Abstract
Despite the importance of commitment for distinctively human forms of sociality, it remains unclear how people prioritize and evaluate their own and others’ commitments - especially implicit commitments. Across two sets of online studies, we found evidence in support of the hypothesis that people’s judgments and attitudes about implicit commitments are governed by an implicit sense of commitment, which is modulated by cues to others’ expectations, and by cues to the costs others have invested on the basis of those expectations.
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Notes
With substantial differences: while according to Bratman commitment is not a necessary aspect of shared intentionality, but a characteristic consequence of it, Gilbert holds commitment to be a core aspect of shared intentionality: by sharing a goal, subjects are implicitly agreeing to be part of a plural subject of the shared goal.
Indeed, if it is the case that such cues typically track others’ expectations, then people may respond to them by increasing their commitment to joint activities even in cases in which they do not in fact reflect a partner’s expectations.
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Acknowledgements
This work was supported by a Starting Grant from the European Research Council (nr 679092, SENSE OF COMMITMENT). We would like to thank Jinnie Ooi and Eszter Salamon for assistance with data collection, as well as Christophe Heintz, Thom Scott-Phillips and Barbora Siposova for helpful comments and discussion.
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Appendix
Appendix
1.1 # Scenario Study 1a
1.1.1 High Cost Condition
You and Pam used to work in the same office on the 5th floor, until you were moved to a 1st floor office 1 year ago. Every day for the past 3 years, you and Pam have spent your afternoon coffee break sitting out on the 5th floor balcony and chatting, though you never agreed to start doing this. After you moved to the new office down on the 1st floor, you nevertheless continued to walk up to the same balcony on the 5th floor every day to spend the coffee break with Pam, even though the balcony is five flights of stairs up from your new office. The sequence is broken when one day you walk all the way up the five flights of stairs and wait for Pam during the coffee break, but she doesn’t turn up.
1.1.2 Low Cost Condition
You and Pam used to work in the same office on the 5th floor, until you were moved to a different office on the same floor 1 year ago. Every day for the past 3 years, you and Pam have spent your afternoon coffee break sitting out on the balcony and chatting, though you never agreed to start doing this. After you moved to the new office, you nevertheless continued to walk over to the same balcony every day to spend the coffee break with Pam, as the balcony is just across the hall from your new office anyway. The sequence is broken when one day you walk over to the balcony and wait for Pam during the coffee break, but she doesn’t turn up.
1.2 # Scenario Study 1b
1.2.1 High Cost Condition
You and Billy used to live in the same building in the 5th district. Recently, you moved to a different apartment in the 1st district. Every weekday for the past 3 years, you and Billy have enjoyed jogging together in the park close to your former building, always beginning as soon as the park opens at 7:00 a.m., though you never agreed to start doing this. After moving to the new building, you have continued to join Billy in the same park to jog together, even though the park is on the other side of town from your new apartment. The sequence is broken when one day you wait for Billy but he doesn’t turn up.
1.2.2 Low Cost Condition
You and Billy used to live in the same building. Recently, you moved to a different apartment in the very same district. Every weekday for the past 3 years, you and Billy have enjoyed jogging together in the park close to your former building, always beginning as soon as the park opens at 7:00 a.m., though you never agreed to start doing this. After moving to the new building, you have continued to join Billy in the same park to jog together. The park is right around the corner from your new apartment. The sequence is broken when one day you wait for Billy but he doesn’t turn up.
1.3 # Scenario Study 2a
1.3.1 High Cost Condition
You and Pam work in the same office building. Every day for the past 3 years, you and Pam have spent your coffee break sitting out on the balcony and chatting, though you never agreed to start doing this. The sequence is broken when 1 day you walk up to the balcony and wait for Pam during the coffee break, but she doesn’t turn up. This is surprising given that it hasn’t happened in the past 3 years.
1.3.2 Low Cost Condition
You and Pam work in the same office building. Every day for the past 3 days, you and Pam have spent your coffee break sitting out on the balcony and chatting, though you never agreed to start doing this. The sequence is broken when 1 day you walk up to the balcony and wait for Pam during the coffee break, but she doesn’t turn up. This is surprising given that it hasn’t happened in the past 3 days.
1.4 # Scenario Study 2b
1.4.1 High Repetition Condition
You and Billy live in the same building. Every morning for the past 3 years, you and Billy have enjoyed jogging together in the park close to your apartment building, each time beginning as soon as the park opens at 7:00 a.m., though you never agreed to start doing this. The sequence is broken for the first time in 3 years when one morning you wait for Billy but he doesn’t turn up.
1.4.2 Low Repetition Condition
You and Billy live in the same building. Every morning for the past 3 days, you and Billy have enjoyed jogging together in the park close to your apartment building, each time beginning as soon as the park opens at 7:00 a.m., though you never agreed to start doing this. The sequence is broken for the first time in 3 days when one morning you wait for Billy but he doesn’t turn up.
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Bonalumi, F., Isella, M. & Michael, J. Cueing Implicit Commitment. Rev.Phil.Psych. 10, 669–688 (2019). https://doi.org/10.1007/s13164-018-0425-0
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13164-018-0425-0