Abstract
This paper is the second of two parts and continues the conversation which had called for a shift in the conceptual focus of science education towards philosophy of education, with the requirement to develop a discipline-specific “philosophy” of science education. In Part I, conflicting conceptions of science literacy were identified with disparate “visions” tied to competing research programs as well as school-based curricular paradigms. The impasse in the goals of science education and thereto, the contending views of science literacy, were themselves associated with three underlying fundamental aims of education (knowledge-itself; personal development; socialization) which, it was argued, usually undercut the potential of each other. During periods of “crisis-talk” and throughout science educational history these three aims have repeatedly attempted to assert themselves. The inability of science education research to affect long-term change in classrooms was correlated not only to the failure to reach a consensus on the aims (due to competing programs and to the educational ideologies of their social groups), but especially to the failure of developing true educational theories (largely neglected since Hirst). Such theories, especially metatheories, could serve to reinforce science education’s growing sense of academic autonomy and independence from socio-economic demands. In Part II, I offer as a suggestion Egan’s cultural-linguistic theory as a metatheory to help resolve the impasse. I hope to make reformers familiar with his important ideas in general, and more specifically, to show how they can complement HPS rationales and reinforce the work of those researchers who have emphasized the value of narrative in learning science.
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Notes
This fact has not gone unnoticed, notably by Piaget in 1977 (quoted in Aldridge et al. 1992, p. 685): “The general problem is to understand why the vast array of educators now laboring throughout the entire world … does not engender an elite of researchers capable of making pedagogy into a discipline, at once scientific and alive, that could take its rightful place among all those applied disciplines that draw upon both art and science.”
The Standards documents in both America (American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS) 1993) and Canada (Council of Ministers of Education Canada 1997) make this explicit. Unlike in the U.S. the Canadian document has legislative force. Bybee and DeBoer (1994, p. 384) have concluded: “Scientific and technological literacy is the major purpose of K-12 science education. This purpose is for all students, not just for those destined for careers in science and engineering”. That science education should also be saddled with the added burden of trying to specify, teach and aim at “technological” literacy seems rather odd considering the debate that still revolves around “scientific” literacy. Unfortunately both terms are too often conflated whereas in some countries they are tied to separate courses (Layton 1993). And certainly while all parties may agree that science literacy is for all students, that slogan explains little, neither does it consider the fact that many students have no interest in science, nor does it contribute to resolving the quandary concerning criteria for content selection (Fensham 2000).
Roberts (2007) has provided a comprehensive review of the term (also noting the occasional conflation of scientific and technological literacy) including its increasing reference in handbooks and at science education research conferences worldwide.
Most importantly, his demolition of the two standard rationalizations of the common literacy conception—which Fensham (2002) acknowledges and terms the pragmatic and democratic arguments—effectively serves to undermine what has become the grounding assumptions of the STS literacy rationales.
The various Standards documents have sought to achieve a kind of ‘balance’ between these goals all-the-while feigning a consensus that is non-existent. And as stated in Part I, they run at cross-purposes according to Egan’s critique (see DeBoer (2000) for a list of nine competing goals). I would add, to square intrinsic aims (science for personal development, for aesthetic appreciation and cultural literacy of the value of science) with extrinsic utilitarian aims (socialization) is most difficult and probably unworkable since it is to square a deontologic with a teleologic, to seek something for its own good versus to seek it as utility for another end. We may seek to do this with aspects of our lives, but to attempt to establish curriculum and goals on these conflicting principles, especially in the confines of a real school schedule and practice seems destined to fail. Hence, the Standards documents taken alone seem to be engineering their probable curricular gridlock as a working project and attempted practical resolution in classrooms of the science literacy debacle (Roberts 2007; Fensham 2000; Rudolph 2000; Shamos 1995).
Long a popular advocate of the STS conception of literacy, Joan Solomon would now drop this word for what she calls “scientific culture”. Shamos alternatively would substitute science “literacy” with “awareness”. He does describe three kinds of science literacy, however, those of “cultural”, “functional” and “true”, all of which Roberts nonetheless locates in the “vision I” category.
Option two would also seem to allow for a two-tiered kind of science education system (along with its respective science literacy conception): allowing a school to choose a type of “vision I” for the science-bound student (traditionalism) but equally another stream for the general non-science student with its “vision II” focus on either cultural or technological literacy or social action—chosen as desired. Shamos has suggested something along these lines as a way to resolve the impasse. Roberts (p. 741) admits that although “this approach is at odds with the majority of the science education community” it is “a stark and forthright acknowledgement” the community must “somehow resolve the problems associated with educating two very different student groups (at least two)”.
