Abstract
In this paper we examine the question of whether complexity-like explanations can be applied to the psychology of individuals, and its implications for the scope of complexity explanations of social phenomena. We start by outlining two representational-cum-computational models of the mind—a symbolic model and a networks or connectionist one—and their pros and cons. Based on this we then outline a radical, non-representational and non-computational alternative model that has been gaining ground recently, and which has significant affinities with complexity explanations in social science. Deploying neo-Kantian considerations, we then argue that due to the discursivity, or conceptual dimension of our cognitive system, the radical alternative must be incorrect insofar as humans are concerned. Indeed, human psychology must involve, at least partly, a representational understanding of the sort provided by the symbolic model. Relatedly, we show how the discursiviry of human cognition complicates our psychology and makes it difficult to account for. Finally, we briefly address the question of how the complicated nature of individual psychology, implied by human discursivity, may affect complexity explanations of social behavior.
Similar content being viewed by others
References
Allen C, Bekoff M (1997) Species of mind: the philosophy and biology of cognitive ethology. Bradford, Cambridge
Anderson ML (2003) Embodied cognition: a field guide. Artif Intell 149:91–130
Audi R (2006) Practical reasoning and ethical decision. Routledge, London
Barrett L (2011) Beyond the brain: how body and environment shape animal and human minds. Princeton University Press, Princeton
Bechtel W, Abrahamsen A (2002) Connectionism and the mind: parallel processing, dynamics, and evolution in networks, 2nd edn. Blackwell, Oxford
Beer RD (1995) A dynamical systems perspective on agent-environment interaction. Artif Intell 72:173–215
Beer RD (2000) Dynamical approaches to cognitive science. Trends Cognit Sci 4:91–99
Beer RD, Gallagher JC (1992) Evolving dynamical neural networks for adaptive behavior. Adapt Behav 1:91–122
Brooks R (1991) Intelligence without reason. Reprinted in Brooks R (1999) Cambrian intelligence: the early history of the new AI. MIT Press, Cambridge, pp 133–186
Buchanan M (2007) Social atoms: why the rich get richer, cheaters get caught, and your neighbor usually looks like you. Bloomsbury, New York
Chemero A (2009) Radical embodied cognitive science. Bradford, Cambridge
Clark A (1990) Connectionist minds. Proc Aristot Soc 90:83–102
Clark A (1994) Representational trajectories in connectionist learning. Mind Mach 4:317–332
Clark A (1997a) Being there: putting brain, body, and world together again. Bradford, Cambridge
Clark A (1997b) The dynamical challenge. Cognit Sci 21:461–481
Clark A (1999) An embodied cognitive science? Trends Cognit Sci 3:345–351
Clark A (2001) Mindware: an introduction the philosophy of cognitive science. Oxford University Press, New York
Clark A (2002) The roots of ‘norm-hungriness’. In: Clapin H (ed) Philosophy of mental representation. Clarendon Press, New York, pp 37–43
Clark A (2008) Supersizing the mind: embodiment, action, and cognitive extension. Oxford University Press, New York
Clark A, Grush R (1999) Towards a cognitive robotics. Adapt Behav 7:5–16
Clark A, Thornton C (1997) Trading spaces: computation, representation, and the limits of uninformed learning. Brain Behav Sci 20:57–66
Clark A, Toribio J (1994) Doing without representing? Synthese 101:401–431
Collins S, Ruina A (2005) A bipedal walking robot with efficient and human-like gait. Proceedings of the 2005 IEEE, 1983–1988
Collins S, Ruina A, Tedrake R, Wisse M (2005) Efficient bipedal robots based on passive-dynamic walkers. Science 307:1082–1085
Crane T (2003) The mechanical mind: a philosophical introduction to minds, machines and mental representation, 2nd edn. Routledge, London
Davidson D (1982) Rational animals. Reprinted in Davidson D (2001) Subjective, intersubjective, objective. Clarendon Press, Oxford, pp 95–105
Engel AK, Maye A, Kurthen M, König P (2013) Where’s the action? The pragmatic turn in cognitive science. Trends Cognit Sci 17:202–209
Evans G (1982) The varieties of reference. Clarendon Press, Oxford
Fodor JA (1985) Fodor’s guide to mental representation: the intelligent auntie’s vade-mecum. Mind 94:76–100
Fodor JA (1987) Psychosemantics: the problem of meaning in the philosophy of mind. MIT Press, Cambridge
Fodor JA, Pylyshyn ZW (1988) Connectionism and cognitive architecture: a critical analysis. Cognition 28:3–71
