Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

Is Evolutionary Psychology Possible?

  • Original Article
  • Published:
Biological Theory Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

In this article I argue that evolutionary psychological strategies for making inferences about present-day human psychology are methodologically unsound. Evolutionary psychology is committed to the view that the mind has an architecture that has been conserved since the Pleistocene, and that our psychology can be fruitfully understood in terms of the original, fitness-enhancing functions of these conserved psychological mechanisms. But for evolutionary psychological explanations to succeed, practitioners must be able to show that contemporary cognitive mechanisms correspond to those that were selected for in the environment of evolutionary adaptedness, that these present-day cognitive mechanisms are descended from the corresponding ancestral mechanisms, and that they have retained the functions of the ancestral mechanisms from which they are descended. I refer to the problem of demonstrating that these conditions obtain as “the matching problem,” argue that evolutionary psychology does not have the resources to address it, and conclude that evolutionary psychology, as it is currently understood, is therefore impossible.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Log in via an institution

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Similar content being viewed by others

Notes

  1. Because psychology can only be fitness-enhancing by producing fitness-enhancing behavioral effects, evolutionary psychologists must assume that ancestral psychology produced behaviors of the same sort as contemporary behaviors.

  2. As mentioned earlier, evolutionary psychologists are often sensitive to this point (e.g., Crawford 1998) but do not recognize the problem that it poses for individuating modules.

  3. A prime example is Anne Campbell’s frequently quoted remark that such people believe that “evolution stops at the neck” (Campbell 2002, p. 13).

References

  • Agrawal AA, Laforsch C, Tollrian R (1999) Transgenerational induction of defenses in animals and plants. Nature 401:60–63

    Google Scholar 

  • Ariew A (2003) Ernst Mayr’s ‘proximate/ultimate’ distinction reconsidered and reconstructed. Biol Philos 18:553–565

    Google Scholar 

  • Barrett L, Dunbar R, Lycett J (2002) Human evolutionary psychology. Princeton University Press, Princeton

    Google Scholar 

  • Buller DJ (2005) Adapting minds: evolutionary psychology and the persistent quest for human nature. MIT Press, Cambridge

    Google Scholar 

  • Buller DJ, Hardcastle VG (2000) Evolutionary psychology, meet developmental neurobiology: against promiscuous modularity. Brain Mind 1:307–325

    Google Scholar 

  • Buss DM (1995) Evolutionary psychology: a new paradigm for psychological science. Psychol Inq 6:1–30

    Google Scholar 

  • Buss DM (2014) Evolutionary psychology: the new science of the mind. Pearson, Boston

    Google Scholar 

  • Campbell A (2002) A mind of her own: the evolutionary psychology of women. Oxford University Press, Oxford

    Google Scholar 

  • Chomsky N (1975) Reflections on language. Random House, New York

    Google Scholar 

  • Chomsky N (1980) Rules and representations. Columbia University Press, New York

    Google Scholar 

  • Conroy GC (2005) Reconstructing human origins. Norton, New York

    Google Scholar 

  • Coplan JD, Andrews MW, Rosenblum LA, Owens MJ, Friedman S, Gorman JM, Nemeroff CB (1996) Persistent elevations of cerebrospinal fluid concentrations of corticotropin-releasing factor in adult nonhuman primates exposed to early-life stressors: implications for the pathophysiology of mood and anxiety disorders. Proc Natl Acad Sci USA 93:1619–1623

    Google Scholar 

  • Coplan JD, Teost RC, Owens MJ, Cooper TB, Gorman JM, Nemeroff CB, Rosenblum LA (1998) Cerebrospinal fluid concentrations of somatostatin and biogenic amines in grown primates reared by mothers exposed to manipulated foraging conditions. Arch Gen Psychiatry 55:473–477

    Google Scholar 

  • Cosmides L (1989) The logic of social exchange: has natural selection shaped how humans reason? Studies with the Wason selection task. Cognition 31:187–276

    Google Scholar 

  • Cosmides L, Tooby J (1997) Evolutionary psychology: a primer. In: Downes S, Machery E (eds) Arguing about human nature: contemporary debates (2013). Routledge, New York, pp 83–92

    Google Scholar 

  • Cosmides L, Tooby J (2005) Neurocognitive adaptations designed for social exchange. In: Buss D (ed) The handbook of evolutionary psychology. Wiley, Hoboken, pp 3–87

    Google Scholar 

  • Crawford C (1998) The theory of evolution in the study of human behavior: an introduction and overview. In: Crawford C, Krebs D (eds) Handbook of evolutionary psychology: ideas, issues, applications. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Mahwah, pp 3–42

    Google Scholar 

  • Crawford C, Krebs D (2008) Foundations of evolutionary psychology. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, New York

    Google Scholar 

  • Currie G, Sterelny K (2000) How to think about the modularity of mind-reading. Philos Q 50:145–160

    Google Scholar 

  • Darwin C ([1859]2003) On the origin of species. Signet Classics, New York

  • Dehaene S (2009) Reading in the brain. Viking, New York

    Google Scholar 

  • Dehaene S, Cohen L (2011) The unique role of the visual word form area in reading. Trends Cognit Sci 15:254–262

    Google Scholar 

  • Fodor JA (1983) Modularity of mind: an essay on faculty psychology. MIT Press, Cambridge

    Google Scholar 

  • Fodor JA (2000) The mind doesn’t work that way: the scope and limits of computational psychology. MIT Press, Cambridge

