Abstract
Trope theory is the view that the world is a world of abstract particular qualities. But if all there is are tropes, how do we account for the truth of propositions ostensibly made true by some concrete particular? A common answer is that concrete particulars are nothing but tropes in compresence. This answer seems vulnerable to an argument (first presented by F. H. Bradley) according to which any attempt to account for the nature of relations will end up either in contradiction, nonsense, or will lead to a vicious infinite regress. I investigate Bradley’s argument and claim that it fails to prove what it sets out to. It fails, I argue, because it does not take all the different ways in which relation and relata may depend on one another into account. If relations are entities that are distinct from yet essentially dependent upon their relata, the Bradleyan problem is solved. We are then free to say that tropes in compresence are what make true propositions ostensibly made true by concrete particulars.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Similar content being viewed by others
References
Armstrong D.M. (1978) Universals and scientific realism I–II. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
Armstrong D.M. (1980) Against Ostrich nominalism: A reply to Michael Devitt. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 61: 440–449
Armstrong D.M. (1989) Universals: An opinionated introduction. Westview Press, Boulder
Armstrong D.M. (2004a) Truth and truthmakers. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
Armstrong, D. M. (2004b) How do particulars stand to universals. In D. W. Zimmerman (Ed.), Oxford studies in metaphysics, Vol. 1 (pp. 139–154). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Bacon, J. (1995). Universals and property instances. The alphabet of being, Aristotelian Society Series, Vol. 15, Oxford: Blackwell.
Baxter D.L.M. (1996) Bradley on substantive and adjective: The complex-unity problem. In: Mander W.J. (eds) Perspectives on the logic and metaphysics of F. H. Bradley. Thoemmes Press, Bristol, pp 1–24
Baxter D.L.M. (2001) Instantiation as partial identity. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 79(4): 449–464
Bradley, F. H. (1908 [1893]). Appearance and reality (2nd ed.). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Cameron R. (2006) Tropes, necessary connections, and non-transferability. Dialectica 60(2): 99–113. doi:10.1111/j.1746-8361.2006.01050.x
Campbell K. (1990) Abstract particulars. Blackwell, Oxford
Denkel A. (1997) On the compresence of tropes. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57(3): 599–606. doi:10.2307/2953751
Grossmann R. (1992) The existence of the world. Routledge, New York
Heil J. (2003) From an ontological point of view. Clarendon Press, Oxford
Hochberg H. (2004) Relations, properties and particulars. In: Hochberg H., Mulligan K. (eds) Relations and predicates. Ontos Verlag, Heusenstamm, pp 17–53
Labossiere M.C. (1993) Swapped tropes. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 74: 258–264
Maurin A.-S. (2002) If tropes. Kluwer, Dordrecht
Maurin A.-S. (2005) Same but different. Metaphysica 6(1): 129–146
Maurin, A.-S. (2007). Infinite regress: Virtue or vice? In T. Rønnow-Rasmussen, B. Petersson, J. Josefsson, & D. Egonsson (Eds.), Hommage à Wlodek, URL: http://www.fil.lu.se/hommageawlodek.
Maurin A.-S. (2009) A world of tropes. In: Vanderbeeken R. (eds) Worldviews, Science, and Us: Studies of Analytical Metaphysics. World Scientific Publishers, Brussels
McDaniel K. (2001) Tropes and ordinary physical objects. Philosophical Studies 104: 269–290. doi:10.1023/A:1010310503120
Molnar, G. (2003) Powers: A study in metaphysics edited by S. Mumford. Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Mormann T. (1995) Trope sheaves: A topological ontology of tropes. Logic and Logical Philosophy 3: 129–150
Mulligan K., Simons P., Smith B. (1984) Truth-makers. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 44(3): 287–321. doi:10.2307/2107686
Oddie G. (1982) Armstrong on the Eleatic principle and abstract entities. Philosophical Studies 41: 285–295. doi:10.1007/BF00354868
Plato. Sophist (1997). In J. M. Cooper (Ed.), Plato: Complete works (N. P. White, Trans.). Indianapolis: Hackett.
Priest G. (1987) In contradiction. Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht
Priest, G. (2007). Identity and difference: The structure of unity. Paper presented at the workshop Structure and Identity, Brussels, December
Russell, B. (1912). On the relations of universals and particulars. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 12, 1–24. (Reprinted in (1956), Logic and knowledge (pp. 105–124). London: Allen and Unwin.)
Simons P. (1992) Logical atomism and its ontological refinements: a defence. In: Mulligan K. (eds) Language, truth and ontology. Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht, pp 157–179
Simons P. (1994) Particulars in particular clothing: Three trope theories of substance. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54(3): 553–575. doi:10.2307/2108581
Simons P. (2000) Identity through time and trope bundles. Topoi 19(2): 147–155. doi:10.1023/A:1006485216998
Simons P. (2005) Negatives, numbers, and necessity: Some worries about Armstrong’s version of truthmaking. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 83(2): 253–261. doi:10.1080/00048400500111162
Smith B. (1999) Truthmaker realism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 77(3): 274–291. doi:10.1080/00048409912349041
Trettin K. (2004a) New literature on tropes. Metaphysica 1: 151–158
Trettin K. (2004b) Tropes and relations. In: Hochberg H., Mulligan K. (eds) Relations and predicates. Heusenstamm, Ontos Verlag, pp 203–217
Vallicella W.F. (2000) Three conceptions of states of affairs. Nous (Detroit, Mich.) 34(2): 237–259. doi:10.1111/0029-4624.00209
Vallicella W.F. (2002) Relations, monism, and the vindication of Bradley’s regress. Dialectica 56(1): 3–96
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Maurin, AS. Trope theory and the Bradley regress. Synthese 175, 311–326 (2010). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-009-9511-2
Received:
Accepted:
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-009-9511-2