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Equilibria in a competitive model arising from linear production situations with a common-pool resource

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Abstract

In this paper we deal with linear production situations in which there is a limited common-pool resource, managed by an external agent. The profit that a producer can attain depends on the amount of common-pool resource obtained through a certain procedure. We contemplate a competitive process among the producers and study the corresponding non-cooperative games, describing their (strict) Nash equilibria in pure strategies. It is shown that strict Nash equilibria form a subset of strong Nash equilibria, which in turn form a proper subset of Nash equilibria.

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Notes

  1. Note that instead of a producer we can consider that each agent represents a group of producers (coalition) and the results do not change.

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Acknowledgements

The authors thank two anonymous referees for their helpful comments and suggestions to improve the contents of the paper. Financial support from the Government of Spain (MICINN, MINECO) and FEDER under projects MTM2011-23205, MTM2011-27731-C03, MTM2014-53395-C3-3-P and MTM2014-54199-P; and from Fundación Séneca de la Región de Murcia through Grant 19320/PI/14 are gratefully acknowledged.

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Correspondence to N. Llorca.

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Gutiérrez, E., Llorca, N., Sánchez-Soriano, J. et al. Equilibria in a competitive model arising from linear production situations with a common-pool resource. TOP 25, 394–401 (2017). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11750-017-0438-3

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11750-017-0438-3

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