Auction design and favoritism☆
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We thank Dimitri Vayanos for research assistance. Helpful discussions with Paul Joskow and Tracy Lewis and financial support from the Pew Charitable Trust, the Ford Foundation, the MIT Energy Lab, the Taussig visiting professorship at Harvard University and the French Ministére de l'Education Nationale are gratefully acknowledged.
Copyright © 1991 Published by Elsevier B.V.