Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

Vertical environmental protection pressure, fiscal pressure, and local environmental regulations: evidence from China’s industrial sulfur dioxide treatment

  • Research Article
  • Published:
Environmental Science and Pollution Research Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

Incorporating vertical environmental protection pressure, fiscal pressure, and government environmental regulatory behavior into a unified research framework, this paper empirically tests local governments’ regulatory behavior on sulfur dioxide under incompatible dual pressures using data of 30 regions in China from 2003 to 2017. The results show that as the vertical environmental protection pressure increases, local governments will improve the regulation intensity on sulfur dioxide. However, as local governments’ fiscal pressure increases, the effect of vertical environmental protection pressure on local governments’ environmental regulations will be weakened. Based on the “neighborhood imitation effect,” the impact of neighboring regions is considered when measuring fiscal pressure. The results still show that fiscal pressure will weaken the improving effect of vertical environmental protection pressure on the local government’s environmental regulation. After controlling the endogenous problem and a series of robustness tests, the above conclusions are still valid. The results indicate that improving the status of environmental protection in the performance evaluation is an effective means to promote the implementation of environmental regulations by local governments. However, China’s environmental governance cannot depend solely on improving the proportion of environmental protection in performance evaluations of local officials. A reasonable promotion incentive mechanism should be designed to avoid the incompatibility pressure caused by conflicting tasks to distort the local government’s compliance with the central government’s pollution control intention.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Log in via an institution

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Institutional subscriptions

Fig. 1
Fig. 2
Fig. 3
Fig. 4
Fig. 5

Similar content being viewed by others

Notes

  1. Vertical environmental pressure refers to environmental protection pressure from the upper-level government. In this paper, it mainly refers to environmental pressure from the central government. Unless otherwise specified, all environmental protection pressures mentioned in this article refer to vertical environmental protection pressures.

  2. After checking the government work report, the number of occurrences of the following words is subtracted. This is because although these words contain the word huanjing, they have nothing to do with the ecological environment. These words are as follows: zhengzhihuanjing, jingjihuanjing, wenhuahuanjing, touzihuanjing, xiaofeihuanjing, zhianhuanjing, guojihuanjing, hepinghuanjing, zhoubianhuanjing, jiuyehuanjing, neiwaihuanjing, fazhanhuanjing, tizhihuanjing, jinronghuanjing, yulunhuanjing, fazhihuanjing, chuangxinhuanjing, chuangyehuanjing, maoyihuanjing, xinyonghuanjing, jingmaohuanjing, lvyouhuanjing, zhengcehuanjing, waibuhuanjing, zhiduhuanjing, wangluohuanjing, wendinghuanjing, yingshanghuanjing, jingzhenghuanjing, yinghuanjing, ruanhuanjing.

References

  • Antweiler W, Copeland BR, Taylor MS (2001) Is free trade good for the environment? Am Econ Rev 91(4):877–908

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Bai J, Lu J, Li S (2018) Fiscal pressure, tax competition and environmental pollution. Environ Resour Econ 73(2):431–447

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Bao G, Guan B (2019) Does fiscal pressure reduce the environmental governance efficiency of local governments. China Popul, Resour Environ 29(4):38–48 (in Chinese)

    Google Scholar 

  • Becker RA (2005) Air pollution abatement costs under the Clean Air Act: evidence from the PACE survey. J Environ Econ Manag 50(1):144–169

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Bernauer T, Koubi V (2012) Are bigger governments better providers of public goods? Evidence from air pollution. Public Choice 156(3-4):593–609

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Cai H, Chen Y, Gong Q (2016) Polluting thy neighbor: unintended consequences of China’s pollution reduction mandates. J Environ Econ Manag 76:86–104

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Caldeira E (2012) Yardstick competition in a federation: theory and evidence from China. China Econ Rev 23(4):878–897

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Cao Y, Liu J, Yu Y, Wei G (2020) Impact of environmental regulation on green growth in China’s manufacturing industry-based on the Malmquist-Luenberger index and the system GMM model. Environ Sci Pollut Res 27(33):41928–41945

    Article  CAS  Google Scholar 

  • Chen X, Chang CP (2020) Fiscal decentralization, environmental regulation, and pollution: a spatial investigation. Environ Sci Pollut Res 27(25):31946–31968

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Chen S, Chen D (2018) Air pollution, government regulations and high-quality economic development. Econ Res J 53:20–33 (in Chinese)

