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From Intentions to Neurons: Social and Neural Consequences of Disbelieving in Free Will

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Abstract

The problem of free will is among the most fascinating and disputed questions throughout the history of philosophy and psychology. Traditionally limited to philosophical and theological debate, in the last decades it has become a matter of scientific investigation. The theoretical and methodological advances in neuroscience allowed very complex psychological functions related to free will (conscious intentions, decision-making, and agency) to be investigated. In parallel, neuroscience is gaining momentum in the media, and various scientific findings are claimed to provide evidence that free will is nothing more than an illusion. Why do neuroscientific findings have such a strong impact on our notion of free will? Does it really matter what neuroscience tells us about free will? Here we critically examine studies in experimental philosophy, social psychology and cognitive neuroscience that attempt to provide an empirical answer to these questions. This overview of the literature demonstrates that inducing disbelief in free will has an impact on folk psychology, social behavior and intentional action.

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Notes

  1. The aim of the present article is to discuss the effects of neuroscientific reductionism—i.e. the idea that complex psychological functions can be understood in terms of chemical and physical processes in the brain—on folk intuitions of free will and on human cognition. The traditional debate on the relationship between free will and the philosophical position of determinism goes beyond the scope of the article and will not be discussed.

  2. It has been previously found that the ingestion of glucose can enhance self-control Gailliot et al. (2007).

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Experimental Psychology, Ghent University, 2 Henri Dunantlaan, 9000, Ghent, Belgium

    Davide Rigoni & Marcel Brass

  2. Behavioural Science Institute, Radboud University Nijmegen, Nijmegen, The Netherlands

    Marcel Brass

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  1. Davide Rigoni
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  2. Marcel Brass
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Correspondence to Davide Rigoni.

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Rigoni, D., Brass, M. From Intentions to Neurons: Social and Neural Consequences of Disbelieving in Free Will. Topoi 33, 5–12 (2014). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11245-013-9210-y

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11245-013-9210-y

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