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Managing Fleet Capacity Effectively Under Second-Hand Market Redistribution

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Abstract

Fishing capacity management policies have been traditionally implemented at national level with national targets for capacity reduction. More recently, capacity management policies have increasingly targeted specific fisheries. French fisheries spatially vary along the French coastline and are associated to specific regions. Capacity management policies, however, ignore the capital mobility associated with second-hand vessel trade between regions. This is not an issue for national policies but could limit the effectiveness of regional capacity management policies. A gravity model and a random-effect Poisson regression model are used to analyze the determinants and spatial extent of the second-hand market in France. This study is based on panel data from the French Atlantic Ocean between 1992 and 2009. The trade flows between trading partners is found to increase with their sizes and to be spatially concentrated. Despite the low trade flows between regions, a net impact analysis shows that fishing capacity is redistributed by the second-hand market to regions on the Channel and Aquitaine from central regions. National capacity management policies (constructions/destructions) have induced a net decrease in regional fleet capacity with varying magnitude across regions. Unless there is a change of policy instruments or their scale of implementation, the operation of the second-hand market decreases the effectiveness of regional capacity management policies in regions on the Channel and Aquitaine.

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Notes

  1. In France, complementary licences have been introduced on a piecemeal basis at the regional or local (sub-regional) level to limit entry for specific fisheries and related fish stocks. These fishery licenses are operated by the fishing industry with limited involvement of the government so far. A more detailed description of how the fishing licences are operated in France can be found in MRAG and Tecnalia (2009).

  2. A métier is a homogeneous subdivision of a fishery by vessel type (ICES 2003, p. 2). The concept has recently been more specifically defined for the European Union as “a group of fishing operations targeting a similar (assemblage of) species, using similar gear, during the same period of the year and/or within the same area and which are characterized by a similar exploitation pattern” (European Commission Decision 2010/93/EU, Annex I, Chap. 1, p. 9). Identification of different métiers is, however, not always straightforward in practice (Marchal 2008; Deporte et al. 2012).

  3. Greater specialization of individual trading partners would be expected to lead to greater trade flows between them (Haveman and Hummels 2004). Subsidies are mostly offered at the national level, and there is no data available on regional or local subsidies. Also, there are no tax differences along the coastline other than landings taxes. There is no available data on these landing taxes and fishers can land outside their maritime district of registration. These were thus not included into the analysis. Fiscal regulations have been shown to influence investment into fishing capital across vessels (Le Floc’h et al. 2011). These regulations are national and apply to all administrative regions.

  4. We tested fish landings as a proxy for implicit equilibrium prices P i(j) in each district (or “multilateral resistance” for trade with other districts) but these were not found to have a significant impact on trade flows between districts. This could be due to the available data on landings only representing the fraction of harvest landed in criées for auction and not including direct sales on fish markets. Landings are also inconsistently recorded over the time period. Because of this low data quality, we have removed landings from our analysis.

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Acknowledgments

The authors would like to acknowledge the very helpful comments and suggestions received from the Editor, the Associate Editor, and two anonymous reviewers. We would also like to thank Dr. Sylvain Barde (University of Kent) and Dr. Olivier Thébaud (CSIRO) for their insights and constructive suggestions. We are also very grateful for comments and suggestions received during a seminar presentation at the School of Economics of the University of Kent (UK) and at the 2012 Conference of the Natural Resource Modeling Association as part of a research visit funded by the ARC Centre of Excellence for Environmental Decision (CEED) Australia. In addition, we would like to thank Dr. Fabienne Daurès for her insights into fishery policy, Samuel Le Blond, Mathilde Pitel and the Sextant team at Ifremer for greatly facilitating the building of the database, Christelle Le Grand and Damaris Phélippé. We would also like to thank Tatiana Jousselin (ESRI) and Dr. Hawthorne L. Beyer (Spatial Ecology LLC) for their help with ArcGIS 9.3.1 and Geospatial Modelling Environment.

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Quillérou, E., Roudaut, N. & Guyader, O. Managing Fleet Capacity Effectively Under Second-Hand Market Redistribution. AMBIO 42, 611–627 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s13280-012-0358-2

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