Reflexively mindblind: Using theory of mind to interpret behavior requires effortful attention

Abstract

People commonly interpret others’ behavior in terms of the actors’ underlying beliefs, knowledge, or other mental states, thereby using their “theory of mind.” Two experiments suggest that using one’s theory of mind is a relatively effortful process. In both experiments, people reflexively used their own knowledge and beliefs to follow a speaker’s instruction, but only effortfully used their theory of mind to take into account a speaker’s intention to interpret those instructions. In Experiment 1, people with lower working memory capacity were less effective than people with larger working memory capacity in applying their theory of mind to interpret behavior. In Experiment 2, an attention-demanding secondary task reduced people’s ability to apply their theory of mind. People appear to be reflexively mindblind, interpreting behavior in terms of the actor’s mental states only to the extent that they have the cognitive resources to do so.

Introduction

By age two, humans have acquired a capacity for social intelligence that outperforms our nearest primate relatives—the capacity to interpret others’ actions in terms of intentions, beliefs, knowledge, and other mental states (Herrmann, Call, Hernandez-Lloreda, Hare, & Tomasello, 2007). This capacity—generally referred to as “theory of mind”—continues to develop through adulthood, at which point it seems almost inevitable that people will interpret others’ actions in terms of underlying mental states. A man running down the street is not simply seen as an object moving in space but rather as a motivated and thoughtful agent. His behavior is understood differently if we know that he is wanting to get some exercise than if we know that he is wanting to elude the police. Understanding a person’s actions often requires considering an agent’s beliefs, and in this sense people appear to use their theory of mind spontaneously to interpret others’ actions.

There are good reasons to believe that the spontaneous use of beliefs to interpret action is effortless. Consider, for example, how people interpret language. The back and forth of conversation occurs quickly, requiring people to understand and formulate utterances without much time to reflect. To understand what others are saying, people constantly resolve the ambiguity inherent in the language so that they can use what speakers believe in order to understand what they mean. The ease of conversation has led to the conclusion that people’s “Use of theory of mind is also rapid … automatic, requiring no effortful attention … and universal.” (Stone, Baron-Cohen, & Knight, 1998, p. 640).

However, there are also good reasons to believe that the use of beliefs to interpret action is effortful. A person’s own perspective is likely to be primary. Considering another’s differing perspective requires both time and motivation (e.g., Epley, Keysar, Van Boven, & Gilovich, 2004), and people appear less able to imagine themselves in another person’s perspective when they are distracted by a concurrent processing task (Davis, Conklin, Smith, & Luce, 1996). Actively monitoring another person’s belief in the midst of conversation also appears to require attentional resources (Apperly et al., 2006, Vorauer et al., 2009), and people are more likely to correctly use knowledge about others’ beliefs to predict their actions when put in a negative mood that stimulates more elaborate thinking (Converse, Lin, Keysar, & Epley, 2008). If inferring another’s differing perspective and monitoring others’ beliefs in interaction are both effortful processes, then using what is known about another’s beliefs to interpret their action may be effortful as well.

We examined in two experiments whether people effortlessly use their knowledge about another’s beliefs to interpret their actions. Based on existing research in the effort required to infer and track others’ beliefs, we predicted that people would be reflexively mindblind (Baron-Cohen, 1995), meaning that they would fail to consider others’ beliefs and knowledge to interpret their behavior unless they had sufficient attentional resources to do so.