“Increasingly it has been claimed that education is itself practice with its own internal rationality, mediated by tradition, which does not need to be informed by external theory from the “disciplines of education”, including philosophical value-theory, and that practical action should not be conceived on a technicist model of the application of high-level generalizations to particular cases” (Blake et al. 2003, p. 7).
“Stated boldly, the emerging thesis is that educational practices in classrooms are premised on a set of folk beliefs about learners’ minds, some of which may have worked advertently toward or inadvertently against the child’s own welfare” (Bruner 1996, p. 163).
This censure is meant to include those authors such as Thomas (1997) who when criticizing “grand theory” (he mentions Piaget, Chomsky and Habermas) as a “totalizing discourse” constructive of creativity and thought would opt instead for “ad hocery”, for practitioner’s reliance on “reflective thinking” and “craft knowledge” learned in situ. Although these are undoubtedly necessary, they are hardly sufficient.
He argues: “psychology has generated much knowledge that is properly of interest to education. Knowledge by itself is mute, however; it is made articulate by being organized into a theory … Knowledge about the psyche, about learning, development, motivation, or whatever, becomes psychologically articulate when organized by a psychological theory. The same knowledge may become educationally articulate only by being organized within an educational theory. This is not, I think, a trivial point. It means that apart from an educational theory no knowledge and no theory have educational implications. Even knowledge about constraints of our nature becomes educationally useful only when it has become incorporated within an educational theory … “ (1983, pp. 122–123). Hence, the controversial conclusion: “psychological theories at present have no implications for education” (p. 125).
Some may object here and argue that science education (and education in general for that matter), can be considered a mere “field of interest” upon which other disciplines have rightful bearing, and thus should not be considered a discipline in its own right. Hence, the argument has been ignored why education when being conceptualized primarily as a field of practice that it, at best, could rightfully accept an amalgam of theories from other disciplines, or use different theories for different purposes, such as ethical theories to define the ‘why’, and social and psychological sciences for the ‘what’, ‘when’, etc. This position ignores both the logical and historical reasons why there are separate disciplines. Disciplinary theories frame the kinds of questions and answers relevant to them: using a psychological theory to guide your questions will get you psychological answers; if you use a theory from sociology, you get sociological answers, etc. Disciplines (surely) are basically imprecise methodologies for answering certain kinds of questions. Even if education is only a “field of interest”, you need questions, methods, and answers appropriate to that field of interest. The record of ignoring the distinctiveness of education in research does not give grounds for confidence that this is serving us well. Calling education a “field of interest” does not prevent one forming a “high level theory” about it—as long as that theory is appropriate to the nature of the phenomenon, and can guide one into asking appropriate educational questions, and suggesting possible answers, about the phenomena.
His (2005b) An Imaginative Approach to Teaching, presents several useful frameworks which illustrate how this metatheory can be applied to curriculum and practice for different subject topics and themes. This book, along with the continuing research of the Centre for Imaginative Education (IERG), has brought his ideas to bear in fruitful ways in a number of diverse cultural classrooms around the globe, being applied from primary to tertiary education. My discussion will focus solely on his high-level theory in The Educated Mind, and the reader is referred to his (2005b) and encouraged to visit the ierg-website (www.ierg.net) for related information about theoretical applications for teacher classroom use.
He writes that an educational metatheory “shows how to realize in individuals a certain conception of education. Without some such conception, all the research findings in the world are educationally blind, and with such a conception, it is unclear what research findings have to offer” (2002, p. 181).
This does not necessarily force a complete separation between the two disciplines but it certainly appears to further widen the gap between psychological theories and educational practice.
“Piaget … is not interested in those concepts which occur “artificially” as a result of instruction, but rather in those concepts which develop spontaneously or naturally as a result of normal interactions with the environment. He is interested in what happens of necessity in the development of cognition. An educational theory is concerned with making value choices among a variety of possibilities. One does not choose to do what is necessary. … it makes no sense to try to teach concepts which develop naturally” (Egan 1983, p. 16; original italics).
“We have suffered from tenuous inferences drawn from insecure psychological theories for generations now, without obvious benefit” (Egan 2002, pp. 100–101).
Howard Gardner has also come to this realization: “The category of “natural development” is a fiction; social and cultural factors intervene from the first and become increasingly powerful well before any formal matriculation at school … Once the child reaches the age of six or seven, however, the influence of the culture—whether or not it is manifested in a school setting—has become so pervasive that one has difficulty envisioning what development could be like in the absence of cultural supports and constraints” (1991, p. 105).
