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Form and Flexibility: The Normalisation of ‘Magnitsky Sanctions’ in the Face of the Rule of Law

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Abstract

So-called ‘Magnitsky laws’ in various jurisdictions are turning unilateral sanctions into normalised instruments for the international promotion of the rule of law. However, the considerable regulatory and executive flexibility introduced by these laws is at strain with the fundamental requirements of the rule of law, both domestically and internationally. Despite a growing literature on sanctions, a systematic and comparative assessment of Magnitsky laws against both the national and international requirements of the rule of law is still lacking. This paper offers a first comparative analysis of the compatibility of US, Canadian, UK, and Australian unilateral sanctions laws with the formal and procedural principles of the rule of law that constitute the common core of both its national and international notions. By analysing the formal aspects of the legal basis, design and application of these laws, our study identifies and conceptualises the legislative techniques that enable the normalisation of Magnitsky sanctions. We find that these techniques, which we name the ‘generalisation’ of sanctions laws, are not inherently incompatible with the rule of law, but so far national legislators have failed to ensure the right balance between the flexibility introduced by such techniques and the rigorous requirements of legality. The principled recommendations we propose based on our findings seek to help lawmakers around the world to strike the right balance between form and flexibility.

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Notes

  1. § 584.311 Russia and Moldova Jackson-Vanik Repeal and Sergei Magnitsky Rule of Law Accountability Act of 2012, Magnitsky Act, Public Law 112-208, title IV, 126 Stat. 1502 (2012).

  2. SMRLAA, s402(a)(1).

  3. Title XII, Subtitle F of P.L. 114–328; 22 U.S.C. §2656 note.

  4. GMHRAA, s1263(a).

  5. Justice of Victims of Corrupt Foreign Officials Act (JVCFO), SC 2017, c21.

  6. JVCFO, Preamble.

  7. Special Economic Measures Act 1992 (SEMA), s4(1.1) as amended by JVCFO.

  8. Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act 2018, s1(2)(i).

  9. SAMLA, s2(1).

  10. Autonomous Sanctions Act 2011 (ASA), s3(3)(e).

  11. C–402/05 P and C–415/05 P Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation v Council and Commission [2008] ECR I–6351; C-584/10 P, C-593/10 P and C-595/10 P European Commission and Others v Yassin Abdullah Kadi [2013] EU:C:2013:518.

  12. In the US: Executive Order 13581 of 25 July 2011, Blocking Property of Transnational Criminal Organizations, Preamble; SMRLAA, s402(a)(1) and (5); Executive Order 13818 of 20 December 2017, Blocking the Property of Persons Involved in Serious Human Rights Abuse or Corruption, Preamble. In Canada: JVCFO, Preamble. In the UK: SAMLA, s1(2)(i). In Australia: ASA, s3(3)(e).

  13. Explanatory Notes to the Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Bill [HL] as introduced in the House of Lords on 18 October 2017 (HL Bill 69), para 12.

  14. Autonomous Sanctions Bill 2010, Replacement Explanatory Memorandum, p. 1.

  15. JVCFO, Preamble.

  16. 50 USC ch35.

  17. IEEPA, §1701(a).

  18. IEEPA, §1704.

  19. IEEPA, §1701(a).

  20. IEEPA, §1701(b).

  21. Executive Order 13581, n 12.

  22. See n 3.

  23. GMHRAA, §1265.

  24. See n 1.

  25. SEMA, s4(1) prior to the 2017 amendment.

  26. See n 5.

  27. SEMA, s4(1.1) as amended in 2017.

  28. Explanatory Notes to the Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Bill, n 13, para 4.

  29. Terrorist Asset-Freezing Act etc. 2010.

  30. SAMLA, s1(1).

  31. SAMLA, s1(1)(a) and (b).

  32. SAMLA, s1(1).

  33. SAMLA, s2(1).

  34. SAMLA, s1(2)(i).

  35. Autonomous Sanctions Bill 2010, Replacement Explanatory Memorandum, p. 1.

  36. Ibid.

  37. ASA, s3(3)(e).

  38. In the UK see Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee, Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Bill (HL 2017–2019, 38) paras 20–21 and Select Committee on the Constitution, Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Bill [HL] (2017–2019, 39) para 12. In Australia, see House of Representatives Deb 26 May 2010, ‘Second reading speech: Autonomous Sanctions Bill 2010’ (Stephen Smith) p. 4112.