    CAS  Google Scholar 

  • Chen Y, Li H, Zhou LA (2005) Relative performance evaluation and the turnover of provincial leaders in China. Econ Lett 88(3):421–425

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Chen Z, Kahn ME, Liu Y, Wang Z (2018) The consequences of spatially differentiated water pollution regulation in China. J Environ Econ Manag 88:468–485

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Chien SS (2010) Economic freedom and political control in Post-Mao China: a perspective of upward accountability and asymmetric decentralization. Asian J Polit Sci 18(1):69–89

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Chong D, Sun N (2020) Explore emission reduction strategy and evolutionary mechanism under central environmental protection inspection system for multi-agent based on evolutionary game theory. Comput Commun 156:77–90

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Cole MA, Elliott RJ (2007) Do environmental regulations cost jobs? An industry-level analysis of the UK. BE J Econ Anal Pol 7(1):28–48

    Google Scholar 

  • Dean JM, Lovely ME, Wang H (2009) Are foreign investors attracted to weak environmental regulations? Evaluating the evidence from China. J Dev Econ 90(1):1–13

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Deng H, Zheng X, Huang N, Li F (2012) Strategic interaction in spending on environmental protection: spatial evidence from Chinese cities. China World Econ 20(5):103–120

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Ehrlich PR, Holdren JP (1971) Impact of population growth. Science 171(3977):1212–1217

    Article  CAS  Google Scholar 

  • Ghanem D, Zhang J (2014) ‘Effortless perfection:’ do Chinese cities manipulate air pollution data? J Environ Econ Manag 68(2):203–225

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Ghose A, Ipeirotis PG, Li B (2012) Designing ranking systems for hotels on travel search engines by mining user-generated and crowdsourced content. Mark Sci 31(3):493–520

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Greenstone M, Hanna R (2014) Environmental regulations, air and water pollution, and infant mortality in India. Am Econ Rev 104(10):3038–3072

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Guo S, Lu J (2019) Jurisdictional air pollution regulation in China: a tragedy of the regulatory anti-commons. J Clean Prod 212:1054–1061

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Guo S, Wen L, Wu Y, Yue X, Fan G (2020) Fiscal decentralization and local environmental pollution in China. Int J Environ Res Public Health 17(22):8661

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Hong T, Yu N, Mao Z (2019) Does environment centralization prevent local governments from racing to the bottom? –evidence from China. J Clean Prod 231:649–659

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Hu S, Liu S (2019) Do the coupling effects of environmental regulation and R&D subsidies work in the development of green innovation? Empirical evidence from China. Clean Technol Environ 21(9):1739–1749

    Article  CAS  Google Scholar 

  • Huang Y (1996) Central-local relations in China during the reform era: the economic and institutional dimensions. World Dev 24(4):655–672

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Javorcik BS, Wei SJ (2003) Pollution havens and foreign direct investment: dirty secret or popular myth? BE J Econ Anal Pol 3(2):1–34

    Google Scholar 

  • Jia K, Chen S (2019) Could campaign-style enforcement improve environmental performance? Evidence from China’s central environmental protection inspection. J Environ Manag 245:282–290

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Jiang K, You D, Merrill R, Li Z (2019) Implementation of a multi-agent environmental regulation strategy under Chinese fiscal decentralization: an evolutionary game theoretical approach. J Clean Prod 214:902–915

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Kostka G, Mol APJ (2013) Implementation and participation in China’s local environmental politics: challenges and innovations. J Environ Pol Plan 15(1):3–16

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Kuai P, Yang S, Tao A, Sa Z, Khan ZD (2019) Environmental effects of Chinese-style fiscal decentralization and the sustainability implications. J Clean Prod 239:118089

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Lou L, Li J, Zhong S (2020) Sulfur dioxide (SO2) emission reduction and its spatial spillover effect in high-tech industries: based on panel data from 30 provinces in China. Environ Sci Pollut Res 6. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11356-021-12755-7

  • Morgenstern RD, Pizer WA, Shih J-S (2002) Jobs versus the environment: an industry-level perspective. J Environ Econ Manag 43(3):412–436

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Nan Y, Li Q, Yu J, Cai H, Zhou Q (2019) Has the emissions intensity of industrial sulphur dioxide converged? New evidence from China’s prefectural cities with dynamic spatial panel models. Environ Dev Sustain 22(6):5337–5369

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Nasrollahi Z, Hashemi M-S, Bameri S, Mohamad Taghvaee V (2018) Environmental pollution, economic growth, population, industrialization, and technology in weak and strong sustainability: using STIRPAT model. Environ Dev Sustain 22(2):1105–1122

