

The effect of make-believe play on deductive reasoning

British Journal of Developmental Psychology

The influence of the imagination on reasoning by young children

British Journal of Developmental Psychology

Pleased and surprised: Children's cognitive theory of emotion

British Journal of Developmental Psychology

Causal powers: A theory of natural necessity

Children and emotion: The development of psychological understanding

Young children's theory of mind and emotion

Cognition and Emotion

Young children's understanding of pretense

Monographs of the Society for Research in Child Development

Talking about outcomes that almost happen