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Explaining Fairness

Results from an Experiment in Guinea

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Abstract

Fairness is undoubtedly an essential normative concept in humans and promotes cooperation in human societies. The fact that fairness exists is puzzling, however, because it works against the short-term interest of individuals. Theories of genetic evolution, cultural evolution, and gene-culture coevolution identify plausible mechanisms for the evolution of fairness in humans. Such mechanisms include kin selection, the support of group-beneficial moral norms through ethnic markers, free partner choice with equal outside options, and free partner choice with reputation as well as spite in small populations. Here, we present the results of a common-pool resource game experiment on sharing. Based on data from 37 multiethnic villages in a subsistence agricultural population in Foutah Djallon, Guinea, we show that fair behavior in our experiment increased with increasing ethnic homogeneity and market integration. Group size and kinship had the opposite effect. Overall, fair behavior was not conditional on reputation. Instead, the ability of the different village populations to support individuals’ fairness in situations lacking the opportunity to build a positive reputation varied significantly. Our results suggest that evolutionary theory provides a useful framework for the analysis of fairness in humans.

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Acknowledgments

First, we thank the Guinean authorities for providing us with their support and all necessary documents to work in the country. Second, we thank the local population for its kind cooperation. Third, we thank our Guinean assistants Salian Traore, Mohammed Kaba Abdoulaye Diallo, and Ousmane Diallo for their work and advices. Finally, we thank two anonymous reviewers, and Christophe Boesch for consultancy, reviewing, and useful advice. This work was funded and facilitated by the Wild Chimpanzee Foundation (WCF) and Deutscher Akademischer Austauschdienst (DAAD).

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Boesch, L., Berger, R. Explaining Fairness. Hum Nat 30, 398–421 (2019). https://doi.org/10.1007/s12110-019-09353-5

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