Grush R (2004a) The emulation theory of representation: motor control, imagery, and perception. Brain Behav Sci 27:377–396
Grush R (2004b) Further explorations of the empirical and theoretical aspects of the emulation theory. Brain Behav Sci 27:425–442
Hallam J, Malcolm CA (1994) Behavior, perception, action and intelligence: the view from situated robots. Philos Trans R Soc A 349:29–42
Haugeland J (ed) (1981) Mind design. MIT Press, Cambridge
Haugeland J (1985) Artificial intelligence: the very idea. Bradford, Cambridge
Haugeland J (1991) Representational genera. Reprinted in Haugeland J (1998) Having thought: Essays in the metaphysics of mind. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, pp 171–206
Haugeland J (2002) Andy Clark on cognition and representation. In: Clapin H (ed) Philosophy of mental representation. Clarendon Press, New York, pp 24–36
Kant I (1998) Critique of pure reason (trans: Guyer P, Wood AW). Cambridge University Press, New York
Levin Y, Aharon I (2014) Emotion, utility maximization, and ecological rationality. Mind Soc 13:227–245
Luntley M (1999) Contemporary philosophy of thought. Blackwell, Oxford
Marr D (2010) Vision: a computational investigation into the human representation and processing of visual information. MIT Press, Cambridge
McDowell J (1996) Mind and world. Harvard University Press, Cambridge
McDowell J (2009) Having the world in view: essays on Kant, Hegel, and Sellars. Harvard University Press, Cambridge
McGeer T (1990) Passive dynamic walking. Int J Robot Res 9:62–82
Noë A (2004) Action in perception. MIT Press, Cambridge
North DC (1994) Economic performance through time. Am Econ Rev 84:359–368
Pfeifer R, Fumiya L, Lungarella M (2014) Cognition from the bottom up: on biological inspiration, body morphology, and soft materials. Trends Cognit Sci 18:404–413
Pylyshyn ZW (2003) Seeing and visualizing: it’s not what you think. Bradford, Cambridge
Ramsey W, Stitch S, Garon J (1991) Connectionism, eliminitivism, and the future of folk psychology. In: Ramsey W, Rumelhart DE, Stich SP (eds) Philosophy and connectionist theory. Lawrence Erlbaum, Hillsdale, pp 199–228
Rayner K, Pollatsek A (2013) Basic processes in reading. In: Reisberg D (ed) The Oxford handbook of cognitive psychology. Oxford University Press, New York, pp 442–461
Rumelhart D, Smolensky P, McClelland J, Hinton G (1986) Schemata and sequential thought processes in PDP models. In: McClelland J, Rummelhart D, the PDP Research Group (eds) Parallel distributed processing: explorations in the microstructure of cognition, vol 2. MIT Press, Cambridge, pp 7–57
Satz D, Ferejohn J (1994) Rational choice and social theory. J Philos 91:71–87
Sellars W (1997) Empiricism and the philosophy of mind. Harvard University Press, Cambridge
Shapiro L (2011) Embodied cognition. Routledge, London
Sreterlny K (1990) The representational theory of mind: an introduction. Basil Blackwell, Oxford
Stitch S (1979) Do animals have beliefs? Australas J Philos 57:15–28
van Gelder T (1991) What is the “D” in “PDP”? A survey of the concept of distribution. In: Ramsey W, Stich S, Rumelhart DE (eds) Philosophy and connectionist theory. Lawrence Erlbaum, Hillsdale, pp 33–59
van Gelder T (1995) What might cognition be, if not computation? J Philos 92:345–381
van Gelder T (1998) The dynamical hypothesis in cognitive science. Behav Brain Sci 21:615–628
van Gelder T (1999) Dynamic approaches to cognition. In: Wilson R, Keil F (eds) The MIT encyclopedia of cognitive sciences. MIT Press, Cambridge, pp 244–246
van Gelder T, Port RF (1995) It’s about time: an overview of the dynamical approach to cognition. In: Port RF, van Gelder T (eds) Mind as motion. MIT Press, Cambridge, pp 1–43
Wheeler M (2005) Reconstructing the cognitive world: the next step. Bradford, Cambridge
Wilson AD, Golonka S (2013) Embodied cognition is not what you think it is. Front Psychol 4:1–13
Acknowledgments
An early version of this paper was presented at a workshop on rationality models and economic crises organized by the Jean Nicod Institute in Paris. We would like to thank the participants in this workshop for their helpful comments. We are also grateful to Andy Clark, Oron Shagrir, and Larry Shapiro for their helpful comments on earlier versions of the paper.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Levin, Y., Aharon, I. Complexity and individual psychology. Mind Soc 14, 203–219 (2015). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11299-015-0171-2
Received:
Accepted:
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11299-015-0171-2