  39. The only exception is the Australian ASA, which refers to the ordinary rules of delegated law-making set by the Legislative Instruments Act 2003.

  40. In the US: GMHRAA, s1264. In Canada: SEMA, s9. In the UK: SAMLA, ss2(4–6), 18(2–7), 30(5–7), 32, 46.

  41. In the US: GMHRAA, s1264. In Canada: SEMA, s9 and JVCFOA, s16. In the UK: SAMLA, s55.

  42. SAMLA, s1(1).

  43. US Department of the Treasury (2022) Office of Foreign Assets Control – Sanctions Programs and Information. https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/office-of-foreign-assets-control-sanctions-programs-and-information; Government of Canada (2022) Canadian sanctions. https://www.international.gc.ca/world-monde/international_relations-relations_internationales/sanctions/index.aspx?lang=eng&_ga=2.213353812.1564561355.1645085219-1682816097.1645085216; Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office (2022) UK Sanctions Regimes. https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/uk-sanctions-regimes-under-the-sanctions-act; Australian Government (2022) Australia and sanctions. https://www.dfat.gov.au/international-relations/security/sanctions. All links accessed 19 June 2022.

  44. US Department of the Treasury (2022) Sanctions Programs and Country Information. https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/financial-sanctions/sanctions-programs-and-country-information. Accessed 19 June 2022.

  45. Government of Canada (2022) Current sanctions imposed by Canada. https://www.international.gc.ca/world-monde/international_relations-relations_internationales/sanctions/current-actuelles.aspx?lang=eng. Accessed 19 June 2022.

  46. Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office, n 43.

  47. Australian Government (2022) Sanction Regimes. https://www.dfat.gov.au/node/123620. Accessed 19 June 2022.

  48. The Freezing Assets of Corrupt Foreign Officials (Ukraine) Regulations (SOR/2014-44) and the Special Economic Measures (Ukraine) Regulations (SOR/2014-60).

  49. Government of Canada (2022) Canadian Sanctions Related to Ukraine. https://www.international.gc.ca/world-monde/international_relations-relations_internationales/sanctions/ukraine.aspx?lang=eng#a7_1. Accessed 19 June 2022.

  50. An example is regulation 3A(1) of the Australian ASR: ‘If both part of a country, and the country, are specified in regulation 4, 4A or 5, the following rules apply: (a) for regulation 4—goods are export sanctioned goods for the part of the country if they are export sanctioned goods for the country, but are not export sanctioned goods for the country merely because they are export sanctioned goods for the part; (b) for regulation 4A—goods are import sanctioned goods for the part of the country if they are import sanctioned goods for the country, but are not import sanctioned goods for the country merely because they are import sanctioned goods for the part; (c) for regulation 5—a service is a sanctioned service for the part of the country if it is a sanctioned service for the country, but is not a sanctioned service for the country merely because it is a sanctioned service for the part’.

  51. In the US: GMHRAA, s1263(f). In the UK: SAMLA, s21. In Canada: SEMA, s4(2) and JVCFOA, s4(3). In Australia: ASR, ss12-16.

  52. GHRSR, s11 and GACSR, s11.

  53. In the US: IEEPA, §1705(c) and GMHRAA, s1263(f). In the UK: SAMLA, s17(4). In Canada: SEMA, s8. In Australia: ASR, s16.

  54. IEEPA, §1701; ASA, s3(3).

  55. IEEPA, §1702; ASA, s10(1).

  56. ASA, ss16–17.

  57. GHRSR s10 and GACSR s10.

  58. GMHRAA, §1263(a)(1); SEMA, s4(1.1)(c); SAMLA, ss1(2)(f) and 7, which refers to s241A of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002.

