Abstract
Using data of contested decisions in the Council of the European Union, combined with data on the position of member states on the left-right and support for European integration dimensions, this paper provides an overview of winning coalitions formed in the council in the 1998 to 2004 time span. It shows distance between the combined policy positions of winning coalitions to individual EU states within these coalitions and demonstrates that most winning coalitions in the Council have a large combined voting weight, minimal winning coalitions are rare, and ideological connectedness plays a much smaller role than expected.
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van Roozendaal, P., Hosli, M.O. & Heetman, C. Coalition formation on major policy dimensions: The Council of the European Union 1998 to 2004. Public Choice 153, 447–467 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-011-9802-2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-011-9802-2