Skip to main content
Log in

Property Rights Effects on Farmers’ Management Investment in Forestry Projects: The Case of Camellia in Jiangxi, China

  • Research Paper
  • Published:
Small-scale Forestry Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

China’s central government has carried out a series of collectivization and de-collectivization attempts of forest tenure over time, which have led to multiple forest tenure arrangements within provinces. This paper investigates the motivation of farmers to maintain forestry under various forest tenure regimes. First, the paper provides a qualitative analysis of the different forest tenure regimes using the New Property Rights Theory. Second, an econometric analysis based on data from camellia projects in Jiangxi province is carried out. Camellia projects are long-term projects for the production of non-timber forest products which are important for rural income generation. Qualitative results of the research show that a multitude of different tenure regimes exist across forestry projects. Community-based or collective forest management regimes are the most important tenure regimes in forest management in Jiangxi province. Village communities and farmers are the main actors in forest resource management and investment in camellia projects in Jiangxi province. The results of the econometric analysis show that higher degrees of tenure security and residual claimancy for farm households lead to a higher use of household labor and capital within camellia forestry projects. Uncertainty about the future forestland distribution is an obstacle for household investments in forestry.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Fig. 1

Similar content being viewed by others

Notes

  1. 1 mu = 1/15 hectare.

  2. Natural village is a sub-unit of an administrative village.

  3. Note that the Collective regime is not included in the analysis because survey households had little involvement in forestry management under this regime and are hence not familiar with the situation.

  4. Note that the continuation of a (contractual) relationship can be related to the assurance perspective of tenure security. This is, however, distinctly different from the perception of long-term tenure security as captured by the variable TS (tenure insecurity).

References

  • Agung P, Galudra G, van Noordwijk M, Maryani R (2014) Reform or Reversal: the impact of REDD+ readiness on forest governance in Indonesia. Clim Policy 14(6):748–768

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Ali DA, Dercon S, Gautam M (2011) Property rights in a very poor country: tenure insecurity and investment in Ethiopia. Agric Econ 42(s1):75–86

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Ambus L, Hoberg G (2011) The evolution of devolution: a critical analysis of the community forest agreement in British Columbia. Soc Nat Resour 24(9):933–950

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Arnot CD, Luckert MK, Boxall PC (2011) What is tenure security? Conceptual implications for empirical analysis. Land Econ 87(2):297–311

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Barzel Y (1997) Economic analysis of property rights. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Besley T (1995) Property rights and investment incentives: theory and evidence from Ghana. J Polit Econ 103(5):903–937

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Bureau of Statistics of Jiangxi province (2011) Statistical yearbook of Jiangxi Province. China Statistics Press, Beijing (In Chinese)

    Google Scholar 

  • Dahal GR, Atkinson J, Bampton J (2011) Forest tenure in Asia: status and trends. EFI/RECOFTC/EU, Kuala Lumpur

  • Edmunds D, Wollenberg E, Contreras AP, Dachang L, Kelkar G, Nathan D, Sarin M, Singh NM (2003) Introduction. In: Edmunds D, Wollenberg E (eds) Local forest management: the impacts of devolution policies. Routledge, London, pp 1–19

    Google Scholar 

  • FAO (2002) Land tenure and rural development. The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, land tenure studies no. 3, Rome

  • FAO (2011) Reforming forest tenure: issues, principles and process. The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, Rome. http://www.fao.org/docrep/014/i2185e/i2185e00.pdf

  • FAO (2012) State of the world’s forests 2012. The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, Rome. http://www.fao.org/docrep/016/i3010e/i3010e.pdf

  • Fenske J (2011) Land tenure and investment incentives: evidence from West Africa. J Dev Econ 95(2):137–156

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Forestry Department of Jiangxi Province (2012) The overview of key forestry projects in Jiangxi. Nanchang, Jiangxi. http://www.jxly.gov.cn/zdgc/tghl/. Accessed 30 Sept 2012. (In Chinese)

  • Furubotn EG, Richter R (2005) Institutions and economic theory: the contribution of the New Institutional Economics. University of Michigan Press, Michigan

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Gao L, Zhang Z (2012) An empirical analysis on the contribution of regulation of property rights and input factors to forestry economic growth. J South China Agric Uni (Soc Sci Ed) 1:77–85 (In Chinese)

    Google Scholar 

  • Godoy RA (1992) Determinants of smallholder commercial tree cultivation. World Dev 20(5):713–725

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Hart O, Moore J (1990) Property rights and the nature of the Firm. J Polit Econ 98(6):1119–1158

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Herbohn JL, Emtage NF, Harrison S, Gregorio NO, Peque DP (2004) The Influence of land and tree tenure on participation in smallholder and community forestry. In: Baumgartner DM (eds) Human dimensions of family, farm and community forestry. Proceedings of international symposium, Washington State University, Washington, pp 205–214

  • Hlaing EES, Inoue M, Pulhin JM (2013) A property-rights approach to understanding regulations and practices in community-based forest management: comparison of three systems in the Philippines. Small-scale For 12(4):579–596

