Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: Existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions☆
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I am indebted to Jean-Marie Blin, Richard Day, Theodore Groves, Rubin Saposnik, Maria Schmundt, Hugo Sonnenschein, and an anonymous referee for their help in the development of this paper.
Copyright © 1975 Published by Elsevier Inc.