Abstract
The benefits and negative consequences of government–nonprofit contracting are well documented. From the literature, we know that government and nonprofits can demonstrate contradictory organization-level characteristics. Some argue that these contradictions make government and nonprofits complementary partners, but empirical evidence reveals the potential loss of nonprofit voluntariness. How does one harvest the alleged benefits of the government–nonprofit relationship while minimizing the potential loss of nonprofit voluntariness? Through the qualitative investigation of one nonprofit, this study identifies seven types of organizational-level differences between the government and the nonprofit. These conflicts are manifested by three forms of power struggle. This illuminates that power struggles are the root cause of the potential loss of nonprofits’ voluntariness. The author argues that as long as nonprofits depend on the government for resources, power struggles will persist and voluntariness will be at risk; hence, addressing resource dependence is the key to answering our research question.
Résumé
Les avantages et les conséquences négatives des ententes entre les gouvernements et organismes sans but lucratif sont bien documentés. La littérature existante nous apprend que ces derniers présentent parfois des caractéristiques contradictoires au niveau organisationnel. Certains affirment que lesdites contradictions font des gouvernements et des organismes sans but lucratif des partenaires complémentaires, mais la preuve empirique révèle une perte possible du volontarisme sans but lucratif. Comment donc récolter les avantages présumés de cette relation tout en minimisant les pertes? Dans le cadre d’une enquête qualitative d’un organisme sans but lucratif, la présente étude identifie sept types de différences organisationnelles entre le secteur gouvernemental et le secteur sans but lucratif. Ces conflits se présentent sous la forme de trois types de luttes de pouvoir. Cela confirme donc que les luttes de pouvoir constituent la cause fondamentale de la perte possible du volontarisme. L’auteur avance que tant et aussi longtemps que les organismes sans but lucratif dépendront du gouvernement pour obtenir des ressources, les luttes de pouvoir persisteront et le volontarisme restera menacé. La résolution du problème de la dépendance aux ressources représente ainsi la clé de la réponse à la question posée par notre recherche.
Zusammenfassung
Die Vorteile und negativen Folgen einer Auftragsvergabe zwischen Regierung und gemeinnützigen Organisationen sind gut dokumentiert. Wir wissen aus der vorhandenen Literatur, dass Regierungen und gemeinnützige Organisationen gegensätzliche Merkmale auf der Organisationsebene aufzeigen können. Einige behaupten, dass diese Gegensätze Regierungen und gemeinnützige Organisationen zu komplementären Partnern machen, aber empirische Daten belegen den potenziellen Verlust der Freiwilligkeit der gemeinnützigen Organisationen. Wie erzielt man die vermeintlichen Vorteile einer Beziehung zwischen Regierung und gemeinnützigen Organisation und minimiert gleichzeitig den potenziellen Verlust der Freiwilligkeit der gemeinnützigen Organisationen? Mittels einer qualitativen Untersuchung einer gemeinnützigen Organisation ermittelt diese Studie sieben Arten von Unterschieden zwischen Regierungen und gemeinnützigen Organisationen bezüglich ihrer Organisationsebenen. Diese Konflikte sind in drei Formen eines Machtkampfes erkennbar. Das zeigt, dass Machtkämpfe die grundlegende Ursache für den potenziellen Verlust der Freiwilligkeit seitens der gemeinnützigen Organisationen sind. Der Autor argumentiert, dass so lange gemeinnützige Organisationen für ihre Ressourcen von der Regierung abhängig sind, die Machtkämpfe weiter bestehen und die Freiwilligkeit gefährdet ist. Folglich ist zur Beantwortung unserer Forschungsfrage wichtig, dass wir uns mit der Ressourcenabhängigkeit befassen.
