Abstract
This paper contributes to the debate on the question of whether a systematic connection obtains between one’s commitment to realism or antirealism and one’s attitude towards the possibility of radical theoretical novelty, namely, theory change affecting our best, most successful theories (see, e.g., Stanford in Synthese 196:3915–3932, 2019; Dellsén in Stud Hist Philos Sci 76:30–38, 2019). We argue that it is not allegiance to realism or antirealism as such that primarily dictates one’s response to the possibility of radical theoretical novelty: what matters the most is, rather, the proposed alternative’s promise to realize one’s favored cognitive aim(s). Our argument tells not only against Stanford’s account of how adherence to realism or antirealism orients how one responds to possible radical theoretical novelty, but also against what we call the “natural pairing thesis.” According to such a thesis, which has kept resurfacing in the history of the philosophy of science, one-to-one pairings obtain between realism/antirealism, on the one hand, and theoretical conservatism/openness to radical theoretical novelty, on the other hand. As our argument suggests, however, when faced with the possibility of radical theoretical novelty, realists can respond either in a conservative way or by being open to theory change, not unlike antirealists.
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Notes
The idea echoes the famous claim that there is nothing new to be discovered in physics and all that remains is more and more precise measurement: “the future truths of Physical Science are to be looked for in the sixth place of decimals.” In a speech delivered in 1894 by Albert Michelson, the words in quotation marks above were reported to have been pronounced by an “eminent physicist,” and subsequently have oftentimes been misattributed to Lord Kelvin (see Horgan, 2015 [1996], p. 12).
“A new scientific truth does not triumph by convincing its opponents and making them see the light, but rather because its opponents eventually die, and a new generation grows up that is familiar with it” (Planck, 1949 [1948], pp. 33–34).
Thanks are due to an anonymous reviewer for pressing us on this point.
The crucial role of history was a central tenet of Mach’s historical-critical approach, vividly expressed, e.g., on the very first page of Principles of the theory of heat: “It is a commonplace of history that the modes of thought current in a given period and acquired by the labors of generations past are not always conducive to the advancement of science, but frequently act as a clog on its progress. […] A view, of which the origin and development lie bare before us, ranks in familiarity with one that we have personally and consciously acquired and of whose growth we possess a very distinct memory. It is never invested with that immobility and authority which those ideas possess that are imparted to us ready formed” (1986 [1896], p. 5).
As Wray (2015) shows, Popper (2002 [1935/1959]) had defended realism using basically the same argumentative strategy later deployed in Feyerabend (1981 [1964]) (see also Bschir 2015 for a compelling reconstruction of how the early Feyerabend’s views on realism and theoretical pluralism originated within Popperian falsificationism). It’s worth noting here that Feyerabend was a long-time admirer of Mach, whose undeserved reputation as an unsophisticated positivist—resting on a “net of confusions” (Feyerabend, 1987 [1984], p. 208)—he repeatedly tried to rehabilitate. With the defense of realism discussed here, Feyerabend took a view opposite to Mach’s, but it should be mentioned that his overall attitude towards realism is a matter of quite some controversy (see, e.g., Preston, 1997; Farrell, 2003; Oberheim, 2006; Chang, 2021).
It’s worth noting that Feyerabend’s argument relies on the assumption that instrumentalism takes theories to be nothing but tools for prediction—precisely the view rejected by Stanford, based on Stein’s suggestion (see Sect. 3).
Wray (2015) offers quite a different take on the issue. In particular, he proposes, against the methodological defense of realism, a case study highlighting the contribution that the Wittenberg astronomers made to the Copernican revolution by tenaciously working on the development of Copernicus’ theory, in spite of the fact that they rejected some of its central cosmological claims.
In a paper that does not directly discuss the problem of the distinction between realism and antirealism, Stanford (2011) argues that different parts of a theory can enjoy the support of different kinds of evidence, and that certain kinds of evidence better defuse the problem of unconceived alternatives, thereby licensing the realist attitude towards the relevant parts of the theory. This, we maintain, counts as evidence that Stanford of course agrees with the claim that scientists can take a “mixed” attitude towards the theoretical machineries with which they operate.
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Acknowledgements
This paper is based on material presented at the EPSA21 conference (Turin, 15–18 September 2021), where the audience offered precious criticisms and suggestions. Theo Kuipers’ insightful comments on a previous version of the manuscript and the detailed feedback of two anonymous reviewers greatly contributed to improve the final product. Usual caveats apply. G.C. acknowledges partial financial support from the MIUR-PRIN grant n. 201743F9YE.
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Tambolo, L., Cevolani, G. Realism, antirealism, and theoretical conservatism. Synthese 201, 16 (2023). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-022-04022-0
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-022-04022-0