See his (1997, p. 30). Bakhurst (pp. 413–414) writes: “Those that invoke the slogans that the mind is “constructed,” “distributed,” “relational,” “situated,” or “socially constituted” to maintain that culture is in some sense constitutive of mind, and that therefore the nature and content of an individual’s mental life cannot be understood independently of the culture of which that individual is apart. Strong culturalism can take various, more or less radical forms … [it] starts from the old intuition that reductionism (or eliminativism) about the mental leaves out something crucial … the missing ingredient is not primarily consciousness or phenomenology, but the sociocultural context of mind. Two intuitions lie behind this claim. [Firstly] that meaning is the medium of the mental, and meaning is … a social phenomenon. [Secondly] … the human mind, and the forms of talk … should be understood on the model of tools; and like all artifacts, we cannot make sense of them independently of the social processes that make them what they are.”
“What the imagination can grasp is enabled and constrained by the logic inherent in the various forms of knowledge and by the psychologic inherent in the process of human development. So the dynamic of this scheme is a troika of generative imagination guided and constrained by epistemological and psychological forces” (1997, p. 189).
Egan has focused to a greater extent on the mental effects due to the advanced stages of literacy, especially as displayed by human culture in the relatively recent past, the last 5000 years or so, above all regarding changes to Greek society and thought. The “romantic” stage can also be seen as forming a transition between mythic and theoretic, while “ironic” is that end stage where “language becomes aware of itself” and its own limitations. For the latter, Egan’s archetypes are, in ancient times Socrates, and in modern times Kierkegaard and Nietzsche. He distinguishes a positive “sophisticated irony” which can manage doubt while preserving aspects of mythic, romantic and philosophic stages, from an “alienating irony” of the typical postmodernist sort—it yields instead to radical epistemic doubt, to rejection and dismissal of the other understandings. “The product of alienating irony is impotence; sophisticated irony is liberating and empowering. The aim of educational theory is to keep alive as much as possible of the earlier kinds of understanding in the development of irony” (1997, p. 162).
Egan is careful to distance himself from the two earlier and unsuccessful versions of recapitulation: the logical one which insisted a particular cultural (knowledge) content must be followed (Herbert Spencer), or the notorious psychological development version with its biological basis, and now discredited (once supported but later repudiated by Dewey and Piaget). See Langer (1988). Egan’s reference is strictly to socio-cognitive tools as invented in human cultural history.
“Intellectual tools, or sign systems, begin, to use Vygotsky’s terms, as interpsychic processes and become intrapsychic within the child” (ibid., p. 29).
This is exactly what Egan laments about contemporary education, along with the well-intentioned but misguided practice of using unsuitable psychological theories when transmitting ‘inert’ knowledge, and all the while hoping to juggle three conflicting goals.
And the newer explanatory cures offered by studies in neuroscience on the so-called “adolescent brain” while suggesting some physiological constraints hardly addresses the issue of their development of mind (Kwan and Lawson 2000). This is once again to defer to a reductive empiricist notion of mind, possibly organismic.
It also formed part of the later critiques by Lawrence Cremin and Paul Hurd at the time of the 1960s scientist-based curricular reforms (Bybee and DeBoer 1994), but to no avail.
“A narrative is a continuous account of a series of events or facts that shapes them into an emotionally satisfactory whole. It has in common with a story that shaping of emotion, and so words are often used synonymously, but it is different in that narratives can be less precisely tied into a tight story, less concerned with emotion, more varied, more open, more complex” (2005b, p. 99).
As examples, Ptolemaic or Keplerian astronomy; Newtonian or Einsteinian physics; phlogiston or Lavoisier’s chemistry; young-earth theories or evolutionary geology, etc.; For those researchers who now argue for the value of stressing model-based reasoning, the particular limits and defects of the respective models of such theories become sharp. Such instances can serve as an effective teaching strategy to help students discover how knowledge can progress, and thus illuminate for them the precarious nature of how science actually advances—along a “paradigm shift” (Kuhn) or along the lines of progressing or degenerating “research programmes” (Lakatos). Alas, conventional instruction rarely elucidates the conceptual structure of even the successful, dominating theory/paradigm (Newton; Darwin; early quantum theory), and even less so does it take sufficient time, if at all, to study the fascinating historical examples of how science deals with cases of competing theories. Where historical development is mentioned, that only too often borders on myth, as many HPS researchers have long complained about (see Allchin 2003).
One avoids the term ‘growth’ here because it is tainted with Dewey’s preconceptions and tied to a biologized view of mind.
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Schulz, R.M. Reforming Science Education: Part II. Utilizing Kieran Egan’s Educational Metatheory. Sci & Educ 18, 251–273 (2009). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11191-008-9168-0
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11191-008-9168-0