Abstract
We inquire into the question whether the Aristotelian or classical ideal of science has been realised by the Model Revolution, initiated at Stanford University during the 1950s and spread all around the world of philosophy of science—salute Suppes. The guiding principle of the Model Revolution is: a scientific theory is a set of structures in the domain of discourse of axiomatic set-theory, characterised by a set-theoretical predicate. We expound some critical reflections on the Model Revolution; the conclusions will be that the philosophical problem of what a scientific theory is has not been solved yet—pace Suppes. While reflecting critically on the Model Revolution, we also explore a proposal of how to complete the Revolution and briefly address the intertwined subject of scientific representation, which has come to occupy center stage in philosophy of science over the past decade.
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Muller, F.A. Reflections on the revolution at Stanford. Synthese 183, 87–114 (2011). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-009-9669-7
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-009-9669-7