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Sharing the Fruit of Labor: Flexible Application of Justice Principles in an Ultimatum Game with Joint-Production

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Abstract

Individuals often need to negotiate how to distribute jointly produced goods—equally (e.g., 50:50) or equitably (e.g., proportionally to their contributions). We examined whether people have stable preferences, or whether they switch between equality and equity in different situations. Pairs of anonymous participants first produced a common pie, and then distributed it in an ultimatum game. Results suggest that individuals apply different justice principles depending on their contribution. When they produced less than 50%, proposers divided the pie equally. However, when they produced more than 50%, their offers fell between equality and equity. Responders’ ratings of fairness and satisfaction varied similarly; with low production, equality was preferred, whereas with high production, equity was preferred. Nevertheless, equal and equitable offers were generally accepted, and only outright unfair offers were rejected. This suggests that individuals are relatively flexible about which justice principle should be applied, but punish proposers whose offers violate both principles.

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Notes

  1. There was no difference between the first and the second half of participants with regards to proposers’ offers and responders’ decisions and satisfaction ratings (all T’s < 1). Hence, this additional rating did not affect behavior.

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Acknowledgments

This study was supported by a Grant No. 105514-123671 from the European Science Foundation and the Swiss National Science Foundation and a Grant No. 230331 from the European Research Council. The study also received financial support from the Swiss National Centre of Competence in Research in the Affective Sciences, project No. 51NF40-128911.

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Correspondence to Benoit Bediou.

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Bediou, B., Sacharin, V., Hill, C. et al. Sharing the Fruit of Labor: Flexible Application of Justice Principles in an Ultimatum Game with Joint-Production. Soc Just Res 25, 25–40 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11211-012-0151-1

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