    Google Scholar 

  • Goetz D, Causey K (2009) Sex differences in perceptions of infidelity: men often assume the worst. Evol Psychol 7:253–263

    Google Scholar 

  • Gould SJ, Lewontin RC (1979) The spandrels of San Marco and the Panglossian paradigm: a critique of the adaptationist programme. Proc R Soc B 205:581–598

    Google Scholar 

  • Gray RD, Heaney M, Fairhall S (2003) Evolutionary psychology and the challenge of adaptive explanation. In: Sterelny K, Fitness J (eds) From mating to mentality: evaluating evolutionary psychology. Psychology Press, New York, pp 247–268

    Google Scholar 

  • Hall A (1945) The origin and purposes of blinking. Br J Ophthalmol 29:445–467

    Google Scholar 

  • Heyes CM (2014) False belief in infancy: a fresh look. Developmental Science 17:647–659

    Google Scholar 

  • Heyes CM (2018) Cognitive gadgets: the cultural evolution of thinking. Harvard University Press, Cambridge

    Google Scholar 

  • Kaplan JM (2002) Historical evidence and human adaptations. Philos Sci 69:294–304

    Google Scholar 

  • Lloyd EA (1999) Evolutionary psychology: the burden of proof. Biol Philos 14:211–233

    Google Scholar 

  • Mayr E (1961) Cause and effect in biology. Science 131:1501–1506

    Google Scholar 

  • Menzel R, Benjamin PR (2013) Invertebrate learning and memory. Handbook of behavioral neuroscience, vol 22. Elsevier, New York

    Google Scholar 

  • Orzack SH, Sober E (1994a) Optimality models and the test of adaptationism. Am Nat 143:361–380

    Google Scholar 

  • Orzack SH, Sober E (1994b) How (not) to test an optimality model. Trends Ecol Evol 9:265–267

    Google Scholar 

  • Orzack SH, Sober E (1996) How to formulate and test adaptationism. Am Nat 148:202–210

    Google Scholar 

  • Orzack SH, Sober E (2001) Adaptationism and optimality. Cambridge University Press, New York

    Google Scholar 

  • Prinz JJ (2006) Is the mind really modular? In: Stainton R (ed) Contemporary debates in cognitive science. Blackwell, Oxford, pp 22–36

    Google Scholar 

  • Richards RJ (2003) Darwin on mind, morals, and emotion. In: Hodge J, Radick G (eds) The Cambridge companion to Darwin. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp 96–119

    Google Scholar 

  • Robbins P (2009) Modularity of mind. In: Zalta EN (ed) The Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy (summer 2010 edition). http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2010/entries/modularity-mind/. Accessed 1 May 2019

  • Robbins P (2013) Modularity and mental architecture. Wiley Rev Cognit Sci 4:641–649

    Google Scholar 

  • Samuels R (1998) Evolutionary psychology and the massive modularity hypothesis. Br J Philos Sci 49:575–602

    Google Scholar 

  • Samuels R (2000) Massively modular minds: evolutionary psychology and cognitive architecture. In: Carruthers P, Chamberlain A (eds) Evolution and the human mind. Cambridge University Press, New York, pp 13–46

    Google Scholar 

  • Schultz AW (2008) Structural flaws: massive modularity and the argument from design. Br J Philos Sci 59:733–743

    Google Scholar 

  • Sherman PW (1985) Alarm calls of Belding’s ground squirrels to aerial predators: nepotism or self-preservation? Behav Ecol Sociobiol 17:313–323

    Google Scholar 

  • Sober E (2008) Evidence and evolution: the logic behind the science. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

    Google Scholar 

  • Sterelny K (2003) Thought in a hostile world: the evolution of human cognition. Blackwell, Oxford

    Google Scholar 

  • Sterelny K, Griffiths PE (1999) Sex and death: an introduction to philosophy of biology. University of Chicago Press, Chicago

    Google Scholar 

  • Tinbergen N (1963) On aims and methods of ethology. Z Tierpsychol 20:410–433

    Google Scholar 

  • Tolliran R, Dodson SI (1999) Inducible defenses in Cladocera: constraints, costs and multipredator environments. In: Tolliran R, Harvell CD (eds) The ecology and evolution of inducible defenses. Princeton University Press, Princeton, pp 177–202

    Google Scholar 

  • Tooby J, Cosmides L (1992) Cognitive adaptations for social exchange. In: Barkow JH, Cosmides L, Tooby J (eds) The adapted mind: evolutionary psychology and the generation of culture. Oxford University Press, New York, pp 163–228

    Google Scholar 

  • West-Eberhard MJ (2003) Developmental plasticity and evolution. Oxford University Press, New York

    Google Scholar 

  • Williams GC (1966) Adaptation and natural selection. Princeton University Press, Princeton

    Google Scholar 

  • Woods C (2010) Visible language: inventions of writing in the ancient middle east and beyond. The Oriental Institute, Chicago

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Philosophy, University of New Hampshire, Durham, NH, USA

    Subrena E. Smith

Authors
  1. Subrena E. Smith
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Subrena E. Smith.

Additional information

Publisher's Note

Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Check for updates. Verify currency and authenticity via CrossMark

Cite this article

Smith, S.E. Is Evolutionary Psychology Possible?. Biol Theory 15, 39–49 (2020). https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-019-00336-4

Download citation

  • Received:

  • Accepted:

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-019-00336-4

Keywords

Search

Navigation