  59. GMHRAA, §1263(a)(3); SEMA, s4(1.1)(d).

  60. SEMA, s4(1.1)(b).

  61. IEEPA, §1701(a).

  62. ASA, s3(3)(a).

  63. ASA, s3(2).

  64. SAMLA, s2(1); ASA, s3(3)(a).

  65. Ibid, s2(2).

  66. SEMA, s4(1).

  67. Executive Order 13581, n 12.

  68. HL Deb 21 November 2017, vol 787, col 124 (Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon).

  69. Explanatory Memorandum to the Global Anti-Corruption Sanctions Regulations 2021 No. 488, para 7.1.

  70. HL Deb 21 November 2017, n 68, col 124 (Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon).

  71. GMHRAA, §1263(a)(3); SEMA, s4(1.1)(d).

  72. GMHRAA, §1263(a).

  73. Executive Order 13581, n 12, s1(ii)(A).

  74. SAMLA, s11(3)(a)–(c).

  75. SAMLA, s11(3)(d).

  76. SAMLA, ss3, 6(6)(a)(ii) and 7(1)(e)(ii) and (8)(a)(ii).

  77. SAMLA, s12(1).

  78. HL Deb 21 November 2017, n 68, cols 130–131 (Lord Judge); Select Committee on the Constitution, Sanctions and Anti- Money Laundering Bill [HL] (2017–2019, 39) paras 15–16.

  79. HL Deb 21 November 2017, n 68, cols 131–133 (Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon).

  80. SAMLA, s2(2), (4) and (6).

  81. SAMLA, s18.

  82. SAMLA, s30.

  83. SAMLA, s32.

  84. GMHRAA, §1263(a); Executive Order 13818, n 12, s1(a)(ii); SEMA, s4(1.1); Freezing Assets of Corrupt Foreign Officials Act 2011, SC 2011, c10, s13; JVCFO, s4(2).

  85. SAMLA, s11(3); ASR, Reg 6.

  86. UN General Assembly (14 October 1997) Economic Measures as a Means of Political and Economic Coercion Against Developing Countries: Report of the Secretary General. UN Doc A/42/459, 16.

  87. SAMLA, s11(3)(a).

  88. GMHRAA, §1263(a)(3); JVCFO, s4(2)(c); ASR, Reg 6(5).

  89. JVCFOA s8; ASR 2011, Reg 10(3)-(2) and 11; SAMLA 2018 s23.

  90. Office of Foreign Assets Control, Department of the Treasury, 31 CFR §501.807.

  91. Al Haramain Islamic Federation v. U.S. Department of Treasury 686 F.3d 965 (9th Cir. 2012); KindHearts for Charitable Humanitarian Dev., Inc. v. Geithner 647 F. Supp. 2d 857 (N.D. Ohio 2009).

  92. See e.g. Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787 (1977).

  93. Australian Government response to the Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Human Rights Sub-Committee report: Criminality, corruption and impunity: Should Australia join the global Magnitsky movement? (5 August 2021) p. 13. https://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Joint/Foreign_Affairs_Defence_and_Trade/MagnitskyAct/Government_Response. Accessed 19 June 2022.

  94. Aye v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2010] FCAFC 69 (11 June 2010).

  95. SAMLA, 2018 s38.

  96. SAMLA, 2018 s38(4).

  97. SAMLA, 2018 s40; Counter-Terrorism Act 2008, ss66–68.

  98. Counter-Terrorism Act 2008, s67.

  99. JCHR, Counter–Terrorism Policy and Human Rights: 28 Days, Intercept and Post–Charge Questioning (2006–07, HL 157, HC 394), para 210.

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Acknowledgements

The authors would like to thank Dr Steve Foster, Dr Nathanael Tilahun and Dr Gary Wilson for their helpful and constructive feedback on the initial draft. The authors would also like to thank the reviewers for their careful reading of the manuscript and their encouraging and valuable comments.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Centre for Financial and Corporate Integrity, Coventry University, Coventry, UK

    Lorenzo Pasculli

  2. Coventry Law School, Coventry University, Coventry, UK

    Lorenzo Pasculli

  3. Nebrija University, Madrid, Spain

    Lorenzo Pasculli

  4. Liverpool John Moores University, Liverpool, UK

    Ben Stanford

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Pasculli, L., Stanford, B. Form and Flexibility: The Normalisation of ‘Magnitsky Sanctions’ in the Face of the Rule of Law. Hague J Rule Law 15, 109–142 (2023). https://doi.org/10.1007/s40803-022-00178-6

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