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Holden S, Xu J, Jiang X (2011) Collective versus individual property: tenure security and forest tenure reforms in China. Centre for Land Tenure Studies, Norwegian University of Life Sciences, Ås

    Google Scholar 

  • Koo H-W (2011) Property rights, land prices, and investment: a study of the Taiwanese land registration system. J Inst Theor Econ 167(3):515–535

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Larson AM (2011) Forest tenure reform in the age of climate change: lessons for REDD+. Glob Environ Change 21(2):540–549

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Liu D (2008) Policies and programmes to make decentralization effective: a case study from China. In: Colfer CJP, Dahal GR, Capistrano D (eds) Lessons from forest decentralization: money, justice and the quest for good governance in Asia-Pacific. Earthscan, London, pp 83–99

    Google Scholar 

  • Ma X, Heerink N, Ierland EV, Berg MVD, Shi X (2013) Land tenure security and land investments in Northwest China. China Agric Econ Rev 5(2):281–307

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Martin FS, Bertomeu M, van Noordwijk M, Navarro R (2012) Understanding forest transition in the Philippines: main farm-level factors influencing smallholder’s capacity and intention to plant native timber trees. Small-scale For 11(1):47–60

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Mullan K, Grosjean P, Kontoleon A (2011) Land tenure arrangements and rural–urban migration in China. World Dev 39(1):123–133

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • National Bureau of Statistics of China (2011) National statistical yearbook. China Statistics Press, Beijing (In Chinese)

    Google Scholar 

  • Qin P, Xu J (2013) Forest land rights, tenure types, and farmers’ investment incentives in China: an empirical study of Fujian Province. China Agric Econ Rev 5(1):154–170

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Sandbrook C, Nelson F, Adams WM, Agrawal A (2010) Carbon, forests and the REDD paradox. Oryx 44(3):330–334

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Segal I, Whinston MD (2013) Property rights. In: Gibbons R, Roberts J (eds) The handbook of organizational economics. Princeton University Press, Princeton, p 1233

    Google Scholar 

  • Slangen LH, Polman NB (2008) Land lease contracts: properties and the value of bundles of property rights. NJAS Wageningen J Life Sci 55(4):397–412

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Slangen LH, Loucks LA, Slangen AH (2008) Institutional economics and economic organisation theory: an integrated approach. Wageningen Academic Published, The Netherlands

    Google Scholar 

  • State Forestry Administration (2009) National camellia development plan. State Forestry Administration, Beijing (In Chinese)

    Google Scholar 

  • Tan S, Heerink N, Kruseman G, Qu F (2008) Do fragmented landholdings have higher production costs? Evidence from rice farmers in Northeastern Jiangxi province, P.R. China. China Econ Rev 19(3):347–358

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Tu Q, Mol APJ, Zhang L, Ruben R (2011) How do trust and property security influence household contributions to public goods? The case of the sloping land conversion program in China. China Econ Rev 22(4):499–511

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Uchida E, Xu J, Xu Z, Rozelle S (2007) Are the poor benefiting from China’s land conservation program? Environ Dev Econ 12(4):593–620

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Wang C, Wen Y, Wu J (2014) The socio-economic effect of the reform of the collective forest rights system in Southern China: a case of Tonggu County, Jiangxi Province. Small-scale Forestry. doi:10.1007/s11842-014-9263-9

  • Xie Y, Wen Y, Zhang Y, Li X (2013) Impact of property rights reform on household forest management investment: an empirical study of southern China. For Policy Econ 34:73–78

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Xu J, Sun Y, Jiang X, Li J (2008) Collective forest tenure reform in China: analysis of pattern and performance. For Econ 9:27–38 (In Chinese)

    Google Scholar 

  • Xu J, White A, Lele UJ (2010) China’s forest tenure reforms: impacts and implications for choice, conservation, and climate change. Rights and resources initiative. Washington, DC. http://www.rightsandresources.org/wp-content/uploads/China-long-report-final-LP-edit-Jan20.pdf

  • Zhang D, Owiredu EA (2007) Land tenure, market, and the establishment of forest plantations in Ghana. For Policy Econ 9:602–610

    Article  Google Scholar 

Download references

Acknowledgments

This research was carried out within the research SURE project (Sustainable Natural REsource Use in Rural China, http://sure.ernasia.org/), which is funded by the Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences (KNAW), grant 08-PSA-E-02, and the Chinese Ministry of Science and Technology (MoST), Grant 2008DFA90630, as part of the Programme Strategic Scientific Alliances.

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Jia Li.

Electronic supplementary material

Below is the link to the electronic supplementary material.

Supplementary material 1 (DOC 34 kb)

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Check for updates. Verify currency and authenticity via CrossMark

Cite this article

Li, J., Bluemling, B. & Dries, L. Property Rights Effects on Farmers’ Management Investment in Forestry Projects: The Case of Camellia in Jiangxi, China. Small-scale Forestry 15, 271–289 (2016). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11842-016-9322-5

Download citation

  • Accepted:

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11842-016-9322-5

Keywords

Navigation