Abstract
This paper develops a formal model to examine the effect of changing market conditions and individuals’ selling constraints on selling price and time-on-market. Using the concept of Relative Liquidity Constraint (RLC)—a stochastic variable that captures the randomness of future individual constraints and market conditions—the study presents the first ex ante analysis that extends the investigation of the issue of seller heterogeneity to the point of the buying decision, that is, from the perspective of the buyer’s (future seller’s) point of view. We show that seller constraint, as well as the uncertainty of such a constraint, significantly depresses the expected selling price and increases risk. Our closed-form formulas provide a set of simple quantitative tools that enable buyers and sellers to adjust the “market average” to their ex ante “individual expectations”.
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Notes
We thank an anonymous referee for his knowledgeable insight that directed our attention to the studies cited in this paragraph.
Of course, in some cases, once a property is placed on the market and an investor has received insufficient interest given her motivation to sell, she may revise her listing price downward based upon a revised perspective of the underlying bid distribution. In addition, in a recent paper Cheng, Lin and Liu (2008) also adopt this assumption to study a model of time-on-market and real estate price under sequential search with recall.
Early studies in labor economics literature often rely on this assumption (e.g. Stigler (1962), Whipple (1973) and Barron (1975)), and it has been extensively applied to the real estate market since the 1980s (e.g. Yinger (1981), Read (1988), Quan and Quigley (1991), Yavas (1992), Arnold (1999), Lin and Vandell (2007)).
In fact, our essential results would hold under a wide variety of more complex distribution function assumptions.
In certain circumstances, it is well recognized that potential buyers can get into a “bidding war” in which they bid a price above the asking price; however, this happens rarely and only when the market is exceptionally “hot” or a property is dramatically underpriced. Based on the data from the National Association of Realtors, Green and Vandell (1998) find that such a situation occurs in about five percent of transactions.
Statistics principles state that the exponential distribution occurs naturally when describing the lengths of the inter-arrival times in a homogeneous Poisson process.
In this paper, we use the term “unconstrained sellers” interchangeably with the term “typical sellers” or “normal sellers”. An “unconstrained seller” is “typically” or “normally” constrained. Thus a “constrained seller” is one who is subject to higher-than-normal constraints.
The conditional variance formula for any two stochastic variables of x and y is \({\text{Var}}\left( {x_y } \right) = E\left[ {{\text{Var}}\left( {x_y \left| y \right.} \right)} \right] + {\text{Var}}\left( {E\left[ {x_y \left| y \right.} \right]} \right)\). See Ross (2002), p 379.
A formal analysis of this observation can be found in Appendix 2.
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Acknowledgements
We wish to thank editor James Kau, two anonymous referees at the Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, David Beltran-del-Rio and Paul Obrecht at Fannie Mae for their insightful comments and suggetions. All errors remain our own. The views expressed in this article are our own and do not necessarily represent the views of the authors affiliated organizations.
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Appendices
Appendix 1
One potential difficulty with application of Theorem 1 and 2 is that the time series return data, when broken down to sub-periods of different market conditions (Good, Bad, and Normal), are not long enough to estimate \(u_\tau \), \(\sigma _\tau \) for each sub-period when the holding period is long. One way to get around this problem is to use the common assumptions on holding-period return and risk: \(u_\tau = \tau u\) and \(\sigma _\tau = \tau \sigma ^2 \), where τ is the total holding period until sale; u and σ 2 are the single holding-period expected return and variance, respectively. Then we can rewrite Eqs. 20 and 21 as follows:
Therefore, the average return and volatility per period can be expressed:
The above two formula can be used to compute Table 1 with an assumed holding-period (5 years in our demonstration).
Similarly, from Eqs. 27 and 29 we can readily obtain:
The average return and volatility per period can thus be written as:
The above two formula can be used to compute Table 2 with an assumed holding-period of 5 years.
Appendix 2
For demonstration purposes, we consider Scenario 3, where T max < NST and the allowable expected TOM is a uniform distribution over [T min, T max]. From Eq. 23, we have:
As we know, the “corresponding” allowable expected TOM in Table 2 is equal to \(\frac{{T_{\min } + T_{\max } }}{2}\), which is deterministic. As a result:
Since:
From Eqs. 23′ and 51, we thus have:
Equation 52 together with Theorems 1 and 2 suggest that the expected returns under uncertain \(\tilde L\) are less than those with certain L even though the mean of “Possible distribution of expected TOM” in Table 2 is the same as the “Seller expected TOM” in Table 1, which is in fact consistent with the results in Tables 1 and 2.
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Cheng, P., Lin, Z. & Liu, Y. Home Price, Time-on-Market, and Seller Heterogeneity Under Changing Market Conditions. J Real Estate Finan Econ 41, 272–293 (2010). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11146-009-9167-1
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11146-009-9167-1