Deindustrialization in 18th and 19th century India: Mughal decline, climate shocks and British industrial ascent

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Abstract

India was a major player in the world export market for textiles in the early 18th century, but by the middle of the 19th century it had lost all of its export market and much of its domestic market, primarily to Britain. The ensuing deindustrialization was greatest c1750–c1860. We ask how much of India’s deindustrialization was due to local supply-side forces—such as political fragmentation and a rising incidence of drought, and how much to world price shocks. An open, three-sector neo-Ricardian model organizes our thinking and a new relative price database implements the empirical analysis. We find local supply side forces were important from as early as 1700. We then assess the size of Indian deindustrialization in comparison with other parts of the periphery.

Introduction

The idea that India suffered deindustrialization during the 19th century has a long pedigree. The image of skilled weavers thrown back on the soil was a powerful metaphor for the economic stagnation Indian nationalists believed was brought on by British rule. However, whether and why deindustrialization actually happened in India remains open to debate. Quantitative evidence on the overall level of economic activity in 18th and 19th century India is scant, let alone evidence on its breakdown between agriculture, industry, and services. Most deindustrialization assessments rely on very sparse employment and output data. Price data are more plentiful, and, as a consequence, this paper uses newly compiled evidence on relative prices to offer a new price-dual assessment of deindustrialization in 18th and 19th century India. A simple neo-Ricardian model of deindustrialization links relative prices to employment and output shares. The paper sheds new light on when deindustrialization happened, whether it was more or less dramatic in India than elsewhere, and the relative roles of domestic and foreign forces in explaining it.

The existing literature attributes most of India’s deindustrialization to Britain’s productivity gains in textile manufacture and to the world transport revolution. Improved British productivity, first in cottage production and then in factory goods, led to declining world textile prices, making production in India increasingly uneconomic (Roy, 2002). These forces were reinforced by declining sea freight rates, which served to foster trade and specialization for both Britain and India. As a result, Britain first won over India’s export market and eventually took over much of its domestic market as well. This explanation for deindustrialization was a potent weapon in the Indian nationalists’ critique of colonial rule (see e.g., Dutt, 1960, Nehru, 1947). A second explanation for India’s deindustrialization also has its roots in globalization forces: relative to textiles, India’s commodity export sector saw its terms of trade improve significantly in the 18th century and drew workers away from textiles.

The historical literature also suggests a third explanation for deindustrialization coming from the supply side, although the connection has been almost ignored. We believe that the economic malaise India suffered following the dissolution of Mughal hegemony in the 18th century ultimately led to aggregate supply-side problems for Indian manufacturing, even if producers in some regions benefited from the new order. In addition, India suffered a profound secular deterioration in climate conditions in the century or so following the early 1700s, events which appear to have added greatly to the slump in agricultural productivity, to the rise in grain prices, and thus to deindustrialization. The paper argues that these explanations are complementary and that each makes a contribution to our overall understanding India’s experience.

Before proceeding to our argument and evidence, we first offer a precise definition of deindustrialization and elaborate on its likely causes. We develop some initial intuition using a simple 2-good 3-factor framework. Suppose an economy produces two commodities: agricultural goods, which are exported, and manufactured goods, which are imported. It uses three factors of production: labor, which is mobile between the two sectors; land, which is used only in agriculture; and capital, which is used only in manufacturing. Suppose further that this economy is what trade economists call a “small country” that takes its terms of trade as exogenous, dictated by world markets. Given these assumptions, deindustrialization can be defined as the movement of labor out of manufacturing and into agriculture, either measured in absolute numbers (what we call strong deindustrialization), or as a share of total employment (what we call weak deindustrialization).

While deindustrialization is easy enough to define, an assessment of its short and long run impact on living standards and GDP growth is more contentious and hinges on the root causes of deindustrialization. One possibility is that a country deindustrializes because its comparative advantage in the agricultural export sector has been strengthened by productivity advance on the land or by increasing openness in the world economy, or both. Under those conditions, GDP increases in the short-run. If productivity advance on the land is the cause, nothing happens to the terms of trade unless the small country assumption is violated, in which case they deteriorate. If increased openness is the cause, the country enjoys an unambiguous terms of trade improvement as declining world trade barriers raise export prices and lower import prices in the home market. Whether real wages also increase depends on the direction of the terms of trade change and whether the agricultural good dominates workers’ budgets. Whether GDP increases in the long run depends on whether industry generates accumulation and productivity externalities that agriculture does not. If industrialization is a carrier of growth—as most growth theories imply—then deindustrialization could lead to a growth slowdown and a low-income equilibrium. The possibility that deindustrialization induced by increased openness in the world economy could engender low growth over the long run provides one potential explanation of the divergence in income between countries that characterized the 19th and first half of the 20th centuries (Maddison, 2001, Blattman et al., 2007), and accounts for the much of the power that deindustrialization has had in both the politics and the historiography of countries affected by it.

A second possibility is that a country deindustrializes due to deterioration in home manufacturing productivity and/or competitiveness. In this case, and still retaining the small country assumption, nothing happens to the terms of trade, but real wages and living standards deteriorate, and so does GDP. The economic impact of deindustrialization from this source is unambiguous, and also carries the possibility of a low-growth equilibrium.

