Abstract
The goal of perceptual systems is to allow organisms to adaptively respond to ecologically relevant stimuli. Because all perceptual inputs are ambiguous, perception needs to rely on prior knowledge accumulated over evolutionary and developmental time to turn sensory energy into information useful for guiding behavior. It remains controversial whether the guidance of perception extends to cognitive states or is locked up in a “cognitively impenetrable” part of perception. I argue that expectations, knowledge, and task demands can shape perception at multiple levels, leaving no part untouched. The position advocated here is broadly consistent with the notion that perceptual systems strive to minimize prediction error en route to globally optimal solutions (Clark Behavioral and Brain Sciences 36(3):181–204, 2013). On this view, penetrability should be expected whenever constraining lower-level processes by higher level knowledge is minimizes global prediction error. Just as Fodor feared (e.g., Fodor Philosophy of Science 51:23–43, 1984, Philosophy of Science 51:23–43, 1988) cognitive penetration of perception threatens theory-neutral observation and the distinction between observation and inference. However, because theories themselves are constrained by the task of minimizing prediction error, theory-laden observation turns out to be superior to theory-free observation in turning sensory energy into useful information.
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Notes
It is common, for instance, for my undergraduate students presented with evidence of linguistic effects on color perception to wonder how language can change the retina. This reaction wonderfully illustrates the implicit (and incorrect) assumption that perception involves sampling the retina and that changes to what we see must always track a change in input.
James’s influence can be glimpsed in Henri Bergson’s claim that “Perception is never a mere contact of the mind with the object present; it is impregnated with memory-images which complete it as they interpret it” (Bergson 1911, p. 133).
There is some irony in this because Marr’s emphasis on vision as a bottom-up process heavily influenced opponents of the idea that perception is cognitively penetrable (Pylyshyn 1999).
Levin and Banaji’s (2006) demonstration that Black faces appear darker than White faces (in particular Exp. 1) cannot be taken at face value owing to stimulus confounds. Specifically, although the photographic faces have the same mean brightness the Black face is psychophysically darker even when the faces are distorted so that they no longer look like faces (Lupyan and Lang, in prep; see also Firestone and Scholl, under review).
The term “representation” has varying definitions. My use is consistent with the use in contemporary cognitive psychology and cognitive neuroscience where it has come to denote an information-bearing state. Although typically applied to neural states, it is a promiscuous term that can be applied to, e.g., the information encoded in the immune system. Critically, my saying that something is “represented” should in no way be interpreted to mean that the information is explicit or implemented in a symbolic form.
I will continue to use terms like “post-perceptual” because the term is descriptively useful, but I do not think it is possible to say where perception ends and cognition begins.
Arguably, this activation of perceptual features is word recognition, but that is a subject for another paper (Lupyan and Bergen forthcoming).
One explanation is that higher-level knowledge helps to integrate otherwise unrelated visual parts into coherent wholes (Lupyan and Spivey 2008).
The pairs are made to be exactly equidistant by editing ‘B’ to have identical upper and lower loops (called ‘counters’ in typography jargon).
The spotlight metaphor also harkens to extramissive theories of vision—that we see by emitting rays from our eyes—something that 13–67 % of adults endorse depending on the question! (Winer et al. 2002).
Viewing attention in this way also avoids another common trope—often explicitly articulated at the start of talks and papers—that attentional mechanisms exist because “Reflected light carries too much information for our visual system to process at once” (Franconeri et al. 2005). Such a view implies that if only humans had higher processing capacities, there would be no need for attention. The fallacy of this argument can be seen by taking it to its extreme: If humans with their relatively large memories and sensory processing capacities are in need of attention to cope with all that information out there, then consider how much attention an earthworm would need to make sense of all that information! Responding that the perceptual system of worms are far simpler and do not have this problem, begs the question. Why should our own perception outstrip our processing capacities by such a large margin? On the present view, attention is needed because the optimal perceptual representation for one task is suboptimal for another. Attention is the process by which perceptual represntations are transformed to make them more useful for guiding for a specific task.
However, if the cost of a false alarm is much lower than the cost of a miss, a simple change in bias may be sufficient. For example, being thirsty appears to bias people to see things as being more transparent possibly because seeing water where there is none is better than missing water entirely (Changizi and Hall 2001).
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Acknowledgments
Preparation of this manuscript was in part supported by NSF#1331293 to G.L. I thank Emily Ward, Chaz Firestone, Zoe Jenkin, and Jonathan Lang for useful discussion.
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Lupyan, G. Cognitive Penetrability of Perception in the Age of Prediction: Predictive Systems are Penetrable Systems. Rev.Phil.Psych. 6, 547–569 (2015). https://doi.org/10.1007/s13164-015-0253-4
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13164-015-0253-4