Abstract
Computer simulations are an exciting tool that plays important roles in many scientific disciplines. This has attracted the attention of a number of philosophers of science. The main tenor in this literature is that computer simulations not only constitute interesting and powerful new science, but that they also raise a host of new philosophical issues. The protagonists in this debate claim no less than that simulations call into question our philosophical understanding of scientific ontology, the epistemology and semantics of models and theories, and the relation between experimentation and theorising, and submit that simulations demand a fundamentally new philosophy of science in many respects. The aim of this paper is to critically evaluate these claims. Our conclusion will be sober. We argue that these claims are overblown and that simulations, far from demanding a new metaphysics, epistemology, semantics and methodology, raise few if any new philosophical problems. The philosophical problems that do come up in connection with simulations are not specific to simulations and most of them are variants of problems that have been discussed in other contexts before.
Similar content being viewed by others
References
Black M. (1962) Models and archetypes. Models and metaphors: Studies in language and philosophy. Cornell University Press, Ithaca, NY, pp 219–243
Boumans M. (1999) Built-in justification. In: Morgan M., Morrison M. (eds) Models as mediators. CUP, Cambridge, pp 66–96
Cartwright N. (1983) How the laws of physics lie. Oxford University Press, Oxford
Cartwright N. (1999) The dappled world. CUP, Cambridge
Cartwright N. (2007) The vanity of rigour in economics: Theoretical models and Galileian experiments. Hunting causes and using them. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp 217–235
Edwards P. (2001) Representing the global atmosphere: Computer models, data, and knowledge about climate change. In: Miller C., Edwards P. (eds) Changing the atmosphere: Expert knowledge and environmental governance. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, pp 31–66
Fox Keller E. (2003) Models, simulation, and ’computer experiments.’ In: Radder H. (eds). The philosophy of scientific experimentation. University of Pittsburgh Press, Pittsburgh, pp 198–216
Frigg A., Frigg R., Hintermann B., Barg A., Valderrabano V. (2007) The biomechanical influence of tibio-talar containment on stability of the ankle joint. Journal of Knee Surgery, Sports Traumatology and Arthroscopy 15: 1355–1362
Frigg, R., & Hartmann, S. (2006, Spring). Models in science. In E. Zalta (Ed.), Stanford Encyclopedia of philosophy. Downloadable at: http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2006/entries/models-science.
Galison P. (1996) Computer simulation and the trading zone. In: Galison P., Stump D. (eds) Disunity of science: Boundaries, contexts, and power. Stanford University Press, California, pp 118–157
Guala F. (1998) Experiments as mediators in the non-laboratory sciences. Philosophica 62: 901–918
Guala F. (2005) The methodology of experimental economics. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
Hartley J., Hoover K., Salyer K. (1997) The limits of business cycle research: Assessing the real business cycle model. Oxford Review of Economic Policy 13(3): 34–54
Hartmann S. (1996) The world as a process: Simulation in the natural and social sciences. In: Hegselmann R., Müller U., Troitzsch K. (eds) Modelling and simulation in the social sciences from the philosophy of science point of view. Kluwer, Dordrecht, pp 77–100
Humphreys P. (1991) Computer simulations. Philosophy of Science PSA 19902: 497–506
Humphreys P. (1993) Numerical experimentation. In: Humphreys P. (eds) Patrick Suppes: Scientific philosopher (Vol 2). Kluwer, Dordrecht
Humphreys P. (1995) Computational science and scientific method. Mind and Machines 5: 499–512
Humphreys P. (2004) Extending ourselves: Computational science, empiricism, and scientific method. OUP, Oxford
Latour B. (1988) The pasteurisation of France. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA
Little D., (eds) (1995) On the reliability of economic models: Essays in the philosophy of economics. Kluwer, Dordrecht
Lucas R. (1982) Studies in business cycle theory. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA
Mäki U. (2005) Models are experiments, experiments are models. Journal of Economic Methodology 12(2): 303–315
Morgan M. (2003) Experiments without material intervention: Model experiments, virtual experiments, and virtually experiment. In: Radder H. (eds) The philosophy of scientific experimentation. University of Pittsburgh Press, Pittsburgh, PA, pp 216–235
Morgan M. (2004) Simulation: The birth of a technology to create “evidence” in economics. Revue d’Histoire des Sciences 57: 341–377
Morgan M. (2005) Experiments versus models: New phenomena, inference and surprise. Journal of Economic Methodology 12: 317–329
Morgan M., Morrison M. (1999) Models as mediating instruments. Models as mediators: Perspectives on natural and social science. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp 10–37
Morgan M., Morrison M. (1999) Models as mediators: Perspectives on natural and social science. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
Morton A. (1993) Mathematical models: Questions of trustworthiness. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 44: 659–674
Norton S., Suppe F. (2000) Why atmospheric modeling is good science. In: Miller C., Edwards P. (eds) Changing the atmosphere: Expert knowledge and environmental governance. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA
Reiss J. (2007) Error in economics: Towards a more evidence-based methodology. Routledge, London
Rohrlich, F. (1991). Computer simulation in the physical sciences. PSA 1990, II, 507–518.
Sismondo S. (1999) Models, simulations and their objects. Science in Context 12: 247–260
Smith P. (1998) Explaining chaos. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
Sorensen R. (1992) Thought experiments. Oxford University Press, Oxford
Srivastava N., Kaufman C., Müller G. (1990) Hamiltonian chaos. Computers in Physics 4(5): 549–553
Sterman J. (2006) Learning from evidence in a complex world. American Journal of Public Health 96(3): 505–514
Stöckler M. (2000) On modelling and simulations as instruments for the study of complex systems. In: Carrier M. (eds) Science at century’s end: Philosophical questions on the progress and limits of science. University of Pittsburgh Press, Pittsburgh
Sugden R. (2000) Credible worlds: The status of theoretical models in economics. Journal of Economic Methodology 7(1): 1–31
Winsberg, E. (1999, Summer). Sanctioning models: The epistemology of simulation. Science in Context.
Winsberg, E. (2001). Simulations, models, and theories: Complex physical systems and their representations. Philosophy of Science, 68(Proceedings), S442–S454.
Winsberg E. (2003) Simulated experiments: Methodology for a virtual world. Philosophy of Science 70: 105–125
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Additional information
An erratum to this article can be found at http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11229-009-9577-x
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Frigg, R., Reiss, J. The philosophy of simulation: hot new issues or same old stew?. Synthese 169, 593–613 (2009). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-008-9438-z
Received:
Accepted:
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-008-9438-z