In order to make this theoretical framework flexible enough to handle the causes of deindustrialization that we believe were most important, a non-tradable grain sector needs to be added. The three sectors considered in the rest of the paper are: agricultural commodity exports, which are tradable on world markets and include industrial intermediates (such as raw cotton and jute) and high-value consumer goods (such as opium and tea); manufacturing, which is dominated by textiles and metal products and is also tradable; and grains, which are non-tradable and include rice, wheat and other food staples.1

We build our account of India’s deindustrialization as follows. In Section 2, we present a theoretical narrative of India’s deindustrialization experience, drawing on evidence from the historical literature. Section 3 reviews existing attempts to measure India’s deindustrialization. We then present a simple, neo-Ricardian, general equilibrium model of deindustrialization in Section 4 to formalize our predictions about relative prices and their relationship to employment shares. Section 5 presents three price series—commodity agricultural exports, manufactured textiles and non-tradable grains, three wage series—the grain wage, the own-wage in the import competing sector, and the own-wage in the export sector, the intersectoral terms of trade between export agricultural commodities and textiles, and the external terms of trade. This evidence is then assessed in relation to the theoretical narrative. This relative price experience is also compared with India’s primary competitor during this period, England. Section 6 compares India’s deindustrializing terms-of-trade shocks with those from other parts of the periphery, and Section 7 concludes.

Section snippets

A narrative account of India’s deindustrialization

Our narrative account of India’s deindustrialization embraces the three contending deindustrialization hypotheses, and traces the roots of deindustrialization well back into the 18th century. Two continent-wide political changes ground our understanding of India’s 18th century: the dissolution of the Mughal empire into a constellation of small successor states was followed, after a time, by the initial phase of reintegration of these states under the East India Company. Mughal hegemony extended

Inputs, outputs, and deindustrialization

Despite its importance for Indian historiography, owing to the dearth of statistical sources there have been only four attempts to directly measure India’s 19th century deindustrialization by trying to construct employment shares. As far as we know, this paper is the first to apply relative price evidence to the deindustrialization question, and by doing so the first to offer evidence, tentative though it may be, about deindustrialization in the 18th and early 19th century. Tirthankar Roy (2000)

A neo-Ricardian model of deindustrialization

In order to formalize our intuitions about the relationship between relative prices and deindustrialization, we develop a simple neo-Ricardian model that relies on the formal contribution of Jones (1971), and the economic insights of Smith, Gerschenkron, 1962, Lewis, 1954, Lewis, 1978. Consider a perfectly competitive economy in which there are three sectors: textiles (T), grain (G), and agricultural commodity exports (C). Grain is not traded.

The terms of trade, relative prices, and the own-wage in manufactures 1750–1913

We divide the Indian deindustrialization experience over the two centuries between 1700 and 1913 into four distinct epochs. Our interpretation of the fundamentals explaining deindustrialization within each of these epochs implies predictions regarding changes in Indian relative prices.

The first epoch ran from about 1700 to 1760 and it was India’s high water mark as a global manufacturing powerhouse. Indian textiles clothed tens of millions of Indians, southeast Asians, the fashionable men and

Indian relative price trends compared with the rest of the periphery

Deindustrialization appeared everywhere around the 19th century periphery, and globalization plays a major role in each region’s historiography. Here, we ask whether 19th century India faced a big or a small deindustrializing global price shock compared with other parts of the periphery. If India’s global price shock was relatively small, it follows that domestic supply-side deindustrialization forces were relatively important in India compared with other parts of the periphery.

Fig. 10 compares

Conclusions

India deindustrialized between 1760 and 1860, and two main epochs, with very different deindustrialization causes, distinguish that century. The first epoch ran from about 1760 to 1810 and was a direct result of poor climate conditions and an indirect result of the dissolution of the Mughal Empire. The deterioration in climate conditions lowered agricultural productivity, raised grain prices, and thus increased nominal wages in home manufacturing, like textiles, lowering India’s competitiveness

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    We are grateful for advice and criticism from William Bernstein, Leah Platt Boustan, Huw Bowen, William Clarence-Smith, Greg Clark, Ron Findlay, Bishnupriya Gupta, Peter Harnetty, Debin Ma, Bob Margo, Patrick O’Brien, Kevin O’Rourke, Şevket Pamuk, Leandro Prados, Om Prakash, Ananth Seshadri, T. N. Srinivasan, Tirthanker Roy, Tony Venables, two anonymous referees for this journal, and participants in the Harvard Economic History Tea and Workshop, the 5th World Cliometrics Conference (Venice: June 2004), the Stockholm School of Economics (Stockholm: October 2004), and the GEHN Conference on Imperialism (Istanbul: September 2005). We also thank Javier Cuenca Esteban and Bishnupriya Gupta for sharing their data. Clingingsmith acknowledges support from the Project on Justice, Welfare, and Economics at Harvard University. Williamson acknowledges support from the National Science Foundation and from the Harvard Faculty of Arts and Sciences.

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