Resumen
Los beneficios y las consecuencias negativas de la contratación gobierno-organizaciones sin ánimo de lucro están bien documentados. Gracias al material publicado, sabemos que el gobierno y las organizaciones sin ánimo de lucro pueden demostrar características contradictorias a nivel de organización. Algunos argumentan que estas contradicciones hacen del gobierno y de las organizaciones sin ánimo de lucro socios complementarios, pero la evidencia empírica revela la pérdida potencial de voluntariedad de las organizaciones sin ánimo de lucro. ¿Cómo se recogen los presuntos beneficios de la relación gobierno-organizaciones sin ánimo de lucro minimizando al mismo tiempo la pérdida potencial de voluntariedad de las organizaciones sin ánimo de lucro? Mediante la investigación cualitativa de una organización sin ánimo de lucro, el presente estudio identifica siete tipos de diferencias a nivel organizativo entre el gobierno y las organizaciones sin ánimo de lucro. Estos conflictos se manifestaron mediante tres formas de lucha por el poder. Esto ilustra que las luchas por el poder son la causa fundamental de la pérdida potencial de voluntariedad de las organizaciones sin ánimo de lucro. El autor argumenta que mientras las organizaciones sin ánimo de lucro dependan del gobierno para la obtención de recursos, las luchas por el poder persistirán y la voluntariedad estará en riesgo; de ahí que abordar la dependencia de recursos sea la clave para responder a la pregunta de nuestra investigación.
Abstract
政府与非营利组织建立合作关系的好处与坏处均有详实的记录。从相关文献来讲,我们发现,政府与非营利组织在组织层面具有相互抵触的特点。有些人认为,这些矛盾使政府与非营利组织相辅相成,但是,根据以往的经验,非营利组织主动性有可能丧失。那么,如何获取政府与非营利组织关系的利益,而又最大限度减少非营利主动性的潜在损失呢?通过一家非营利组织的定性调查,本研究发现了七种政府与非营利组织在组织层面上的差异。这些冲突表现为三种形式的权力争斗。权力争斗是非营利组织主动性丧失的根本原因。本文作者认为,只要非营利组织依靠政府取得所需资源,权力争斗便会持续不断,主动性便可能存在变数。因此,解决资源依赖是解决我们研究问题的关键。
Abstract
إن الفوائد والعواقب السلبية للتعاقد الحكومي الغير ربحي موثقة بشكل جيد من الأدب، نحن نعلم أن الحكومة والمنظمات الغير ربحية يمكن أن تظهر خصائص متناقضة على مستوى المنظمة. يرى البعض أن هذه التناقضات تجعل من الشركاء الحكوميين والمنظمات الغير ربحية شركاء تكميليين، لكن الأدلة التجريبية تكشف عن الخسارة المحتملة للإختيار الذي يتم من الإرادة الحرة الغير ربحي. كيف يحصد الشخص الفوائد المزعومة للعلاقة الحكومية الغير ربحية مع التقليل من الخسائر المحتملة للإختيار الذي يتم من الإرادة الحرة الغير ربحي؟ من خلال التحقيق النوعي لمؤسسة غير ربحية واحدة، تحدد هذه الدراسة سبعة أنواع من الإختلافات على مستوى المؤسسة بين الحكومة والمنظمات الغير ربحية. تتجلى هذه الصراعات بثلاثة أشكال من صراع السلطة. هذا يسلط الضوء على أن صراع السلطة هو السبب الأساسي للخسارة المحتملة للإختيار الذي يتم من الإرادة الحرة للمنظمات الغير ربحية. يجادل الكاتب بإنه ما دامت المنظمات الغير ربحية تعتمد على الحكومة من أجل الموارد، سوف تستمر صراع السلطة وستتعرض التطوعية للخطر؛ وبالتالي، فإن معالجة الإعتماد على الموارد هو المفتاح للإجابة على سؤالنا البحثي.
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This study was funded by the Monieson Center, Smith School of Business, Queen’s University.
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Knutsen, W.L. Retaining the Benefits of Government–Nonprofit Contracting Relationship: Opposites Attract or Clash?. Voluntas 28, 1373–1398 (2017). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11266-017-9874-9
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11266-017-9874-9