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Nie Y, Cheng D, Liu K (2020) The effectiveness of environmental authoritarianism: evidence from China’s administrative inquiry for environmental protection. Energy Econ 88:104777

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Ran R (2013) Perverse incentive structure and policy implementation gap in China’s local environmental politics. J Environ Pol Plan 15(1):17–39

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Rosa EA, Dietz T (1998) Climate change and society: speculation, construction and scientific investigation. Int Sociol 13(4):421–455

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Wan K, Shackley S, Doherty RM, Shi Z, Zhang P, Golding N (2020) Science-policy interplay on air pollution governance in China. Environ Sci Pol 107:150–157

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Wang Y, Zuo Y, Li W, Kang Y, Chen W, Zhao M, Chen H (2018) Does environmental regulation affect CO2 emissions? Analysis based on threshold effect model. Clean Technol Environ 21(3):565–577

    Article  CAS  Google Scholar 

  • Weingast BR (2009) Second generation fiscal federalism: the implications of fiscal incentives. J Urban Econ 65(3):279–293

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Xi P, Liang R, Xie Z (2017) Tax sharing adjustments, fiscal pressure and industrial pollution. J World Econ 10:170–191 (in Chinese)

    Google Scholar 

  • Xiang C, van Gevelt T (2020) Central inspection teams and the enforcement of environmental regulations in China. Environ Sci Pol 112:431–439

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Xing Y, Kolstad CD (2002) Do lax environmental regulations attract foreign investment. Environ Resour Econ 21(1):1–22

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Xu C (2011) The fundamental institutions of China’s reforms and development. J Econ Lit 49(4):1076–1151

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Yang T, Liao H, Wei YM (2020) Local government competition on setting emission reduction goals. Sci Total Environ 745:141002

    Article  CAS  Google Scholar 

  • Zang J, Liu L (2020) Fiscal decentralization, government environmental preference, and regional environmental governance efficiency: evidence from China. Ann Reg Sci 65:439–457

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Zhang X (2006) Fiscal decentralization and political centralization in China: implications for growth and inequality. J Comp Econ 34(4):713–726

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Zhang H (2016) Strategic interaction of regional environmental regulation: an explanation on the universality of incomplete enforcement of environmental regulation. China Industr Econ 7:74–90 (in Chinese)

    Google Scholar 

  • Zhang J, Fu X (2008) FDI and environmental regulations in China. J Asia Pac Econ 13(3):332–353

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Zhang Z, Jin T, Meng X (2020) From race-to-the-bottom to strategic imitation: how does political competition impact the environmental enforcement of local governments in China? Environ Sci Pollut Res 27(20):25675–25688

    Article  CAS  Google Scholar 

  • Zhao Y, Liang C, Zhang X (2020) Positive or negative externalities? Exploring the spatial spillover and industrial agglomeration threshold effects of environmental regulation on haze pollution in China. Environ Dev Sustain. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10668-020-01114-0

  • Zhu Z, Gao Y (2010) The involvement of financial pressure and official performance: research on the local government investment and financing platform. Macroeconomy 202(12):30–35 (in Chinese)

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Availability of data and material

The data and material used or analyzed during the current study are available from the corresponding author on reasonable request.

Funding

This work was supported by the National Ministry of Education Humanities and Social Science Research Planning Fund Project [18YJA790031].

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. School of Business Administration, Northeastern University, Shenyang, 110169, China

    Po Kou & Ying Han

Authors
  1. Po Kou
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

  2. Ying Han
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Contributions

Conceptualization, Po Kou; writing (original draft), Po Kou; methodology, Po Kou and Ying Han; formal analysis and investigation, Po Kou and Ying Han; funding acquisition, Ying Han.

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Po Kou.

Ethics declarations

Ethics approval and consent to participate

Not applicable.

Consent for publication

Not applicable.

Competing interests

The authors declare no competing interests.

Additional information

Responsible editor: Eyup Dogan

Publisher’s note

Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Check for updates. Verify currency and authenticity via CrossMark

Cite this article

Kou, P., Han, Y. Vertical environmental protection pressure, fiscal pressure, and local environmental regulations: evidence from China’s industrial sulfur dioxide treatment. Environ Sci Pollut Res 28, 60095–60110 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11356-021-14947-7

Download citation

  • Received:

  • Accepted:

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11356-021-14947-7

Keywords

Search

Navigation