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Undermining truthmaker theory

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Abstract

Truthmaker theorists hold that there is a metaphysically explanatory relation that holds between true claims and what exists. While some critics (e.g. Merricks 2007) try to provide counterexamples to truthmaker theory, that response quickly leads to a dialectical standoff. The aim of this paper is to move beyond that standoff by attempting to undermine some standard arguments for truthmaker theory. Using realism about truth and a more pragmatic account of explanation, I show how some of those arguments can be undermined.

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Notes

  1. A proposition \(p\) (classically) entails a proposition \(q\) just in case it is impossible for \(p\) to be true and \(q\) false.

  2. Armstrong attempted to provide a “proof” for it (2004, p. 6–7), but it is clearly unsuccessful (see, inter alia, Cameron (2008a, pp. 109–113)).

  3. The No Preemption principle is meant to exclude the possibility that, in world W, S makes \(p\) true but in some other world, V, S does not make \(p\) true, but some other thing, T, “preempts” S and it makes \(p\) true.

  4. Such as Schaffer (2008, pp. 309–10), Stenwall (2010, pp. 217ff.) and Parsons (1999), though it is not clear to me that Parsons would identify as a truthmaker theorist.

  5. Note that this “metaphysically explanatory” relation is not a causal relation (see Rodriguez-Pereyra 2006b, p. 189; Armstrong 2004, p. 5; and Keller 2004, p. 86).

  6. Note that, on this characterization, Lewis (2003) does not come out as a truthmaker theorist; his definition of a truthmaker (2003, p. 28) is consistent with the falsity of (1)-(4). (Indeed, I think that Lewis would reject (4).) I think this is a virtue; most people I know who are sympathetic with truthmaker theory find Lewis’ account unsatisfying.

  7. For a nice overview of some of the standard arguments and responses, see MacBride (2013).

  8. I here rely primarily on the work of Alston (1996).

  9. My characterization of realism is very similar to Alston’s first approximation of what he calls the realist conception of truth (1996, pp. 5, 22). Of course, there are certain paradoxical cases that must be excluded. This will not affect my treatment. If one wants, one can reformulate realism about truth as a large list of the non-paradoxical cases (as does Merricks 2007, p. 175).

  10. Cf. Alston (1996, p. 52): “A proposition is true when it is related in the right kind of way (identity of content) to something that is the case.”

  11. By ‘the truthmaker principle,’ Sorenson means the principle that “for each contingent truth there must be something in the world that makes it true” (2001, p. 171).

  12. Aristotle, Categories, 12, (many translations).

  13. ‘Some’ and not ‘all’ because the ‘all’ formulation would be controversial among truthmaker theorists, including Rodriguez-Pereyra.

  14. Of course, we will have to place restrictions on what propositions can be substituted in for \(p\) so as to exclude certain paradoxical cases. I’ll assume throughout that such restrictions are in place and remind the reader of this where relevant.

  15. In presenting my objection, I prefer to work with these general schema. My objection can be reformulated by simply working with instances, so deflationists regarding truth need not worry.

  16. I distinguish between the Grounding Thesis and the Asymmetry Thesis. Others have not. For instance, Rodriguez-Pereyra claims that ‘the proposition that the rose is red is true because the rose is red’ expresses the idea that truth is “grounded” (2009, p. 243). I disagree. Whether the force of that ‘because’ is best accounted for in terms of truth being “grounded” is a live philosophical question. Additionally, if one does not distinguish between these two theses, then one seems to be committed to holding that some philosophers—e.g. Quine (1970, p. 1) and Horwich (1990, pp. 104–108)—who appear to accept the Asymmetry Thesis also accept the Grounding Thesis (cf. Rodriguez-Pereyra (2005, p. 22)). But this is implausible. (Quine accepts metaphysical grounding? (!)) If one distinguishes between these theses, one is not committed to such a thing. Further, Merricks distinguishes between truth depending “trivially” and “substantively” on being (Merricks 2007, p. xiii, 2011, pp. 212–213)). If one does not distinguish between these two theses, then one may end up accounting for Merrick’s distinction by attributing to him views he does not hold (cf. Bennett (2011, pp. 188–191), Merricks (2011, pp. 212–213)). By distinguishing between these theses, one can account for Merricks’ distinction. His “trivial dependence” is just the Asymmetry Thesis, and his “substantive” dependence is an instance of the makes true relation.

  17. One can resist these final steps, but since I’m focusing on the first inference, I will not.

  18. Here I mainly follow the account of van Fraassen (1980), without necessarily committing myself to all the details or applications.

  19. Note that there are some cases where it is not. Sometimes the correct answer to ‘why is it true that P?’ is to provide a justification for P. (If during a Q&A portion of a talk, you ask the presenter ‘why is it true that your view does not have problematic consequence C?’, you would not think the question to have been answered with ‘because my view does not have that problematic consequence’!) I am here focusing on cases where ‘because P’ is the correct answer.

  20. This is a crude formulation of an antirealist position, but epicycles on antirealist positions will not affect my point here.

  21. (1980, p. 130ff.) Even Kitcher and Salmon, in their well-known critique of van Fraassen, concede that van Fraassen provides an explanation here (1987: p. 316); their criticisms of his view lie elsewhere.

  22. He uses his account to criticize truthmaker theory, but a discussion of that is unnecessary for my purposes here.

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Acknowledgments

For helpful feedback and conversation, I thank Dave Fisher, Hao Hong, Kirk Ludwig, Nick Montgomery, Harrison Waldo, and two anonymous reviewers. Special thanks to Tim O’Connor, who not only commented on multiple drafts but provided encouragement and support for the project.

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  1. Department of Philosophy, Indiana University, 1033 E. Third St., Sycamore Hall 026, Bloomington, IN, 47405-7005, USA

    Timothy Perrine

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Perrine, T. Undermining truthmaker theory. Synthese 192, 185–200 (2015). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-014-0558-3

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