Abstract
The current empirical paradigm for psychological research is criticized because it ignores the irreversibility of psychological processes, the infinite number of influential factors, the pseudo-empirical nature of many hypotheses, and the methodological implications of social interactivity. An additional point is that the differences and correlations usually found are much too small to be useful in psychological practice and in daily life. Together, these criticisms imply that an objective, accumulative, empirical and theoretical science of psychology is an impossible project.
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Smedslund, J. Why Psychology Cannot be an Empirical Science. Integr. psych. behav. 50, 185–195 (2016). https://doi.org/10.1007/s12124-015-9339-x
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s12124-015-9339-x